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Abstract
This thesis concerns the analysis of the unconditional security of quantum cryptographic
protocols using convex optimization techniques. It is divided into the study of coin-flipping
and oblivious transfer. We first examine a family of coin-flipping protocols. Almost all of
the handful of explicitly described coin-flipping protocols are based on bit-commitment. To
explore the possibility of finding explicit optimal or near-optimal protocols, we focus on a
class which generalizes such protocols. We call these BCCF-protocols, for bit-commitment
based coin-flipping. We use the semidefinite programming (SDP) formulation of cheating
strategies along the lines of Kitaev to analyze the structure of the protocols.
In the first part of the thesis, we show how these semidefinite programs can be used
to simplify the analysis of the protocol. In particular, we show that a particular set of
cheating strategies contains an optimal strategy. This reduces the problem to optimizing a
linear combination of fidelity functions over a polytope which has several benefits. First, it
allows one to model cheating probabilities using a simpler class of optimization problems
known as second-order cone programs (SOCPs). Second, it helps with the construction of
point games due to Kitaev as described in Mochon’s work. Point games were developed to
give a new perspective for studying quantum protocols. In some sense, the notion of point
games is dual to the notion of protocols.
There has been increased research activity in optimization concerning generalizing the-
ory and algorithms for linear programming to much wider classes of optimization problems
such as semidefinite programming. For example, semidefinite programming provides a
tool for potentially improving results based on linear programming or investigating old
problems that have eluded analysis by linear programming. In this sense, the history of
semidefinite programming is very similar to the history of quantum computation. Quan-
tum computing gives a generalized model of computation to tackle new and old problems,
improving on and generalizing older classical techniques. Indeed, there are striking dif-
ferences between linear programming and semidefinite programming as there are between
classical and quantum computation. In this thesis, we strengthen this analogy by studying
a family of classical coin-flipping protocols based on classical bit-commitment. Cheating
strategies for these “classical BCCF-protocols” can be formulated as linear programs (LPs)
which are closely related to the semidefinite programs for the quantum version. In fact,
we can construct point games for the classical protocols as well using the analysis for the
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quantum case. The intricate relationship between the semidefinite programming quantum
protocol analysis and the linear programming classical protocol analysis is depicted in the
figure below.
Figure 1: Relationship between classical and quantum BCCF-protocols and their point
games. F.R. denotes “feasible region.”
Using point games, we prove that every classical BCCF-protocol allows exactly one
of the parties to entirely determine the outcome. Also, we rederive Kitaev’s lower bound
to show that only “classical” protocols can saturate Kitaev’s analysis. Moreover, if the
product of Alice and Bob’s optimal cheating probabilities is 1/2, then at least one party
can cheat with probability 1.
The second part concerns the design of an algorithm to search for BCCF-protocols
with small bias. Most coin-flipping protocols with more than three rounds have eluded
direct analysis. To better understand the properties of optimal BCCF-protocols with four
or more rounds, we turn to computational experiments. We design a computational opti-
mization approach to search for the best protocol based on the semidefinite programming
formulations of cheating strategies. We create a protocol filter using cheating strategies,
some of which build upon known strategies and others are based on convex optimization
and linear algebra. The protocol filter efficiently eliminates candidate protocols with too
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high a bias. Using this protocol filter and symmetry arguments, we perform searches in a
matter of days that would have otherwise taken millions of years. Our experiments checked
1016 four and six round BCCF-protocols and suggest that the optimal bias is 1/4.
The third part examines the relationship between oblivious transfer, bit-commitment,
and coin-flipping. We consider oblivious transfer which succeeds with probability 1 when
the two parties are honest and construct a simple protocol with security provably better
than any classical protocol. We also derive a lower bound by constructing a bit-commitment
protocol from an oblivious transfer protocol. Known lower bounds for bit-commitment then
lead to a constant lower bound on the bias of oblivious transfer. Finally, we show that
it is possible to use Kitaev’s semidefinite programming formulation of cheating strategies
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This thesis is comprised of the work I have done on quantum coin-flipping and quantum
oblivious transfer. My work on quantum coin-flipping, the content of Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3, was done with my supervisors Ashwin Nayak and Levent Tunçel and my work
on quantum oblivious transfer was done with Iordanis Kerenidis and André Chailloux.
We start with an overview of the problems and proof techniques examined in this thesis
and a brief history of quantum cryptography. We then provide the necessary background
on linear algebra, quantum information, semidefinite programming, formal definitions of
cryptographic primitives, and quantum protocols in Section 1.4.
1.1 Overview
In this thesis, we use optimization techniques to give a detailed analysis of a family of quan-
tum bit-commitment based coin-flipping protocols, which we call BCCF-protocols. After
defining the protocols, we formulate cheating strategies for both parties as semidefinite
programs (abbreviated as SDP, discussed in Subsection 1.4.4). These SDPs fully represent
cheating in the protocol, that is, there is a direct connection between feasible solutions of
the SDP and cheating strategies in the protocol. Moreover, the objective function is the
success probability of the corresponding cheating strategy. This transforms the problem of
analyzing cheating in the coin-flipping protocol into analyzing optimization problems.
Duality theory is the backbone of semidefinite programming and can often provide a
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new perspective. This is the case with the cheating SDPs of coin-flipping protocols as
Kitaev used the duals of the cheating SDPs to derive the first constant lower bound on the
bias of coin-flipping protocols. Moreover, he used these dual SDPs and other notions from
convex analysis to construct “point games.” We similarly use dual SDPs to construct a
family of point games and show their correspondence with BCCF-protocols. This illustrates
Kitaev’s ideas of how protocols and “point games” are dual notions.
We then repeat the same analysis for a family of “classical” BCCF-protocols. Since
these rely on classical messages and calculations, we are able to model cheating strategies as
linear programs. It turns out that the linear programs for the classical cheating strategies
and the semidefinite programs for the quantum strategies are very closely related. In
fact, there are close connections not only between the cheating strategy formulations, but
throughout the whole process of constructing the point games, as illustrated in the figure
below.
Figure 1.1: Quantum-classical connections between protocols and point games.
This figure illustrates the fact that the generalization of classical to quantum informa-
tion is analogous to the generalization of linear programming to semidefinite programming.
Using point games, we prove that at least one party can cheat perfectly in every classical
BCCF-protocol and that this result extends to the quantum case. Further analysis shows
2
that exactly one party can cheat perfectly. We then rederive Kitaev’s lower bound to prove
that if this lower bound is saturated, then the cheating probabilities are the same as in the




Unfortunately, finding closed-form expressions for the optimal values of these SDPs
is a very difficult problem. We therefore study the structure of the SDPs to design a
search algorithm to find the best choice of protocol parameters to minimize cheating.
In terms of optimization theory, we are seeking data for which these SDPs have small
optimal values. By restricting the feasible region of the cheating SDPs, we reveal hidden
convex structure leading to “near-optimal solutions.” These near-optimal solutions are in
fact near-optimal cheating strategies whose success probabilities approximate the optimal
cheating probabilities. This helps to reveal some structure in these highly interactive
protocols which generalizes the analysis in previous work. By exploiting these near-optimal
cheating strategies, we are able to search over 1016 protocols to approximate the best
parameters that minimize cheating. Without these strategies and other heuristics, this
search would take millions of years.
Concerning the analysis of oblivious transfer, we first make connections between it
and bit-commitment. Using known protocols and lower bounds for bit-commitment, we
construct a protocol and derive lower bounds for oblivious transfer. We then make the
connection between a “forcing” variant of oblivious transfer and coin-flipping. In particular,
we show how similar cheating SDPs are involved and can be used to derive bounds on the
bias.
1.2 An overview of the use of optimization techniques
in quantum literature
Semidefinite programming gained popularity in the 1990s after Goemans and Williamson
discovered how to use semidefinite programming to significantly improve the worst-case
approximation ratio of heuristic algorithms for the MAX-CUT problem [GW95]. This
further illustrated the use of semidefinite programming as a theoretical tool for analyzing
important problems in combinatorics and other areas of mathematics and computer science.
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We give a quick glimpse of some of the areas of quantum computation that have benefited
from using SDPs and related topics from optimization theory.
Quantum information
One of the oldest uses of convex optimization techniques in quantum information is
finding optimal measurements [Hol73b, YKL75], see also [Hel69, EMV03]. The first two
papers predate the advent of semidefinite programming by over a decade, making this
result quite remarkable. The ideas in these papers have many applications, from the hid-
den subgroup problem [Ip03, BCvD05, BCvD06] to quantum cryptography (see [Amb01],
[KN04], [CKS10], [CK11], etc). In fact, discriminating between two quantum states is one
of the central themes in this thesis.
Some related problems are unambiguous state discrimination [ESH04], distinguishing
between convex sets of states [GW05], quantum channel discrimination [Sac05, PW09],
and quantum strategy discrimination [Gut09, Gut10].
Another central theme in this thesis is the “closeness” of two quantum states or proba-
bility vectors as measured by the fidelity function (see Section 1.4.3). Along with studying
norms useful for quantum channel discrimination, Watrous [Wat09] analyzed the fidelity
function using semidefinite programming and showed that Uhlmann’s and Alberti’s char-
acterizations of the fidelity function are “dual” to each other. We provide a similar analysis
for the fidelity function over probability vectors in Subsection 1.4.7.
Computational complexity theory
Computational complexity theory is the study of classifying how difficult certain prob-
lems are to solve. It turns out that algorithms to approximate the optimal values of
semidefinite programs have been incredibly useful in the study of quantum computational
complexity theory, see [KW00] for an early example. In recent work, the matrix multiplica-
tive weights update method for approximating the optimal value of an SDP was used by
Jain, Ji, Upadhyay, and Watrous [JJUW11] to prove that the complexity class known as
QIP (for quantum interactive proof systems) is equivalent to the complexity class known
as PSPACE (problems that can be decided using a polynomial amount of space).
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Also, using product theorems for semidefinite programming and other convex opti-
mization problems, one can show that certain complexity classes admit perfect parallel
repetition [MS07, Gut09, GSU11]. Roughly speaking, perfect parallel repetition is when
two games are played simultaneously, then one cannot entangle strategies such to increase
the maximum probability of winning both games. This can be used to improve the error
bounds in the proof systems.
Query complexity
Query complexity is the study of determining how many queries are needed to ascertain
a value of a certain black-box function f , such as the XOR of n bits. Duality theory of
semidefinite programming has been used to show that many quantum adversary methods
are equivalent [SS06]. The proof relies on showing that the adversary methods considered
are equivalent to either the semidefinite version of minimax, or another semidefinite pro-
gram that turns out to be its dual. Showing that the optimal values of these two SDPs
are equal yields the result.
Recently, it has been shown by Reichardt [Rei09] that the query complexity of a Boolean
function can be captured by the general adversary bound, and this bound is given by the
optimal value of an SDP. This SDP can be modified to yield a norm used in the study
of state conversion [LMR+11]. Semidefinite programming appears in numerous papers on
query complexity, see for example [BSS03, HLS07, LR11] and the references therein.
Linear optical quantum gates
A task that was thought impossible was to perform a two-qubit entangling gate in a
photonic quantum computer. Indeed, a DiVincenzo criterion [DiV00] is that one needs two-
qubit entangling gates to perform circuit-based quantum computation. Knill, Laflamme,
and Milburn discovered a way to perform a two-qubit entangling gate using the non-linear
sign shift gate (NLS gate), which in turn can be used to implement a controlled-Z gate. The
NLS gate cannot be perfectly implemented using quantum mechanics, however it can be
implemented in a probabilistic way using post-selection. The proposal of Knill, Laflamme,
and Milburn implements this gate with probability 1/4.
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The theory of convex optimization can be applied to finding the maximum success prob-
ability of implementing such gates under certain restrictions, as shown by Eisert [Eis05].
That is, by fixing several parameters, the problem becomes a convex optimization prob-
lem. What is different from many other optimization problems in quantum literature is
that those in Eisert’s paper are second-order cone programs (discussed in Subsection 1.4.4),
although these were treated as SDPs. This paper is one of the few instances of a second-
order cone program arising in a quantum setting.
Cryptography
We now give a brief overview of how SDPs and convex analysis have been used to
tackle similar problems to those in this thesis. Firstly, Kitaev formalized a way to study
the cheating strategies of quantum coin-flipping protocols using semidefinite programming.
Using this, he developed point games which also use other ideas from convex analysis such
as analyzing the cone of operator monotone functions and the duality of convex sets (see
Subsection 1.4.2). We give an overview of Kitaev’s ideas in Subsection 1.4.6.
Using SDP formulations of cheating strategies, Mochon studied a few different families
of weak coin-flipping protocols [Moc04, Moc05]. He studied protocols based on public-
coins, which are similar to the bit-commitment based protocols in this thesis. He was
able to find optimal primal and dual solutions to the cheating SDPs, which for the first
time gave a description of optimal cheating strategies for such highly interactive protocols.
Then, using the convexity of optimal parameters, he was able to show a lower bound on
the bias of the entire family of protocols (which could be approached as the number of
messages grows large).
The goal in Chapters 2 and 3 is to analyze a family of quantum coin-flipping protocols
using SDP techniques in the same manner as Mochon did for his family of protocols.
1.3 A brief history of quantum cryptography
Quantum cryptography dates back to the work of Wiesner in his seminal paper “Conju-
gate coding” [Wie83]. Written around 1970, the concepts were so new that it took until
1983 to get published. Among other things, this paper provides “a means for transmit-
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ting two messages either but not both of which may be received,” which Wiesner called
multiplexing. This task now goes by the name 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer which is one
of the cryptographic primitives examined in this thesis. His idea was for the sender, call
her Alice, to use a light pipe as the communication channel and have messages encoded as
certain polarizations. Then the receiver, call him Bob, would measure the messages as he
received them in a way that depends on the message he wants to receive. This approach is
secure in practice (assuming the limitations of current technology) but, as Wiesner pointed
out, is insecure in principle since an all-powerful Bob could decode both messages. This
work was the beginning of quantum cryptography.
After hearing about Wiesner’s work, Bennett and Brassard used similar ideas to those
in Wiesner’s paper to present a quantum key distribution scheme which is unconditionally
secure, or information theoretically secure, against an eavesdropper [BB84], (see also [LC99,
PS00, May01]). That is, a computationally unbounded eavesdropper can obtain very little
information about the key. This is opposed to the security analyses based on computational
assumptions such as the hardness of factoring or finding discrete logarithms. In 1984, many
classical protocols for oblivious transfer and coin-flipping were based on, e.g., the hardness
of factoring. However, many of these cryptosystems turn out to be vulnerable to quantum
attacks using Shor’s algorithm [Sho94]. This makes the unconditional security which can
be promised by quantum mechanics more attractive since it does not rely on yet unproven
computational conjectures.
In Bennett and Brassard’s key distribution scheme, they also use messages being po-
larizations of light in such a way that if an eavesdropper tampered with the message, then
Alice and Bob would be alerted and could abort the protocol. In the same paper, they
present a coin-flipping protocol that follows in the same manner as their key distribution
scheme. Roughly speaking, coin-flipping is the cryptographic task of two mistrustful parties
generating a random bit over a communication channel. Much like Wiesner’s multiplexing
protocol, Bennett and Brassard’s coin-flipping protocol is secure in practice, however in-
secure in principle. The work presented in these two seminal papers opened up many new
problems in quantum cryptography such as authentication [BG89], the bounded storage
model [DFSS08], and the problems addressed in this thesis. In particular, we are inter-
ested in finding the attainable levels of information theoretic security of coin-flipping and
oblivious transfer protocols.
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Quantum coin-flipping and quantum bit-commitment
Coin-flipping was introduced by Blum [Blu81] as a way for two parties to “flip a coin
by telephone.” Consider the scenario where Alice and Bob are settling a divorce and need
to decide who keeps the TV. They decide to settle this over the telephone, as they despise
seeing each other, in the following way: Alice flips a coin and only if Bob is able to guess
the value can he have the TV. The problem here is that Alice can cheat by telling Bob
that his guess is wrong, even if it is not. Ideally, we would like a method such that neither
Alice nor Bob can control the outcome. Unfortunately, this is impossible using classical
information (assuming Alice and Bob are computationally all-powerful) since game theory
tells us that at least one of them has a strategy that ensures a certain win. This motivates
the use of quantum information when designing coin-flipping protocols.
Quantum coin-flipping is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, it is important in quan-
tum cryptography being a task known as a primitive. Primitives are simple cryptographic
tasks which are used as building blocks for larger, more elaborate protocols. For this
reason, it is important to understand the attainable levels of security of such primitives,
since it could affect the security of the larger protocol. Secondly, it is interesting from a
general quantum computational standpoint: If we start with Alice and Bob sharing no
entanglement, then how could they create an EPR (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) state shared
between them if Alice and Bob suspect the other of cheating? Cheating can be viewed as
trying to bias the amplitudes of the supposed EPR state, and we wish to design protocols
such that the resulting state is as close to maximally entangled as possible.
To discuss the security of a coin-flipping protocol, we define the bias, denoted as ε, as
the maximum of:
• Pr[Alice can force Bob to accept a desired outcome (without Bob aborting)]− 1/2,
• Pr[Bob can force Alice to accept a desired outcome (without Alice aborting)]− 1/2.
Aharonov, Ta-Shma, Vazirani, and Yao [ATVY00] first showed the existence of a coin-
flipping protocol with bias ε = 0.4143 < 1/2 proving that quantum information can guar-
antee a level of security provably better than any classical protocol. Roughly speaking, the
protocol proceeds as follows:
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• Alice chooses a ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random and encodes it into a quantum state.
Alice sends this state to Bob.
• Bob then responds to Alice with a guess for the value of a.
• Alice then sends a and a description of the quantum state to Bob. He measures to
check if the state received is in the state claimed by Alice. If so, Bob’s guess being
right or wrong determines the outcome of the protocol.
If Alice wants to cheat, then she must avoid detection by Bob and if Bob wants to cheat,
then he must be able to learn the value of a early. By choosing the encoding quantum states
in a smart way, it can be the case that neither Alice nor Bob can completely control the
outcome, even if they are not computationally bounded. Ambainis [Amb01] and Spekkens
and Rudolph [SR01] showed better choices of states such that the bias lowers to ε = 1/4,
see also [NS03], [KN04]. As for lower bounds, Lo and Chau [LC97], showed that ideal
coin-flipping is impossible, i.e., a bias of ε = 0 is impossible. In 2002, Kitaev [Kit02] used
a formulation of cheating strategies as semidefinite programs to prove that the product
of Alice and Bob’s cheating probabilities is at least 1/2, showing that the bias satisfies
ε ≥ 1/
√
2− 1/2 ≈ 0.207 for every protocol. Another proof of this lower bound was given
by Gutoski and Watrous [GW07] using a different representation of quantum strategies.
The problem of finding the optimal bias was resolved by Chailloux and Kerenidis [CK09]
who showed the existence of protocols with bias ε < 1/
√
2 − 1/2 + δ for any δ > 0.
The protocols they present rely only on classical messages and a related primitive known
as quantum weak coin-flipping.
The version of coin-flipping discussed thus far is called strong coin-flipping. Weak coin-
flipping is when Alice and Bob desire opposing outcomes and therefore we can view this
primitive as having a winner and a loser. This primitive is well-suited for situations when
Alice and Bob favour opposite outcomes, such as playing a game or settling a divorce.
As for security, we can define the bias, denoted εWCF, in the same way, except Alice and
Bob would only try to force specific outcomes. From this definition, weak coin-flipping
protocols could have smaller biases than strong coin-flipping protocols. Indeed, Spekkens
and Rudolph [SR02] presented a simple protocol for weak coin-flipping which has bias
εWCF = 1/
√
2 − 1/2 ≈ 0.207 already matching Kitaev’s lower bound for strong coin-
flipping. Mochon [Moc04, Moc05] improved on the ideas in [SR02] to find protocols with
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biases of εWCF = 0.192 and approaching εWCF = 1/6, respectively. One of the reasons
these protocols are able to surpass Kitaev’s lower bound is that they have stronger cheat
detection steps: only the “winner” gets tested for cheating. The best known lower bound
for weak coin-flipping is by Ambainis [Amb01] who showed that a protocol with bias εWCF
must use Ω(log log(1/εWCF)) rounds of communication. Then, in a breakthrough result,
Mochon [Moc07] showed the existence of weak coin-flipping protocols with bias εWCF < δ
for any δ > 0 using a development of Kitaev’s called point games.
Point games were developed by Kitaev as a new perspective for studying coin-flipping
protocols. Roughly speaking, a point game is a sequence
p0 → p1 → · · · → pn,
where each pi is a probability distribution over finitely many points in R2+. Using his SDP
formulation of cheating strategies in coin-flipping protocols, Kitaev found rules determining
valid moves (or transitions) from pi to pi+1 (more on this in Section 1.4.6). Let P
∗
B,1 be the
optimal probability Bob can force honest Alice to accept outcome 1 and let P ∗A,0 be the
optimal probability Alice can force honest Bob to accept outcome 0. Then for any protocol
and for any δ > 0, there exists a point game satisfying:
• p0 has two points (0, 1) and (1, 0), each having probability 1/2,
• pn has one point (P ∗B,1 + δ, P ∗A,0 + δ),
• pi → pi+1 is a “valid move,” for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}.
What is surprising is that the converse is also true. If there is a point game of the form:
• p0 has two points (0, 1) and (1, 0), each having probability 1/2,
• pn has one point (ζB, ζA),
• pi → pi+1 is a “valid move,” for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1},
then for any δ > 0, there exists a weak coin-flipping protocol with P ∗B,1 ≤ ζB +δ and P ∗A,0 ≤
ζA +δ. Using this new machinery, Mochon [Moc07] was able to prove the existence of point
games with final point being arbitrarily close to (1/2, 1/2) proving the existence of weak
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coin-flipping protocols with arbitrarily small bias. However, the reverse mapping from some
point games to the description of a protocol is very difficult. No one has conducted this
mapping for Mochon’s optimal point game. The problem remains of explicitly constructing
such optimal weak coin-flipping protocols and, therefore, any protocols that rely on them,
such as optimal protocols for strong coin-flipping and bit-commitment.
Bit-commitment is a cryptographic primitive closely related to coin-flipping. Roughly
speaking, bit-commitment is the task of Alice sending an encoding of a random bit a to
Bob such that:
• The encoding ‘hides’ the value of a from Bob, and ‘binds’ Alice to the value a,
• Alice can reveal a and Bob can then check that the revealed bit is consistent with
the encoding.
We can also define the bias of a bit-commitment protocol, denoted εBC, as the maximum
of:





Pr[Alice reveals a = c without Bob aborting]− 1/2.
The history of quantum bit-commitment is closely related to quantum coin-flipping with
the first example being the coin-flipping protocol in [BB84]. Moreover, most of the strong
coin-flipping protocols previously mentioned are bit-commitment protocols with an added
message from Bob who sends Alice his guess of a before Alice reveals it; the coin-flip
being the correctness of Bob’s guess. In this case, the bias of the bit-commitment protocol
is the same as the bias of the coin-flipping protocol. This is the form of the protocols
in [BB84, ATVY00, Amb01, SR01, KN04]. Mayers [May97] and Lo, Chau [LC97] proved
that quantum bit-commitment protocols with εBC = 0 do not exist by showing that if
Bob can infer no information about a before Alice reveals it, then Alice can cheat with
probability 1. There has been some controversy over this no-go theorem, with some saying
it is not entirely general. Some claim to be able to create bit-commitment protocols by
circumventing some of the assumptions used. For example, one assumption is that Alice
and Bob both have a complete description of the protocol before it starts. However, this is
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a widely accepted concept known as “Kerckhoffs’s principle” [Ker83] which is also assumed
in this thesis.
The result of the no-go theorem can be improved using Kitaev’s lower bound for strong
coin-flipping which, using the coin-flipping protocol construction above, shows that the
bias can be no lower than that of strong coin-flipping. Recently, this has been improved by
Chailloux and Kerenidis [CK11] who showed that εBC ≥ 0.239 for every bit-commitment
protocol. They show this bound is tight by presenting a protocol with bias εBC < 0.239+δ
for any choice of δ > 0. Again, these protocols rely on optimal weak coin-flipping protocols
as subroutines.
In this thesis, we construct coin-flipping protocols using bit-commitment in a way
similar to the construction in [NS03]. Instead of adding the extra message from Bob before
Alice reveals the value of a, we are going to blend two bit-commitment protocols in the
following way. Alice chooses a bit a and encodes it in a quantum state. Bob chooses a bit
b and encodes it in a quantum state. They each take turns revealing parts of their states
to each other. Once the states are completely revealed, they reveal a and b to each other
and they output a ⊕ b if cheating is not detected. Nayak and Shor showed that in every
protocol of this form, one party can cheat with probability at least 9/16. Although this
is not as strong as the implicit cheating strategy from Kitaev’s lower bound, it showed an
explicit cheating strategy for this class of protocols.
Quantum oblivious transfer
Oblivious transfer, abbreviated OT, is the cryptographic primitive where Alice sends
to Bob one of two bits but is oblivious to the bit received. Wiesner first proposed obliv-
ious transfer as multiplexing, although the cryptographic significance was not known at
the time. The first use of the term ‘oblivious transfer’ was by Rabin [Rab81] while dis-
cussing how to exchange secrets. This form of oblivious transfer is different than Wiesner’s
multiplexing and accomplished the following task:
• Alice has one bit x she wishes to transfer to Bob,
• With probability 1/2, Bob receives the bit x, and with probability 1/2, he receives
# indicating the message was lost,
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• Alice does not learn if x or # is received.
This is often referred to as “Rabin OT.” Another version of oblivious transfer was proposed
by Even, Goldreich, and Lempel in [EGL85] which accomplished the following task:
• Alice has two bits x0 and x1 she wishes to transfer to Bob,
• With probability 1/2, Bob receives the bit x0, and with probability 1/2, he receives
x1,
• Alice does not learn which bit is received.
This version is called “1-out-of-2 OT” and is an interactive version of Wiesner’s multi-
plexing. It was shown by Crépeau [Cré87] that these two forms of oblivious transfer are
equivalent. More specifically, he showed that with a perfect 1-out-of-2 OT channel, one
can implement a perfect Rabin OT channel and with access to perfect Rabin OT channels,
one can implement a 1-out-of-2 OT channel (with an exponentially small probability of
failure). In this thesis, we only consider 1-out-of-2 OT and refer to it as just oblivious
transfer or OT (with a formal definition of OT given in Subsection 1.4.5).
The history of OT is less straightforward than quantum coin-flipping or quantum bit-
commitment due to varying names, definitions, and security requirements. For example, we
can have different definitions concerning the probability Bob receives the correct message
or the objectives of cheating Alice or Bob. OT is a very important cryptographic task
since it is universal for secure function evaluation [Kil88] (where Alice and Bob compute
a function without revealing extra information about their respective inputs). This being
the case, we need to worry about how one defines the security of an OT protocol when
designing larger, more elaborate cryptographic systems that rely on this security. It has
been proven by Lo [Lo97] that ideal oblivious transfer is impossible, even with quantum
information. Since every OT protocol is imperfect, one needs to settle for some definition
of security which could vary by situation.
Bennett, Brassard, Breidbard, and Wiesner [BBBW83] presented an early example of
quantum oblivious transfer. They provide a way that Alice can encode her two bits x0 and
x1 into a pure qubit state such that Bob can measure and learn either bit with probability
cos2(π/8). In fact, since only one qubit of information is transmitted, Bob cannot learn
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both bits due to information bounds [Hol73a, Nay99]. It turns out that Bob cannot obtain
any information about the XOR of the two bits since the density matrices for the two cases
are identical.
There has been work done on quantifying the amount of ‘information’ which is leaked
in OT protocols, i.e., how much information Bob can get about Alice’s inputs or how
much information Alice can get from Bob’s inputs. For example, Salvail, Schaffner, and
Sotakova [SSS09] define a quantity called information leakage and show that oblivious
transfer has constant leakage. In other work, Jain, Radhakrishnan, and Sen [JRS09] showed
that for the Set Membership Problem, which can be thought of as 1-out-of-n oblivious
transfer, if Bob reveals at most k bits of information about his input, then Alice must
reveal at least n/2O(k) bits of information about her input. Oblivious transfer has also
been studied in other settings such as the bounded-storage model [DFSS08] and the noisy-
storage model [Sch10] which each provide a high level of security.
We now discuss the notion of security considered in this thesis. We define the bias,
denoted εOT, as the maximum of the two quantities:
• Pr[Alice can guess Bob’s input b ∈ {0, 1} without Bob aborting]− 1/2,
• Pr[Bob can guess Alice’s bits (x0, x1) without Alice aborting]− 1/2,
where Bob’s input b is the index of the bit he wants to learn. We assume that Bob gets
the correct value of xb with probability 1, when both parties are honest, and therefore
we have εOT ∈ (0, 1/2] for every protocol. Note that Bob may try to cheat to learn any
function of (x0, x1) and then a different definition of bias would be needed. However, in this
thesis, we are mostly concerned with lower bounding the bias so this definition is the most
appropriate. The goal is now the same as in coin-flipping and bit-commitment which is to
determine the smallest attainable bias. Note that the lower bounds discussed previously are
in terms of information and do not directly translate into learning probabilities. Therefore,
using this definition of bias for oblivious transfer protocols is a new measure of security we
adopt for this thesis for which we give the first lower and upper bounds.
1.3.1 Contributions
Here we discuss the contributions and layout of the thesis.
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Chapter 2
We define a family of coin-flipping protocols based on bit-commitment, which we call
BCCF-protocols. Using SDP formulations of cheating strategies, we analyze the structure
of optimal cheating strategies of Alice and Bob. In particular, we reduce the SDPs to a
much simpler structure involving the optimization of fidelity functions over a polytope.
Using this reduced problem, we are able to prove a bound on the dimension of messages
and also to characterize optimal dual solutions to develop point games.
We then study a family of classical BCCF-protocols and show how they are related to
the quantum version. Using this relationship, we also develop “classical point games” and
use them to prove that every classical BCCF-protocol has bias ε = 1/2. In fact, we are
able to conclude that exactly one party can cheat with probability 1 which also extends to
the quantum case.
In Subsection 2.3, we adapt Kitaev’s lower bound for BCCF-protocols and prove a
theorem which roughly states that only “classical protocols” can saturate Kitaev’s analysis.
That is, if the product of Alice and Bob’s optimal cheating probabilities equals 1/2, then
one of them can cheat with probability 1. This rules out the possibility of BCCF-protocols




In this chapter, we search over the parameters defining a BCCF-protocol to seek one
with the smallest bias. In Subsection 3.1, we lower bound the optimal cheating probabili-
ties by finding feasible solutions to the cheating SDPs. By restricting the feasible regions,
we reveal hidden convex structure behind some “near-optimal strategies.” We use these
strategies to filter out protocols with high bias. In Subsection 3.2, we examine the sym-
metry in the protocol parameters to reduce the number of protocols in the search. In
Subsection 3.3, we develop the search algorithm by showing how the mesh is created and
presenting a decent protocol which provides a cut-off point for the bias. We present our
numerical findings for four round and six round searches in Subsection 3.4. We conclude
with the conjecture that the minimal bias attainable by a BCCF-protocol is ε = 1/4.
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Chapter 4
The topic of Chapter 4 is oblivious transfer. We present in Subsection 4.1 a simple pro-
tocol for oblivious transfer that has bias εOT = 1/4 which is related to the bit-commitment
protocol in [KN04]. To prove a lower bound on the bias, we construct a bit-commitment
protocol using oblivious transfer and relate the corresponding cheating probabilities in Sub-
section 4.2. We then present (and prove in Section 4.3) a Learning-In-Sequence Lemma
which provides a way for Bob to sequentially learn Alice’s two input bits x0 and x1. Using
this lemma and known lower bounds for quantum bit-commitment [CK11], we prove that
the bias for every OT protocol satisfies εOT ≥ 0.0852. We conclude this chapter by study-
ing a forcing variant of oblivious transfer in Subsection 4.4 which generalizes coin-flipping.
We show how to formulate cheating strategies as SDPs which are used to derive optimal
lower bounds on the bias.
1.4 Mathematical preliminaries and notation
In this section, we establish the notation and the necessary background for this thesis.
1.4.1 Linear algebra
For a finite set A, we denote by RA, RA+, Prob
A, and CA the set of real vectors, nonnegative
real vectors, probability vectors, and complex vectors, respectively, each indexed by A. We
use Rn, Rn+, Prob
n, and Cn for the special case when A = {1, . . . , n}. We denote by ΣA
and ΣA+ the set of Hermitian matrices and positive semidefinite matrices, respectively, each
with columns and rows indexed by A. For vectors x and y, the notation x ≥ y denotes
that x − y has nonnegative entries, x > y denotes that x − y has positive entries, and
for matrices X and Y , the notation X  Y denotes that X − Y is positive semidefinite,
and X  Y denotes X − Y is positive definite when the underlying spaces are clear from
context. When we say that a matrix is positive semidefinite or positive definite, it is









where C is positive definite. Then X  0 if and only if S := A−BC−1B>  0. We call S
the Schur complement.
The Kronecker product of two matrices X and Y , denoted X ⊗ Y , is defined as
X ⊗ Y :=

X1,1 Y X1,2 Y · · · X1,n Y





Xn,1 Y Xn,2 Y · · · Xn,n Y
 .
Note that X ⊗ Y ∈ ΣA×B+ when X ∈ ΣA+ and Y ∈ ΣB+ and Tr(X ⊗ Y ) = Tr(X) · Tr(Y )
when X and Y are square.
For a vector x ∈ CA, we define supp(x) to be the set of indices of A where x is nonzero.
We define x−1 to be the element-wise inverse, when x > 0, and
√
x to be the element-wise
square root when x ≥ 0. The element-wise square root of a probability vector yields a
unit vector (in the Euclidean norm). This operation, in some sense, is a conversion of a
probability vector to a quantum state.




where X∗ is the adjoint of X and
√
X denotes the square root of a positive semidefinite
matrix X, i.e., the positive semidefinite matrix Y such that Y 2 = X. Note that the 1-norm






We use the notation ā to denote the complement of a bit a with respect to 0 and 1 and
a⊕ b to denote the XOR of the bits a and b. We use Zn2 to denote the set of n-bit binary
strings.
For a vector p ∈ RA, we denote by Diag(p) ∈ ΣA the diagonal matrix with p on the
diagonal. For a matrix X ∈ ΣA, we denote by diag(X) ∈ RA the vector on the diagonal of
X.
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For a matrix X, we denote by Null(X) the nullspace of X, by det(X) the determinant
of X, and by λmax(X) the largest eigenvalue of X. We denote by 〈X, Y 〉 the standard
inner product of matrices acting on the same space given by Tr(X∗Y ).
1.4.2 Convex analysis
A convex combination of finitely many vectors x1, . . . , xn is any vector of the form
∑n
i=1 λixi,
when λ1, . . . , λn ∈ [0, 1] satisfy
∑n
i=1 λi = 1. The convex hull of a set C is the set of convex
combinations of elements of C, denoted conv(C). A set C is convex if C = conv(C).
A convex function f : Rn → R ∪ {∞} is one that satisfies
f(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≤ λf(x) + (1− λ)f(y), for all x, y ∈ Rn, λ ∈ [0, 1].
A convex function is strictly convex if
f(λx+ (1− λ)y) < λf(x) + (1− λ)f(y), for all x 6= y, x, y ∈ Rn, λ ∈ (0, 1).
We say that a convex function is proper if f(x) < +∞ for some x ∈ Rn. The epigraph of
a function f is the set
epi(f) := {(x, t) : f(x) ≤ t}
which are the points above the graph of the function. A function is convex if and only if
its epigraph is a convex set.
A function f : Rn → R ∪ {−∞} is (strictly) concave if −f is (strictly) convex, and
proper when f(x) > −∞ for some x ∈ Rn. The hypograph of a function f is the set
hypo(f) := {(x, t) : f(x) ≥ t}
which are the points below the graph of the function. A function is concave if and only if
its hypograph is a convex set.
Let f1, . . . , fn : Rn → R ∪ {∞} be proper, convex functions. We define the convex
hull of {f1, . . . , fn}, denoted conv{f1, . . . , fn}, as the greatest convex function f such that
f(x) ≤ f1(x), . . . , fn(x) for every x ∈ Rn. Equivalently, we can define this in terms of the
epigraph
conv{f1, . . . , fn}(x) := inf {t : (x, t) ∈ conv(∪ni=1epi(fi))} .
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We can similarly define the concave hull of {f1, . . . , fn}, denoted conc{f1, . . . , fn}, as
conc {f1, . . . , fn} := −conv {−f1, . . . ,−fn}
when f1, . . . , fn : Rn → R∪{−∞} are proper, concave functions. That is, the concave hull
is the least concave function f such that f(x) ≥ f1(x), . . . , fn(x) for every x ∈ Rn, or
conc{f1, . . . , fn}(x) := sup {t : (x, t) ∈ conv(∪ni=1hypo(fi))} .




where f is a convex function and C is a convex set. Alternatively, one could maximize a
concave function over a convex set. See Subsection 1.4.4 for the types of convex programs
examined in this thesis.
A set C ⊆ Rn is closed if it contains every limit point of sequences within C. In a
complex Euclidean space, a set is compact if and only if it is closed and bounded.
We call a convex set K a cone if λK ⊆ K, for all λ > 0. This thesis concerns the
optimization of linear functions over closed, convex cones, see Subsection 1.4.4. Given a
set C ⊆ Rn, its dual cone, denoted C∗, is defined as
C∗ := {x ∈ Rn : 〈x, y〉 ≥ 0, for all y ∈ C} .
One can check that the dual cone is always a closed, convex cone. Also, we have that
C1 ⊆ C2 implies C∗1 ⊇ C∗2 and the converse holds if C1 and C2 are closed convex cones.
A function f : Σn → Σm is said to be operator monotone if
f(X)  f(Y ) when X  Y.
The set of operator monotone functions is a convex cone.
A function f : Rn → R is said to be positively homogeneous if
f(λx) = λf(x), for all λ > 0.
A polyhedron is the solution set of a system of finitely many linear inequalities (or
equalities). A polytope is a bounded polyhedron.
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1.4.3 Quantum information
In this subsection, we give a brief introduction to quantum information. For a more
thorough treatment of the subject, we refer the reader to [NC00].
Quantum states
Quantum states are a description of the state of a physical system, such as the spin of
an electron. In the simplest case, such a state is a unit vector in a finite-dimensional
Hilbert space (which is a complex Euclidean space). For example, the following vectors
























These are examples of quantum bits or qubits. The first two are standard basis vectors and
can be thought of as the logical states of a standard computer. In general, a qubit can be
written as
|ψ〉 := α0 |0〉+ α1 |1〉,
where α0, α1 ∈ C satisfy |α0|2 + |α1|2 = 1. This condition ensures that |ψ〉 has norm equal
to 1.








|1〉. These states are said to
be in a superposition of the states |0〉 and |1〉 and hold properties of being in both states
at the same time. This is in part what gives quantum computers the power to efficiently
tackle hard problems such as factoring [Sho94].
In general, a system may be in one of several superpositions according to some proba-
bility distribution. Suppose a quantum system is in such a state drawn from the ensemble
of states (|ψ0〉, |ψ1〉, . . . , |ψn〉) with respective probabilities (p0, p1, . . . , pn). This quantum




where 〈ψ| := |ψ〉∗ is the adjoint. (We define 〈ψ|φ〉 := 〈|φ〉, |ψ〉〉 to be the inner product.)
Notice that the matrix above is positive semidefinite and has unit trace. Moreover, any
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positive semidefinite matrix with unit trace can be written in the above form using its
spectral decomposition.
Two different probability distributions over superpositions may have the same density
matrix. For example, density matrices do not record “phase information,” i.e., the density
matrix of the state |ψ〉 is the same as that of −|ψ〉. However, two ensembles with the same
density matrix behave identically under all allowed physical operations. Therefore, there
is no loss in working with density matrices.
A quantum superposition given by the vector |ψ〉 can be thought of as the rank 1
density matrix |ψ〉〈ψ| and we call it a pure state. States with a density matrix of rank 2
or more are said to be mixed.
Quantum operations
Suppose U is a unitary operator acting on CA and |ψ〉 ∈ CA is a quantum state. If we
apply U to |ψ〉 then the resulting quantum state is U |ψ〉 ∈ CA. Note this is a well-defined
quantum state since unitary operators preserve the norm. Also, every unitary operation is
a valid quantum operation.
Suppose we are given a state drawn from the ensemble (|ψ0〉, |ψ1〉, . . . , |ψn〉) with respec-
tive probabilities (p0, p1, . . . , pn). If we apply the unitary U to the state, it is equivalent to
saying the state is given to us from the ensemble (U |ψ0〉, U |ψ1〉, . . . , U |ψn〉) with the same
probabilities. We can write the new density matrix as
n∑
i=0







where U∗ is the adjoint of U . Thus, if we are given a density matrix ρ and apply the
unitary U , then UρU∗ is the density matrix of the new quantum state. Indeed, this matrix
is still positive semidefinite with unit trace.
Quantum measurement
A quantum measurement is a means of extracting classical information from a quantum
state. This is represented by a set of positive semidefinite operators {Π1, . . . ,Πn} satisfying∑n
i=1 Πi = I. This set of operators is called a positive operator valued measure or a POVM.
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If we have a density matrix ρ and we apply the measurement {Π1, . . . ,Πn}, we obtain out-
come “i” with probability 〈Πi, ρ〉. The definitions of density matrices and measurements
establish this as a well-defined probability distribution over the indices. After a measure-
ment, the state collapses to one that is consistent with the outcome. For example, if each
Πi is a projection, then on outcome i, the state becomes ΠiρΠi (normalized). Therefore,
sometimes only a limited amount of classical information may be extracted from a given
quantum state. For example, if we apply the measurement {Π0 := |0〉〈0|,Π1 := |1〉〈1|} to
the state |+〉〈+|, we obtain the outcome:{
“0” with probability 〈Π0, |+〉〈+|〉 = 1/2,
“1” with probability 〈Π1, |+〉〈+|〉 = 1/2.
Multiple quantum systems
Suppose we are given two quantum systems that are independently in states |ψ1〉 ∈ CA1
and |ψ2〉 ∈ CA2 . The combined state is |ψ1〉 ⊗ |ψ2〉 ∈ CA1 ⊗ CA2 = CA1×A2 . Note that
the Kronecker product has the property that ‖x⊗ y‖2 = ‖x‖2 ‖y‖2 so the unit norm is
preserved. Although we can compose two vectors to get a larger vector, it is not always
possible to decompose a larger vector into two smaller vectors in this way. Consider the
following state |Φ+〉 := 1√
2
[1, 0, 0, 1]>. This vector cannot be expressed as |ψ1〉 ⊗ |ψ2〉 for
any choice of |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉 ∈ C2. A vector that cannot be expressed as a Kronecker product
of two smaller vectors is said to be entangled.
If two disjoint quantum systems are independently in states given by density matrices
ρ1 ∈ ΣA1+ and ρ2 ∈ ΣA2+ , then the joint state of the combined system is given by the density
matrix ρ1⊗ ρ2 ∈ ΣA1×A2+ . We make use of the properties that Kronecker products preserve
positive semidefiniteness and Tr(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) = Tr(ρ1) · Tr(ρ2). In this representation, it is
not always possible to write a density matrix ρ ∈ ΣA1×A2+ as ρ1 ⊗ ρ2 where ρ1 ∈ ΣA1+ and
ρ2 ∈ ΣA2+ . However, there is a way to describe the “part” of the state which is in A1 using
the notion of partial trace.
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Partial trace over quantum states and marginal probability vectors
The partial trace over A1 is the unique linear transformation TrA1 : Σ
A1×A2 → ΣA2 ,
which satisfies
TrA1(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) = Tr(ρ1) · ρ2,








X (ex1 ⊗ IA2) ,
where {ex1 : x1 ∈ A1} is the standard basis for CA1 . In fact, the definition is independent
of the choice of basis, so long as it is orthonormal. Note that the partial trace is positive,
i.e., TrA1(X) ∈ ΣA2+ when X ∈ ΣA1×A2+ , and also trace-preserving. This ensures that the
new matrix is a well-defined density matrix.
Consider the scenario where two parties, Alice and Bob, hold parts of a quantum system
which are jointly in some state ρ, i.e., they share a quantum state ρ over CA×B. Then the
partial trace of ρ over one space represents that quantum state over the remaining space.
For example, TrA(ρ) is the density matrix representing Bob’s half of the state and TrB(ρ)
represents Alice’s half.
Suppose we are given the density matrix ρ ∈ ΣA+. We call the pure state |ψ〉 ∈ CA×B
a purification of ρ if TrB|ψ〉〈ψ| = ρ. Note that a purification exists if |B| ≥ |A|, and is
in general not unique. An important property of purifications of the same state is that
if TrB|ψ〉〈ψ| = TrB|φ〉〈φ| for two pure states |ψ〉 and |φ〉, then there exists a unitary U
acting on CB alone such that |ψ〉 = (IA ⊗ U) |φ〉.
The partial trace operation is the quantum analogue of calculating marginal probability












where eA ∈ CA is the vector of all ones. We see that this gives the marginal probability
distribution of p over B. Alternatively, one may view probability vectors as diagonal
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positive semidefinite matrices with unit trace. Then, taking the partial trace (as defined
for quantum states) corresponds exactly to the computation of marginal distributions.
Distance measures for quantum states and probability vectors
The different notions of distance between quantum states and probability vectors are
very important in quantum cryptography. Here, we discuss two distance measures and
show how they are related.














Both definitions of the fidelity are symmetric, positively homogeneous in both arguments,
and concave. Notice F(ρ, σ) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if 〈ρ, σ〉 = 0 and, if ρ and σ are
quantum states, F(ρ, σ) ≤ 1 with equality if and only if ρ = σ. An analogous statement
can be made for fidelity of probability vectors.
Another distance measure is the trace distance. We define the trace distance between










Notice ∆(ρ, σ) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if ρ = σ and ∆(ρ, σ) ≤ 1 with equality if and
only if 〈ρ, σ〉 = 0. The analogous statement can be made for the trace distance between
probability vectors.
We now discuss two important notions in quantum cryptography. The first is how easily
two states can be distinguished from each other. For example, if Alice gives to Bob one of
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two states ρ or σ chosen uniformly at random, then Bob can measure to learn whether he













proven by Helstrom [Hel69]. The second notion is quantum steering. Suppose Alice has
given to Bob the B part of |φ〉 ∈ CA×B. Suppose she wants to send CA in such a way to
convince Bob that a different state was sent, say |ψ〉 ∈ CA×B. Her most general strategy
is to apply a quantum operation on CA before sending it to Bob. Using Uhlmann’s The-
orem [Uhl76], it can be shown that if Bob measures with the POVM {|ψ〉〈ψ|, I− |ψ〉〈ψ|},
Alice can convince him that the state was |ψ〉 with maximum probability
F(TrA|ψ〉〈ψ|,TrA|φ〉〈φ|).
The trace distance and fidelity are closely related. The following Fuchs-van de Graaf
inequalities [FvdG99] illustrate this relationship
1−
√
F(ρ, σ) ≤ ∆(ρ, σ) ≤
√
1− F(ρ, σ),
for all quantum states ρ and σ. The analogous statement holds for probability vectors.
1.4.4 Semidefinite programming
A natural model of optimization when studying quantum information is semidefinite pro-
gramming. A semidefinite program, abbreviated SDP, is an optimization problem of the
form
(P) sup 〈C,X〉
subject to A(X) = b,
X ∈ Σn+,
whereA : Σn → Rm is linear, C ∈ Σn, and b ∈ Rm. In this subsection, we give the necessary
theory and tools that are used in this thesis concerning semidefinite programming. We
begin with some definitions. In (P) above, we call A(X) = b and X ∈ Σn+ the constraints,
any solution of the constraints is said to be feasible, and the set of feasible solutions is
the feasible region. We call 〈C,X〉 the objective function and any feasible solution X̄ has
the corresponding objective function value 〈C, X̄〉. If there exists feasible X̄ such that
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〈C, X̄〉 ≥ 〈C,X〉 for all feasible X, then X̄ is said to be an optimal solution and 〈C, X̄〉
to be the optimal objective value. Note that we need to use “sup” in the definition since
SDPs with finite optimal objective values exist having no optimal solutions.
We can write the dual of (P) as
(D) inf 〈b, y〉
subject to A∗(y)− S = C,
S ∈ Σn+,
where A∗ is the adjoint of A. We refer to (P) as the primal problem and to (D) as its dual.
The usefulness of defining the dual in this way is apparent in the following lemmas.
Lemma 1.4.1 (Weak duality). For every X̄ feasible for (P) and (ȳ, S̄) feasible for (D),
we have
〈b, ȳ〉 − 〈C, X̄〉 = 〈X̄, S̄〉 ≥ 0.
We call the minimum value of 〈X̄, S̄〉 over feasible solutions the duality gap.
Using weak duality, we can prove bounds on the optimal objective value of (P) and
(D), i.e., the objective function value of any primal feasible solution yields a lower bound
on (D) and the objective function value of any dual feasible solution yields an upper bound
on (P).
We say that a primal feasible solution X̄ is strictly feasible if X̄  0 and a dual feasible
solution (ȳ, S̄) is strictly feasible if S̄  0. Sometimes these are also called Slater points.
Under mild conditions, we have that the optimal objective values of (P) and (D) coin-
cide. In this case, we say that the primal and dual have zero duality gap.
Lemma 1.4.2 (Strong duality for (P)). If the objective function of (P) is bounded from
above on the set of feasible solutions and there exists a strictly feasible solution, then (D)
has an optimal solution and there is zero duality gap.
Since the dual of the dual is the primal problem, we get the following lemma.
Lemma 1.4.3 (Strong duality for (D)). If the objective function of (D) is bounded from
below on the set of feasible solutions and there exists a strictly feasible solution, then (P)
has an optimal solution and there is zero duality gap.
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Another notion in convex optimization is complementary slackness. In the SDP above,
notice that if X̄ is an optimal solution for (P) and (ȳ, S̄) an optimal solution for (D), then
〈X̄, S̄〉 = 0 if there is zero duality gap. This means that X̄ is orthogonal to S̄. Similarly, if
X̄ is a feasible solution for (P) and (ȳ, S̄) a feasible solution for (D) and 〈X̄, S̄〉 = 0, then
both feasible solutions are optimal in their respective problems by weak duality. We refer
to the condition 〈X,S〉 = 0 as complementary slackness.
Semidefinite programming has a powerful and rich duality theory and the interested
reader is referred to [WSV00, Tun10] and the references therein.
Taking the duals of SDPs with multiple variables
The SDPs encountered in this thesis are a bit more involved than the standard form
above. Most of the times when dual SDPs appear in papers, the construction of the dual
is omitted since the calculations are quite tedious. There are many duals that appear in
this thesis, so to explain their derivations, we develop the dual of the SDP below which
captures a common structure.
Consider the SDP
(P’) sup 〈Ck, Xk〉
subject to A1(X1) = B,
Aj(Xj) = Dj(Xj−1), for all j ∈ {2, . . . , k} ,
Xi ∈ Σni+ , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} ,
where Ck and B are Hermitian and A1, . . . ,Ak,D2, . . . ,Dk are Hermiticity preserving. To




|i〉〈i| ⊗Xi and C := |k〉〈k| ⊗ Ck and b := (vec(B), 0, . . . , 0)>,
where vec(B) is a column vector containing exactly the elements of B (we could think of
vec as stacking the columns). Technically, we need b to be a real vector, but this is not an










we see that we get an SDP in the form previously discussed. Taking its dual yields
inf 〈b, y〉
subject to A∗(y)− S = C,
S ∈ Σn1+···+nk+ .
Note that the off-diagonal entries of C, X, and S do not factor into any constraint or
either objective function. Thus, we can assume they are set to 0, but they effectively do
not matter.
Let y = (y1, . . . , yk)
> and let Yi be the matrix such that vec(Yi) = yi (we can assume it
is Hermitian). We can write the dual objective function as
〈b, y〉 = 〈vec(B), y1〉 = 〈B, Y1〉.
We can now solve for A∗(y) from
〈A∗(y), X〉 = 〈y,A(X)〉
= 〈y1, vec(A1(X1))〉+ 〈y2, vec(A2(X2))− vec(D2(X1))〉
+ · · · + 〈yk, vec(Ak(Xk))− vec(Dk(Xk−1))〉
= 〈A∗1(Y1)−D∗2(Y2), X1〉+ 〈A∗2(Y2)−D∗2(Y3), X2〉+ · · ·+ 〈A∗k(Yk), Xk〉.
We can write the dual of (P’) as
(D’) inf 〈B, Y1〉





Complementary slackness in this case is
〈Xi,A∗i (Yi)−D∗i+1(Yi+1)〉 = 0, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} , and 〈Xk,A∗(Yk)− Ck〉 = 0.
The SDPs in this thesis are mostly of this form. Some modifications are used later,
such as replacing some of the positive semidefiniteness constraints with nonnegative vector
constraints. Instead of rederiving this from scratch, we can simply modify the above dual.
For example, if we replace the constraint Xi ∈ Σni+ with xi ∈ Rni+ , then all we must do is
replace the “” with an “≥” in the i’th dual constraint. The simplest way to keep track of
this is to view the complementary slackness conditions. If x is a vector, then the constraint
(which appears in the inner product) also needs to be a vector inequality. We review Rn+
constraints below in the part about linear programming.
Second-order cone programming
The second-order cone (or Lorentz cone) is defined as
SOCn :=
{
(x, t) ∈ Rn : x ∈ Rn−1, t ≥ ‖x‖2
}
.
A second-order cone program, denoted SOCP, is an optimization problem of the form
(P) sup 〈c, (x1, . . . , xk)〉
subject to A(x1, . . . , xk) = b,
xi ∈ SOCni , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
where A is an m × (
∑k
i=1 nk) matrix, b ∈ Rm, and k is finite. An SOCP also has a dual
which can be written as
(D) inf 〈b, y〉
subject to A>y − (s1, . . . , sk) = c,
si ∈ SOCni , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} .
Note that weak duality and strong duality also hold for SOCPs for the properly modified
definition of strictly feasible.
There is a related cone called the rotated second-order cone, defined as
RSOCn :=
{




We can optimize over the rotated second-order cone using second-order cone programming
because (x, t) ∈ SOCn if and only if (t/2, t, x) ∈ RSOCn+1 and (a, b, x) ∈ RSOCn if and
only if (a+ b, x, a, b) ∈ SOCn+1. Indeed, in some optimization literature, one refers to any
cone linearly isomorphic to SOCn as a second-order cone, such as RSOCn+1 above. For
this reason, we still call it a second-order cone program if SOC is replaced by RSOC, or
any other second-order cone.
Indeed, both second-order cone constraints can be cast as positive semidefinite con-
straints:











This proves that second-order cone programming is a special case of semidefinite program-
ming. However, there are some differences between semidefinite programs and second-order
cone programs. One is that the algorithms for solving second-order cone programs can be
more efficient and robust than those for solving semidefinite programs. We refer the inter-
ested reader to [Stu99, Stu02, Mit03, AG03] and the references therein.
Linear programming
A linear program, denoted LP, can be written as
(P) max 〈c, x〉
subject to Ax = b,
x ∈ Rn+,
where A is an m× n matrix, c ∈ Rn and b ∈ Rm.
Linear programming is a special case of both second-order cone programming and
semidefinite programming. This can be seen by casting a nonnegativity constraint t ≥ 0 as
the SOC constraint (0, t) ∈ SOC2. Associated with every linear program is its dual which
is defined as
(D) min 〈b, y〉
subject to A>y − s = c,
s ∈ Rn+.
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Note that in this special case, we do not require strict feasibility to guarantee strong duality.
If a feasible linear program is bounded, then it and its dual attain an optimal solution and
the optimal values always coincide.
1.4.5 Quantum protocols
In this thesis, we consider two-party quantum communication protocols in the style of
Yao [Yao93]. We concentrate on a class of communication protocols relevant to coin-
flipping, bit-commitment and oblivious transfer. In such protocols, two parties Alice and
Bob hold some quantum state; the states with each party are initialized to a fixed pure
state. The initial joint state is therefore unentangled across Alice and Bob (otherwise, Alice
and Bob could perform some tasks, such as coin-flipping, trivially). The two parties then
communicate in turns. Suppose it is Alice’s turn. Alice performs a unitary transformation
on her state and then sends part of her state to Bob. Sending part of the state does not
change the overall superposition, it merely changes ownership, i.e., who has control over
that part of the state. This allows Bob to apply his next unitary transformation on the
state under his control. At the end of the protocol, each player performs a measurement
and, if applicable, announces the outcome.
Formally, the players Alice and Bob, hold some state, which initially factors into a
tensor product CA0 ⊗ CB0 of Hilbert spaces. The state corresponding to CA0 is in Alice’s
possession, and the state corresponding to CB0 is in Bob’s possession. When the protocol
starts, CA0 is initialized to some pure state |ψA,0〉 and CB0 is initialized to |ψB,0〉, both
of which are determined by the protocol. The communication consists of m ≥ 1 rounds
of exchanging messages. Either party may start. In the i’th round, i ≥ 1, suppose it is
Alice’s turn. Suppose the state space just before the round factors as CAi−1 ⊗CBi−1 . Alice
applies a unitary operator UA,i to CAi−1 . Then, Alice “sends” part of the state to Bob.
Formally, the space CAi−1 factors as CAi ⊗ CMi , where CMi denotes the state space for
the i’th message. Consequently, CBi = CMi ⊗ CBi−1 . In the next round, Bob may thus
apply a unitary operation to the part of the state previously in Alice’s control.
At the end of the m rounds, Alice and Bob measure the states in their possession
according to some measurement. The outcomes of these measurements represent their
outputs. We emphasize that there are no measurements until all rounds of communication
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are completed. A protocol with intermediate measurements may be transformed into this
form by appealing to standard techniques [BV97].
We are interested in the probabilities of the different outcomes when either party
“cheats.” Suppose Alice and Bob have agreed upon a protocol, i.e., a set of rules for
the state initialization, communication, quantum operations, and measurements. What if
Alice or Bob do not follow protocol? Suppose Alice is dishonest and would like to achieve
some specific goal, e.g., forcing Bob to output “0” in a coin-flipping protocol. She may
use a different space for her private operations, so that her space CA′i may be much larger
than CAi . She may create any initial state she wants. During the communication, the only
restriction is that she send a state of the correct dimension, e.g., if the protocol requires
a message with three qubits in the first message, then Alice sends three qubits. Between
messages, she may apply any quantum operation she wants on the state in her possession.
At the end of the protocol, she may use a different measurement of her choice. For example,
she may simply output “0” if this is her desired outcome (which corresponds to a trivial
measurement). The rules that Alice chooses to follow instead of the protocol constitute a
cheating strategy.
We would like to quantify the extent to which a dishonest party can cheat while the
other is honest, so we focus on runs of the protocol in which at most one party is dishonest.
We analyze in this thesis the maximum probability with which Alice (or Bob) can cheat
in terms of a “bias,” i.e., the advantage over the honest probability that a cheating party
can achieve.
Formal definitions of primitives
Here we give formal definitions of the primitives considered in this thesis.
Definition 1.4.4 (Strong coin-flipping). A strong coin-flipping protocol with bias ε is
a protocol with output c ∈ {0, 1, abort}, satisfying:
• Alice and Bob start uncorrelated,
• if Alice and Bob are honest, then they never abort and they output the same uniformly
random bit c ∈ {0, 1},
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• P ∗A,c is the maximum probability dishonest Alice can force honest Bob to accept out-
come c ∈ {0, 1},
• P ∗B,c is the maximum probability dishonest Bob can force honest Alice to accept out-
come c ∈ {0, 1},
• ε := max{P ∗B,0, P ∗B,1, P ∗A,0, P ∗A,1} − 1/2.
The idea is to design protocols which protect honest parties from cheating parties and
there are no security guarantees when both parties are dishonest.
Definition 1.4.5 (Weak coin-flipping). A weak coin-flipping protocol with bias εWCF is
a protocol with output c ∈ {0, 1}, satisfying:
• Alice and Bob start uncorrelated,
• if Alice and Bob are honest, they output the same uniformly random bit c,
• P ∗A,0 is the maximum probability dishonest Alice can force honest Bob to accept out-
come 0,
• P ∗B,1 is the maximum probability dishonest Bob can force honest Alice to accept out-
come 1,
• εWCF := max{P ∗B,1, P ∗A,0} − 1/2.
We can assume neither party aborts in a WCF protocol. If, for instance, Alice detects
Bob has cheated then she may declare herself the winner, i.e., the outcome is c = 0. This
is not the case in strong coin-flipping since there is no sense of “winning.”
Definition 1.4.6 (Bit-commitment). A bit-commitment protocol with bias εBC is a
protocol with a commit phase and a reveal phase, satisfying:
• Alice and Bob start uncorrelated,
• in the commit phase, Alice interacts with Bob in order to commit to a random bit a,
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• in the reveal phase, Alice interacts with Bob in order to reveal a. Bob decides to
accept or reject depending on the revealed value of a and his final state. We say that
Alice successfully reveals a if Bob accepts the revealed value,
• if Alice and Bob are both honest then Alice always successfully reveals the bit a which
she has committed,
• Alice’s maximum cheating probability is





Pr[Alice successfully reveals a = c],
• Bob’s maximum cheating probability is
P ∗B,BC = sup Pr[Bob guesses a after the commit phase without Alice aborting],
• εBC := max{P ∗B,BC, P ∗A,BC} − 1/2,
where the suprema are taken over all cheating strategies of the party indicated.
We see that we can use a bit-commitment protocol to create a coin-flipping protocol.
In between the commit phase and reveal phase, Bob announces his guess for Alice’s bit
a. Then the bias of the coin-flipping protocol equals that of the bit-commitment protocol.
Note that the protocols in this thesis are not of this form.
Definition 1.4.7 (Oblivious transfer (OT)). An oblivious transfer protocol, denoted
OT, with bias εOT is a protocol with inputs, satisfying:
• Alice and Bob start uncorrelated,
• Alice inputs two uniformly random bits (x0, x1) and Bob inputs a uniformly random
index b ∈ {0, 1},
• when Alice and Bob are honest they never abort, Bob learns xb perfectly, Bob gets no
information about xb̄, and Alice gets no information about b,
• P ∗A,OT is the maximum probability dishonest Alice can learn b without Bob aborting,
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• P ∗B,OT is the maximum probability dishonest Bob can learn (x0, x1) without Alice abort-
ing,
• εOT = max{P ∗B,OT, P ∗A,OT} − 1/2.
When a party cheats, we only refer to the probability by which they can learn the
desired values without the other party aborting. For example, when Bob cheats, we do not
require that he learns either bit with probability 1.
Note that there could be some ambiguity about how a party cheats if the inputs are not
chosen randomly, i.e., if Bob chooses b however he wants, then what does it mean for Alice
to learn b with some probability? If Bob can freely choose his input, a suitable definition
of Alice’s cheating probability is
max
c∈{0,1}
{Pr[Alice learns b|Bob chooses input b = c]} . (1.1)
Since we are mainly concerned with lower bounds, we assume Bob and Alice choose their
inputs randomly since, for example, P ∗A,OT is a lower bound on (1.1). On the other hand,
suppose we have a protocol where Bob and Alice have specific values they want to input.
Then this is easily remedied by adding the extra messages at the end of the protocol
specifying whether the randomly chosen inputs were the ones desired. For example, suppose
b = 0, but Bob really wanted b = 1. Then he can tell Alice, “my value of b is wrong.”
Then Bob can switch the value of b and Alice can switch her two bits x0 and x1. We can
do a similar thing for Alice. Thus, having the inputs chosen randomly is not an issue when
designing protocols with this definition of the bias.
Definition 1.4.8 (Forcing oblivious transfer (Forcing-OT)). A k-out-of-n forcing obliv-
ious transfer protocol, denoted as Forcing-OT(n,k), with forcing bias εFOT, is a protocol
satisfying:
• Alice and Bob start uncorrelated,
• Alice and Bob have no inputs,
• Alice outputs n random bits x := (x1, . . . , xn),
• Bob outputs a random k-index set b and bit string xb consisting of xi for i ∈ b,
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• εFOT = max{εA, εB},
where the suprema are taken over all cheating strategies of the party indicated.
The main difference between this primitive and the standard definition of oblivious
transfer is the definition of security. Here, we design protocols to protect against a dishonest
party being able to force a desired value as the output of the other party. Standard
oblivious transfer protocols are designed to protect against a dishonest party learning the
other party’s input. Notice that in coin-flipping, we can design protocols to protect against
a dishonest party forcing a desired outcome, but both parties learn the outcome perfectly
when they are honest.
This primitive is a generalization of coin-flipping since we can cast the problem of coin-
flipping as a 1-out-of-1 forcing oblivious transfer protocol. Of course, in Forcing-OT(1,1),
Alice always knows Bob’s index set so the forcing bias is the only interesting notion of
security in this case.
We define the bias εFOT as a multiplicative factor instead of additive, since the honest
probabilities can be much different and in this case this definition makes more sense. To
relate this bias to the one previously mentioned in coin-flipping, we have that coin-flipping
protocols with bias εFOT ≤
√
2 + δ exist for any δ > 0, see [CK09].
1.4.6 The Kitaev coin-flipping protocol formalism
Kitaev developed point games from his SDP formulation of cheating strategies for coin-
flipping protocols. Here, we review this construction.
Coin-flipping protocols
We give a setting for a coin-flipping protocol which is equivalent to the general setting
described earlier. This setting has a space devoted for messages and each message has the
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same dimension. This is done for convenience as it makes the analysis in this subsection
(and at the end of Chapter 4) simpler.
A coin-flipping protocol can be described by the following parameters:
• The number of messages, denoted here as m. We can assume m is even,
• three Hilbert spaces: Alice’s private space CA, a message space CM , and Bob’s private
space CB,
• a set of unitaries {UA,1, UA,3, . . . , UA,m−1} acting on CA×M . These correspond to
Alice’s messages to Bob,
• a set of unitaries {UB,2, UB,4, . . . , UB,m} acting on CM×B. These correspond to Bob’s
messages to Alice,
• a projective measurement for Alice {ΠA,0,ΠA,1,ΠA,abort} ⊂ ΣA+ determining Alice’s
protocol outcome,
• a projective measurement for Bob {ΠB,0,ΠB,1,ΠB,abort} ⊂ ΣB+ determining Bob’s
protocol outcome.
The protocol proceeds as follows. Alice initializes the space CA to |ψA,0〉 and Bob
initializes CM×B to |ψM,0〉M |ψB,0〉B and sends CM to Alice. Then Alice applies her first
unitary UA,1 and sends CM to Bob. Then he applies his first unitary UB,2 and returns
CM to Alice. They repeat this until Bob applies his last unitary UB,n. Then they both
measure their private spaces to get the outcome of the protocol. This process is depicted
in Figure 1.2.
The protocol parameters must satisfy the requirements that
1. Alice and Bob do not abort when both are honest.
2. They output the same bit when they are honest, and that bit is randomly generated.
If we let |ψ〉 ∈ CA×M×B be the state at the end of the protocol when Alice and Bob are
honest, both requirements are satisfied when





Figure 1.2: Four-message coin-flipping protocol setting.
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Cheating SDPs
We can calculate the extent cheating Bob can force honest Alice to output a fixed
desired outcome, say c ∈ {0, 1}, by solving the following SDP:
P ∗B,c = max 〈ΠA,c, ρA,n〉
subject to ρA,0 = |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|,
ρA,i = ρA,i−1, for all i even,







, for all i odd,
ρA,i ∈ ΣA+, for all i,
ρ̃A,i ∈ ΣA×M+ , for all i even.
The variables describe the parts of the quantum state under Alice’s control during different
times in the protocol as depicted in Figure 1.3. The constraints model how much cheating
Bob can change the current state of the protocol in each message and the objective function
is the probability Alice accepts outcome c ∈ {0, 1} by measuring the state she has at the
end of the protocol.
We get a very similar SDP for cheating Alice by switching the projections and inter-
changing the “odd” constraints with the “even” ones:
P ∗A,c = max 〈ΠB,c, ρB,n〉
subject to ρB,0 = |ψB,0〉〈ψB,0|,
ρB,i = ρB,i−1, for all i odd,







, for all i even,
ρB,i ∈ ΣB+, for all i,
ρ̃B,i ∈ ΣM×B+ , for all i odd.
The variables for a cheating Alice are also depicted in Figure 1.3. These SDPs are referred
to as Alice and Bob’s cheating SDPs.
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Figure 1.3: Context of primal variables in a four-message coin-flipping protocol.
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The duals of the above SDPs are as follows:
inf 〈ZA,0, |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|〉
subject to ZA,i−1 ⊗ IM  U∗A,i(ZA,i ⊗ IM)UA,i, for all i odd,




subject to ZB,i−1 ⊗ IM  U∗B,i(ZB,i ⊗ IM)UB,i, for all i even,
ZB,i−1 = ZB,i, for all i odd,
ZB,n = ΠB,c.
Kitaev’s lower bound for strong coin-flipping
We can derive a lower bound on the bias of any strong coin-flipping protocol by exam-
ining feasible dual solutions. Since the dual SDPs have strictly feasible solutions and the
objective function is bounded on the feasible region, there is zero duality gap. Therefore,
for any δ > 0, we can find feasible dual solutions (ZB,0, . . . , ZB,n) and (ZA,0, . . . , ZA,n), such
that
P ∗A,0 + δ > 〈ZB,0, |ψB,0〉〈ψB,0|〉 and P ∗B,0 + δ > 〈ZA,0, |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|〉.
Therefore, we have(
P ∗B,0 + δ
) (
P ∗A,0 + δ
)
> 〈ZB,0, |ψB,0〉〈ψB,0|〉〈ZA,0, |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|〉
= 〈ZA,0 ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,0, |ψB,0〉〈ψB,0| ⊗ |ψM,0〉〈ψM,0| ⊗ |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|〉
= 〈ZA,0 ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,0, |ψ0〉〈ψ0|〉,
where we define |ψi〉 to be the state after Bob applies UB,i in an honest run of the protocol,
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. From the dual constraints, we have
〈ZA,i ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,i, |ψi〉〈ψi|〉 ≥ 〈U∗A,i+1(ZA,i+1 ⊗ IM)UA,i+1 ⊗ ZB,i, |ψi〉〈ψi|〉
= 〈ZA,i+1 ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,i, UA,i+1|ψi〉〈ψi|U∗A,i+1〉
≥ 〈ZA,i+1 ⊗ U∗B,i+1(IM ⊗ ZB,i+1)UB,i+1, UA,i+1|ψi〉〈ψi|U∗A,i+1〉
= 〈ZA,i+1 ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,i+1, |ψi+1〉〈ψi+1|〉,
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for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We can compute
〈ZA,n ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,n, |ψn〉〈ψn|〉 = 〈ΠA,0 ⊗ IM ⊗ ΠB,0, |ψn〉〈ψn|〉 = 1/2,



















This lower bound was later reproven by Gutoski and Watrous [GW07] using a different
representation of quantum strategies.
Notice that we can reproduce the proof above using dual feasible solutions for Bob
cheating towards 1 and Alice cheating towards 0. In this case, we get the final condition
〈ZA,n ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,n, |ψn〉〈ψn|〉 = 〈ΠA,0 ⊗ IM ⊗ ΠB,1, |ψn〉〈ψn|〉 = 0.
This gives a trivial bound on the product of the cheating probabilities. However, Kitaev
used this to create point games. We refer the reader to [Moc07] for the full details of the
construction of general point games as the details are not needed for this thesis. However,
we discuss the construction of point games for specific protocols (which we later apply to
the family of protocols in Chapter 2).
Point games
Let eig(Z) denote the set of eigenvalues for an operator Z and let Π
[λ]
Z denote the
projection onto the eigenspace of Z corresponding to eigenvalue λ ∈ eig(Z). For a quantum
state σ ∈ Σn+, and X, Y ∈ Σn+, denote by Prob(X, Y, σ) : R2 → R+ the function







Y , σ〉 [λ, µ] ,
where we use the notation [λ, µ] : R2 → R to denote the function that takes value 1 on
input (λ, µ) and 0 otherwise. Note this function has finite support. Using this definition,
we can create a point game from feasible dual variables as follows
pn−i := Prob(ZB,i, ZA,i,TrM |ψi〉〈ψi|),
42
where |ψi〉 ∈ CA×M×B is the state after Bob applies UB,i in an honest run of the protocol.
Consider the dual SDPs for weak coin-flipping, i.e., Bob trying to force outcome 1 and
Alice trying to force outcome 0. Then any dual feasible solution yields a point game. We
can calculate p0 =
1
2
[0, 1] + 1
2
[1, 0], which acts as the starting point of the point game.
Notice for any δ > 0, there exists a large constant Λ such that
ZA,0(δ) := (〈ψA,0|ZA,0|ψA,0〉+ δ) |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|+ Λ (I− |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|)  ZA,0,
which can be proved using the Schur complement after writing ZA,0 in a basis containing
|ψA,0〉. Notice (ZA,0(δ), ZA,1, . . . , ZA,n) is feasible if (ZA,0, ZA,1, . . . , ZA,n) is feasible and has
the same objective function value as δ → 0. If we replace ZA,0 with ZA,0(δ), and replace
ZB,0 with the properly modified definition of ZB,0(δ), we get that the final point is
pn = 1 [ZA,0 + δ, ZB,0 + δ] .
By strong duality, we see that we can choose the dual feasible solutions such that this final







A point game p0 → p1 → · · · → pn with final point (ζB, ζA) can be defined independent
of protocols. Define [x] : R → R to be the function that takes value 1 on input x and
equals 0, otherwise. Then p0 → p1 → · · · → pn is a point game if each pi is a function
with finite support, p0 =
1
2
[0, 1] + 1
2
[1, 0], pn = 1 [ζB, ζA], and the moves (or transitions)




pi,a [xa, y]→ pi+1 =
∑
b∈B




pi,a [y, xa]→ pi+1 =
∑
b∈B














where OMF is the cone of operator monotone functions. The purpose of the second condi-
tion is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is used to prove that if there is a point game
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with final point (ζB, ζA), then there exists a coin-flipping protocol with P
∗
B,1 ≤ ζB + δ and
P ∗A,0 ≤ ζA + δ, for any δ > 0 [Moc07]. Mochon proved that there exists a point game with
final point (1/2 + δ, 1/2 + δ), for any δ > 0, proving the existence of weak coin-flipping
protocols with arbitrarily small bias.
1.4.7 Technical lemmas
In this part, we present a few lemmas which are helpful during the analysis in this thesis.
Subspace Lemma
This first lemma is useful when developing the point games for the family of protocols
discussed in the next chapter. It is used to simplify dual constraints.
Lemma 1.4.9 (Subspace Lemma). For a vector |ψ〉 ∈ Cn, a set S ⊆ Σn, and a continuous,
monotonically nondecreasing function F , we have
inf
X,Y ∈Σn
{F (〈ψ|X|ψ〉) : X  Y, Y ∈ S} = inf
X,Y ∈Σn
{F (〈ψ|X|ψ〉) : 〈ψ|X|ψ〉 ≥ 〈ψ|Y |ψ〉, Y ∈ S}.
Proof. The proof follows by noticing that for any X ∈ ΣA, and any δ > 0, there is a
positive constant Λ such that
X(δ) := (〈ψ|X|ψ〉+ δ) |ψ〉〈ψ|+ Λ (I− |ψ〉〈ψ|)  X,
as noted in Subsection 1.4.6. Thus, we can assume X has |ψ〉 as an eigenvector and we are
only concerned with minimizing X on the subspace spanned by |ψ〉〈ψ|. Suppose X  Y ,
we see this implies
〈ψ|X|ψ〉 ≥ 〈ψ|Y |ψ〉. (1.3)
This is also a sufficient condition since any X that satisfies (1.3), we have for all δ > 0,
there is a Λ, such that X(δ)  Y (by the same argument showing X(δ)  X).
This lemma can be generalized. We can use this lemma whenever the constraint on X
is satisfied by replacing it with X(δ) for δ > 0. The most complicated constraints that
arise later in this thesis are of the form∑
x∈A
Wx,y ⊗ |x〉〈x| ⊗ IB  C,
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where Wx,y are the variables and the objective function is continuous and nondecreasing
on 〈φ|Wx,y|φ〉. We see that a necessary condition is∑
x∈A
〈φ|Wx,y|φ〉 · |x〉〈x| ⊗ IB  (〈φ| ⊗ IA ⊗ IB)C (|φ〉 ⊗ IA ⊗ IB).
By using a properly modified definition for Wx,y(δ), we have that this condition is also
sufficient. The idea is to increase the eigenvalues on subspaces that do not affect the
objective function.
SDP characterization of the fidelity of probability vectors
We characterize the fidelity of probability vectors using semidefinite programming. Note
that this is very closely related to the analysis of the fidelity function of quantum states
in [Wat09]. However, the primal SDP is slightly different and the details of the proofs are
useful later in this thesis.
Lemma 1.4.10. For any p, q ∈ RA+, we have
F(p, q) = max{〈X,√p√p>〉 : diag(X) = q, X ∈ ΣA+}.




q> is a feasible solution to the SDP with objective function
value F(p, q). All that remains to show is that it is an optimal solution. If p = 0, then we
are done, so assume p 6= 0. The dual can be written as
inf{〈y, q〉 : Diag(y)  √p√p>, y ∈ RA}.














if qa = 0,
ε if pa = 0, qa > 0.
We can check that 〈y(ε), q〉 → F(p, q) as ε → 0, so it suffices to show that y(ε) is dual
feasible for all ε > 0. To show this, we use the following trick. For any y > 0,

















p>Diag(y)−1/2 is rank 1 so the largest eigenvalue is equal to its
trace. From this, we can check that y(ε) is feasible for all sufficiently small ε > 0.
The proof above shows that




which is the classical version of Alberti’s Theorem [Alb83], which states that
F(ρ, σ) = inf
X0
〈X, ρ〉〈X−1, σ〉,
for any quantum states ρ and σ.
From the proof of Lemma 1.4.10, we see that we can apply the same trick to the
inequality
Diag(y)⊗ IA  |ψ〉〈ψ| (y > 0)
to get the equivalent condition
1 ≥ 〈ψ|Diag(y)−1 ⊗ IA|ψ〉,
which works for any |ψ〉 ∈ CA×A. In particular, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1.4.11. For any p ∈ RA+, we have that






Using Lemma 1.4.10, we can prove fidelity is concave.
Lemma 1.4.12. The classical fidelity function is concave on the nonnegative orthant.











q>〉 : diag(Xi) = pi, Xi  0},
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for i ∈ {1, 2}. Define X̄ := λX1 + (1− λ)X2. Then we have




q>〉 : diag(X) = λp1 + (1− λ)p2, X  0}
≥ 〈X̄,√q√q>〉 since X̄ is feasible
= λF(p1, q) + (1− λ) F(p2, q),
proving it is concave.
Note, we can also prove it is concave by showing the Hessian is negative semidefinite on
the interior of the nonnegative orthant. Since it is not negative definite, we know fidelity







 , p2 :=
 01
0





0 = F(λp1 + (1− λ)p2, q) 6> λF(p1, q) + (1− λ) F(p2, q) = 0.
The concavity of the fidelity function of quantum states can be proved using Uhlmann’s
Theorem [Uhl76], which states that
F(ρ, σ) = max
A,|ψ〉,|φ〉
|〈ψ|φ〉|2,
where TrA|ψ〉〈ψ| = ρ and TrA|φ〉〈φ| = σ.
Largest eigenvalue and trace distance characterizations

















η + τ +
√
(η − τ)2 + 4ητ F(p, q)
)
.














p = [1, 0, 0, . . . , 0]> and U
√
q = [sin θ, cos θ, 0, . . . , 0]>,
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q>) = η + τ
and, by taking the determinant of the only nonzero block, we get





η + τ +
√
(η − τ)2 + 4ητF(p, q)
)
, as desired.
Note that Lemma 1.4.13 shows that switching the roles of η and τ does not affect the
largest eigenvalue.




{βa,y} = 1 + ∆(β0, β1).



















{βa,y} = 2∆(β0, β1).
Putting it together, we have









Coin-flipping protocols based on
bit-commitment
The content of this chapter is based on my work with Ashwin Nayak and Levent Tunçel.
We now turn our attention to analyzing a family of quantum coin-flipping protocols
which are based on bit-commitment. This type of protocol was first considered in [NS03] as
a way to blend two bit-commitment protocols together to create a strong coin-flipping pro-
tocol. This style of protocol is also similar to the weak coin-flipping protocols in [Moc05]
which are analyzed using semidefinite programming. Like the analysis in [Moc05], this
chapter is concerned with gaining a better understanding of a family of coin-flipping pro-
tocols by studying their cheating SDPs.
The structure of this chapter is as follows:
• Section 2.1: We describe a family of coin-flipping protocols based on bit-commitment.
We call these BCCF-protocols.
• Section 2.1.1: We formulate the cheating strategies as SDPs.
• Section 2.1.2: We prove that we can simplify the SDPs by considering specific strate-
gies for each party. This results in the cheating probabilities being a maximum of a
linear combination of fidelity functions over probability vectors constrained to be in
a certain polytope. We call these problems the reduced SDPs or reduced problems.
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• Section 2.1.3: We show an immediate consequence of examining the reduced SDPs,
that we can assume each message consists of one qubit.
• Section 2.1.4: We show the simple nature of the reduced SDPs by modelling them as
SOCPs. That is, we can characterize the bias using a simpler class of optimization
problems.
• Section 2.1.5: Using the reduced SDPs and their duals, we develop the point games
corresponding to BCCF-protocols. We give a protocol-independent definition of
“BCCF-point games” and use it to define “BCCF-point game pairs” which is an
analog for strong coin-flipping. This leads to a relationship between the cheating
probabilities in BCCF-protocols and the “final points” of BCCF-point game pairs.
• Section 2.2: This section describes a family of “classical BCCF-protocols.” Using LP
formulations of cheating strategies, we develop their point games. Throughout the
process, we see how closely connected these protocols and point games are to their
quantum counterparts, and how the analysis is very similar. We use the point games
to (re)prove these classical protocols have bias ε = 1/2.
• Section 2.3: We present modified versions of Kitaev’s lower bounds for BCCF-
protocols that arise from the reduced cheating SDPs. We then show that if the
lower bounds are saturated, then the protocol is “classical” in a sense described
later. This rules out the possibility of quantum BCCF-protocols attaining a bias of
ε = 1/
√
2− 1/2 and shows a deeper connection to the classical version.
2.1 A family of quantum coin-flipping protocols
We now describe a family of protocols where Alice and Bob each choose a random bit and
commit to their respective bits by exchanging quantum states. Then they reveal their bits,
and send the remaining part of their quantum states for cheat detection purposes. Each
party checks the received state against the state claimed and, if both parties accept the
revealed values, the outcome of the protocol is the XOR of the committed bits.
The difficulty in designing a good protocol is in deciding how Alice and Bob should
commit their bits to each other. If Alice or Bob leak too much information too early, then
50
the other party has more information to form a cheating strategy. Thus, we try to maintain
a balance between the two parties so as to minimize the bias they can achieve by cheating.
Consider the following Cartesian product of finite sets A = A1×· · ·×An corresponding





αa,x |xx〉 ∈ CA×A
′
for a ∈ {0, 1} ,
where A′ is a copy of A. The reason we define the state over CA and a copy is because
in the protocol, Alice sends states in CA while retaining copies in CA′ until the end of the







|aa〉 ⊗ |ψa〉 ∈ CA0×A
′
0×A×A′ ,
where A0 = A
′
0 = {0, 1}. This yields the space CA0×A
′
0 to hold two copies of Alice’s bit
a ∈ {0, 1}.
We now describe the setting for Bob’s messages. Consider the following Cartesian
product of finite sets B = B1 × · · · ×Bn corresponding to Bob’s first n messages to Alice,





βb,y |yy〉 ∈ CB×B
′
for b ∈ {0, 1} ,
where B′ is a copy of B. Since Bob chooses b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random, we can






|bb〉 ⊗ |φb〉 ∈ CB0×B
′
0×B×B′ ,
where B0 = B
′
0 = {0, 1}. The space CB0×B
′
0 holds two copies of Bob’s bit b ∈ {0, 1}. We
now describe the steps of the protocol.
Protocol 2.1.1 (BCCF-protocol).
(i) Alice prepares the state |ψ〉 and Bob prepares the state |φ〉, as described above.
(ii) For i from 1 to n: Alice sends CAi to Bob who replies with CBi.
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(iii) Alice fully reveals her bit by sending CA′0. She also sends CA′ which Bob uses to check
if she was honest. Bob then reveals his bit by sending CB′0. He also sends CB′ which
Alice uses to check if he was honest.










|b̄〉〈b̄| ⊗ |b〉〈b| ⊗ |φb〉〈φb|, and
ΠA,abort := I− ΠA,0 − ΠA,1.










|ā〉〈ā| ⊗ |a〉〈a| ⊗ |ψa〉〈ψa|, and
ΠB,abort := I− ΠB,0 − ΠB,1.
A six-round BCCF-protocol is depicted in Figure 2.1. Note that the measurements
check two things. First, it checks whether the outcome, a⊕b, is 0 or 1. The first two terms
determine this, i.e., whether a = b or if a 6= b. Second, it checks whether the other party
was honest. For example, if Alice’s measurement projects onto a space where b = 0 and
Bob’s messages are not equal to |φ0〉, then Alice could detect Bob has cheated and abort.
BCCF-protocols are parameterized by A, B, and four probability vectors α0, α1, β0,
β1. It is a difficult problem to solve for the best choices of these parameters. Indeed, we do
not even have an upper bound on the sizes of A or B in an optimal protocol. However, we
can solve for the bias of a protocol once these parameters are fixed using the optimization
techniques in the next subsection.
We note here how this protocol fits the form discussed in Subsection 1.4.6. One dif-
ference is that we “send” the space, rather than swap the state with the message space
(to have it swapped into the other parties’ private space). Another difference is that the
messages in BCCF-protocols could have varying dimension. These types of messages can
easily be cast in the form in Subsection 1.4.6, although the extra information clutters the
underlying problem.
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Figure 2.1: Six-round BCCF-protocol. Alice’s actions in red, Bob’s actions in blue.
2.1.1 Quantum cheating strategy formulations
We can formulate strategies for cheating Bob and cheating Alice as semidefinite programs
in the same manner as Kitaev [Kit02]. The extent to which Bob can cheat is captured by
the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1.2. Bob’s optimal cheating probability for forcing honest Alice to accept the
outcome c ∈ {0, 1} is given by the optimal objective value of the following semidefinite
program:
P ∗B,c = sup 〈 ρF ,ΠA,c 〉
subject to TrB1(ρ1) = TrA1|ψ〉〈ψ|,
TrBj(ρj) = TrAj(ρj−1), ∀j ∈ {2, . . . , n},
TrB′×B′0(ρF ) = TrA′×A′0(ρn),
ρj ∈ Σ
A0×A′0×B1×···×Bj×Aj+1×···×An×A′





The actions of a cheating Bob and the variables in the SDP above are depicted in
Figure 2.2 below. Note that the data defining this SDP is real and thus we can restrict
ourselves to real matrix variables without loss of generality. This is because the real part
of any complex feasible solution is also feasible and has the same objective function value.
Figure 2.2: Bob cheating in a six-round BCCF-protocol. Alice’s actions in red, Bob’s
actions in blue.
Proof. The variables are the density matrices under Alice’s control after each of Bob’s
messages. The partial trace is trace-preserving, so any feasible solution satisfies
Tr(ρF ) = Tr(ρn) = · · · = Tr(ρ1) = Tr|ψ〉〈ψ| = 1.
Since ρ1, . . . , ρn, ρF are constrained to be positive semidefinite, they are valid quantum
states.
Bob sends CB1 to Alice replacing CA1 which was sent to Bob. Thus, ρ1, the density
matrix Alice has after Bob’s first message, satisfies
TrB1(ρ1) = TrA1|ψ〉〈ψ|.
54
Similarly, for each j ∈ {2, . . . , n}, we have the constraint
TrBj(ρj) = TrAj(ρj−1),
for each ρj after Bob’s j’th message, and
TrB′×B′0(ρF ) = TrA′×A′0(ρn),
for ρF being the state Alice has at the end of the protocol. She then measures ρF and
accepts c with probability 〈ρF ,ΠA,c〉.
These constraints are necessary conditions on the states under Alice’s control. We now
show that every feasible solution to the above problem yields a valid cheating strategy for
Bob with success probability equal to the objective function value of the feasible solution.
He can find such a strategy by maintaining a purification of each density matrix under
Alice’s control. For example, suppose the protocol starts in the state |ψ〉⊗ |φ′〉, where Bob
creates |φ′〉 ∈ CK := CB0×B′0×B×B′×K′ and CK′ is extra space Bob uses to cheat. Consider
|τ〉 ∈ CA0×A′0×A×A′×K a purification of ρ1 and |η〉 := |ψ〉 ⊗ |φ′〉, a purification of |ψ〉. Since
TrB1(ρ1) = TrA1|ψ〉〈ψ|, we have
TrA1×K |τ〉〈τ | = TrB1(ρ1) = TrA1|ψ〉〈ψ| = TrA1×K |η〉〈η|.
Thus, there exists a unitary U which acts on CA1×K which maps |τ〉 to |η〉. If Bob applies
this unitary after Alice’s first message and sends CB1 back then he creates ρ1 under Alice’s
control. The same argument can be applied to the remaining constraints.
The states corresponding to an honest Bob yield a feasible solution. Attainment of an
optimal solution follows from continuity of the objective function and from the feasible
region being nonempty and compact. An optimal solution yields an optimal cheating
strategy.
In a similar fashion, we formulate cheating strategies for Alice in the lemma below.
Lemma 2.1.3. Alice’s optimal cheating probability for forcing honest Bob to accept the
outcome c ∈ {0, 1} is given by the optimal objective value of the following semidefinite
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program:
P ∗A,c = sup 〈σF ,ΠB,c ⊗ IB′0×B′〉
subject to TrA1(σ1) = |φ〉〈φ|,
TrAj(σj) = TrBj−1(σj−1), ∀j ∈ {2, . . . , n} ,
TrA′×A′0(σF ) = TrBn(σn),
σj ∈ Σ
B0×B′0×A1×···×Aj×Bj×···×Bn×B′




The actions of a cheating Alice and the variables in the SDP above are depicted in
Figure 2.3. Again, we can restrict ourselves to real matrices without loss of generality.
Figure 2.3: Alice cheating in a six-round BCCF-protocol. Alice’s actions in red, Bob’s
actions in blue.
Proof. The proof for this is almost exactly the same as the case for cheating Bob. We let
the variables be the states in Bob’s control after each of Alice’s messages. There are two
key differences. One is that Alice sends the first message and Bob sends the last, explaining
the slightly different constraints. Secondly, Bob measures only the CB0×A′0×A×A′ part of his
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state after Alice’s last message, i.e., he measures the state described by TrB′0×B′(σF ). Note
that the adjoint of the partial trace can be written as Tr∗A(Y ) = Y ⊗ IA, which is evident
from the definition. Therefore, we can write
〈TrB′0×B′(σF ),ΠB,c〉 = 〈σF ,ΠB,c ⊗ IB′0×B′〉,
which explains the objective function.
We refer to these SDPs as Bob’s and Alice’s cheating SDPs, respectively. Analyzing
and solving these SDPs numerically get increasingly difficult and time consuming as n
increases since the dimensions of the positive semidefinite variables increase exponentially
with the number of qubits in the communication. We make use of the reductions described
in the next subsection.
2.1.2 Reduced formulations of quantum strategies
We now prove that the cheating SDPs can have a certain, restricted form while retaining
the same optimal objective function value. That is, we cut down the feasible region to
something that is much cleaner and illustrates the simple communication of the protocol.
The main technique used in proving that we do not cut off any optimal solutions comes
from duality theory of semidefinite programming. We generalize the following idea. If we
wish to prove that a certain feasible solution is optimal for the primal problem, it suffices
to exhibit a dual solution with the same objective function value. Here, we claim that
a restricted feasible region contains an optimal solution. Let p∗1 be the optimal value of





optimal values of the respective dual problems and assume all of them are finite. We want
to show that p∗1 = p
∗
2. Suppose the restricted problem and its dual have zero duality gap
(which can be guaranteed if restricting the feasible region does not cut off all the strictly
feasible points). Then if we can prove that d∗1 ≤ d∗2, we have
p∗1 ≤ d∗1 ≤ d∗2 = p∗2 ≤ p∗1,
proving p∗1 = p
∗
2 as desired. To show d
∗
1 ≤ d∗2, it suffices to find a restriction of the dual of
the original SDP to get to a problem equivalent to the dual of the restricted SDP. This is
depicted in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: There exist optimal solutions in certain restrictions of the feasible regions of
the cheating SDPs.
Cheating Bob
Let xi denote an element of Ai and let yi denote an element of Bi, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We now restrict the feasible region of Bob’s cheating SDPs by defining the following primal
feasible solution. Intuitively, Bob creates a state similar to his honest state, but the am-
plitudes are being changed during each message according to all of the previously revealed







|x1, . . . , xj〉〈x1, . . . , xj| ⊗ |ψx1,...,xj〉〈ψx1,...,xj | ⊗Diag(pj),





where pj ∈ R
A1×B1×···×Aj×Bj























αa,x[pn]x,y |yy〉, ∀a ∈ {0, 1}.








(αa ⊗ IA)>pn, βa
)
and the variables (p1, . . . , pn) belong to a polytope which we refer to as Bob’s cheating
polytope, defined below.
Definition 2.1.4. We define Bob’s cheating polytope, denoted PB, as the set of vectors
(p1, p2, . . . , pn) satisfying
TrB1(p1) = eA1 ,
TrB2(p2) = p1 ⊗ eA2 ,
...
TrBn(pn) = pn−1 ⊗ eAn ,
pj ∈ R
A1×B1×···×Aj×Bj
+ , for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
where eAj denotes the vector of all ones in the corresponding space CAj .
Since we have restricted the feasible region of a maximization SDP, we have proved
that





(αa ⊗ IB)>pn, βa
)
: (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB
 .













(αa ⊗ IB)>pn, βā
)
: (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB
 .
This swaps Bob’s choice of commitment reveal in the last message.
We now argue that the above inequalities hold with equality.
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Theorem 2.1.5 (Bob’s reduced problems). For the BCCF-protocol defined by the param-
eters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB, we have





(αa ⊗ IB)>pn, βa
)
: (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB

and





(αa ⊗ IB)>pn, βā
)
: (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB
 .
Note that we sometimes refer to this reduced problem as Bob’s reduced SDP. This
implies we have replaced the fidelity with its SDP characterization from Subsection 1.4.7.
We do the same for cheating Alice, to come.
Proof. We begin by proving this for the case of P ∗B,0. Consider the dual of Bob’s cheating
SDP below:
P ∗B,0 = inf 〈W1,TrA1 |ψ〉〈ψ|〉
subject to Wj ⊗ IBj  Wj+1 ⊗ IAj+1 ,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} ,
Wn ⊗ IBn  Wn+1 ⊗ IA′ ⊗ IA′0 ,




for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Wn+1 ∈ ΣA0×B.











|x1, y1, . . . , yj−1, xj〉〈x1, y1, . . . , yj−1, xj| ⊗Wj,x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj ,











subject to Wj,x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj 
∑
xj+1
|xj+1〉〈xj+1| ⊗ IAj+1 ⊗Wj+1,x1,y1,...,yj ,xj+1 ,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} ,
(x1, . . . , xj) ∈ A1 × · · · × Aj,











, for all a ∈ {0, 1},







, for all a ∈ {0, 1}, if Bob is cheating towards 1 and the rest of the
proof follows similarly in this case. Note that this shows d∗2 ≥ P ∗B,0.
Since the objective function only depends on W1,x1 in the subspace |ψx1〉〈ψx1|, we apply













|x3〉〈x3| ⊗ IA3 ⊗W3,x1,y2,x2,y2,x3 .
Since the objective function value only depends on 〈ψx1,x2 |W2,x1,y1,x2|ψx1,x2〉, we can repeat





Continuing in this fashion, we can replace each constraint to get the following problem
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for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} ,
(x1, . . . , xj+1) ∈ A1 × · · · × Aj+1,











, for all a ∈ {0, 1}.
Define
wj,x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj := 〈ψx1,...,xj |Wj,x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj |ψx1,...,xj〉,










for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} ,
(x1, . . . , xj+1) ∈ A1 × · · · × Aj+1,













,∀a ∈ {0, 1}.
This problem has a strictly feasible solution and the objective function is bounded from
below on the feasible region, thus strong duality holds and there is zero duality gap. The














〉 : diag(ρa) = (αa ⊗ IB)>pn, ∀a ∈ {0, 1}
 ,






We now restrict the feasible region of Alice’s cheating SDPs by defining the following primal








|y1, . . . , yj−1〉〈y1, . . . , yj−1| ⊗ |φy1,...,yj−1〉〈φy1,...,yj−1| ⊗Diag(sj),






|a〉〈a| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ |φy〉〈φy| ⊗ |φ′a,y〉〈φ′a,y|,
where sj ∈ R
A1×B1×···×Bj−1×Aj




















sa,y,x |xx〉, ∀y ∈ B, a ∈ {0, 1}.
With this restriction, we can write the new objective function for forcing outcome 0 as









where s(a,y) ∈ CA is defined as the restriction of s with a and y fixed. We can define it
element-wise as [s(a,y)]x := sa,y,x. The new objective function for forcing outcome 1 is









The variables (s1, . . . , sn, s) belong to a polytope which we refer to as Alice’s cheating
polytope, defined below.
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Definition 2.1.6. We define Alice’s cheating polytope, denoted PA, as the set of vectors
(s1, s2, . . . , sn, s) satisfying
TrA1(s1) = 1,
TrA2(s2) = s1 ⊗ eB1 ,
...
TrAn(sn) = sn−1 ⊗ eBn−1 ,
TrA′0(s) = sn ⊗ eBn ,
s1 ∈ RA1+ ,
sj ∈ R
A1×B1×···×Bj−1×Aj





where eBj is the vector of all ones in the corresponding space CBj .
We have proved






(a,y), αa) : (s1, . . . , sn, s) ∈ PA

and






(a,y), αa) : (s1, . . . , sn, s) ∈ PA
 .
The following theorem shows that the above inequalities hold with equality.
Theorem 2.1.7 (Alice’s reduced problems). For the BCCF-protocol defined by the param-
eters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB, we have






(a,y), αa) : (s1, . . . , sn, s) ∈ PA

and






(a,y), αa) : (s1, . . . , sn, s) ∈ PA
 .
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Proof. Consider the dual to Alice’s cheating SDP for forcing outcome 0, below:
P ∗A,0 = inf 〈Z1, |φ〉〈φ|〉
subject to Zj ⊗ IAj  Zj+1 ⊗ IBj ,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} ,




for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n, n+ 1}.











|x1, y1, . . . , xj, yj〉〈x1, y1, . . . , xj, yj| ⊗ Zj+1,x1,y1,...,xj ,yj ,
for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Substituting this into the constraints, we get the following new problem
d∗2 = inf 〈Z1, |φ〉〈φ|〉
subject to Z1 
∑
y1




|yj〉〈yj| ⊗ IBj ⊗ Zj+1,x1,y1,...,xj ,yj ,
for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n},
(x1, . . . , xj) ∈ A1 × · · · × Aj,
(y1, . . . , yj) ∈ B1 × · · · ×Bj,∑
x∈A
Zn+1,x,y ⊗ |x〉〈x| ⊗ IA′  |a〉〈a| ⊗ IB′0 ⊗ |ψa〉〈ψa|, ∀a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B.
This shows that d∗2 ≥ P ∗A,0. Applying the Subspace Lemma (Lemma 1.4.9) recursively, as






〈φy1,...,yj |Zj+1,x1,y1,...,xj ,yj |φy1,...,yj〉,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
(x1, . . . , xj) ∈ A1 × · · · × Aj,
(y1, . . . , yj) ∈ B1 × · · · ×Bj,∑
x∈A
〈φy|Zn+1,x,y|φy〉 |x〉〈x| ⊗ IA′  12βa,y |ψa〉〈ψa|, for all a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B.
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Defining
zj+1,x1,y1,...,xj ,yj := 〈φy1,...,yj |Zj+1,x1,y1,...,xj ,yj |φy1,...,yj〉,







for y ∈ B, we get the following problem:
d∗2 = inf z1




for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
(x1, . . . , xj) ∈ A1 × · · · × Aj,








>, for all y ∈ B, a ∈ {0, 1}.
This problem has a strictly feasible solution and the objective function is bounded from














>〉 : diag(σa,y) = s(a,y), ∀a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B

which is equivalent to Alice’s reduced problem for forcing outcome 0 by Lemma 1.4.10 and





The case for forcing outcome 1 is almost the exact same, except every occurrence of αa













>〉 : diag(σa,y) = s(a,y), ∀a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B
 .
Since the last constraint is symmetric in a, we can replace s(a,y) with s(ā,y) (and σa,y with

















We note here that we can get similar reductions if Alice chooses a with a non-uniform
probability distribution and similarly for Bob. It only changes the 1/2 multiplicative factor
in the reduced problems to something that depends on a and the proofs are nearly identical.
We can also prove these two theorems using the primal SDPs alone. These proofs rely
on the fact that for any x ∈ CA, the set
{λxx∗ : λ > 0}
is an extreme ray of the cone of positive semidefinite matrices. That is, if X1, X2 ∈ ΣA+
satisfy X1 + X2 = λxx
∗, for some λ > 0, then X1 = λ1 xx
∗ and X2 = λ2 xx
∗ for some
λ1, λ2 ≥ 0, satisfying λ1 + λ2 = λ.
The structure of certain optimal solutions shown in this subsection was an observation
after numerically solving some of the cheating SDPs from the last subsection. We note that
there are some similarities between the reduced problems above and the optimal solutions of
the cheating SDPs for the weak coin-flipping protocols in [Moc05]. The protocols Mochon
considers in [Moc05] also give rise to “reduced problems” being the maximization of fidelity
functions over a polytope. However, the analysis is much cleaner in Mochon’s work since
the objective function only involves a single fidelity function as opposed to the linear
combination of fidelity functions that arise in BCCF-protocols. This difference is due
to the fact that weak coin-flipping protocols often allow a stronger cheat detection step
than those for strong coin-flipping. Having a single fidelity function allowed Mochon to
construct an optimal solution using a dynamic programming approach. The structure of
the objective functions in the reduced problems above for BCCF-protocols does not reveal
an obvious way to solve it using dynamic programming, making this family of protocols
harder to analyze.
A succinct way to write the duals of the reduced cheating problems
In this part, we present a simple form for the duals of the reduced cheating SDPs. We
show that we only need to consider the variables in the positive semidefiniteness constraints,
since the linear inequalities reveal how to optimally assign the rest of the variables.
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Sometimes it is easier to work with the succinct form developed in this section because
handling many dual variables can overcomplicate simple ideas.
Consider Bob’s reduced cheating SDP, below, using the SDP characterization for fidelity

















subject to w1 ⊗ eB1 ≥ TrA2(w2),
w2 ⊗ eB2 ≥ TrA3(w3),
...
wn ⊗ eBn ≥ 12
∑







, for all a ∈ {0, 1}.




w2,x1,y1,x2 for all x1 ∈ A1, y1 ∈ B1. Once we fix a value for w2, an optimal
choice of w1 is w1,x1 = maxy1
∑
x2




















































each for forcing outcome 0. We can switch β0 with β1 to get the succinct forms for forcing
outcome 1.
Sometimes these forms for the duals are convenient, as seen in the next subsection.
2.1.3 An SDP proof for why qubit messages are sufficient
In this subsection, we show how the succinct representation of the duals helps us prove
a novel result, that we can bound the dimension of the messages in a BCCF-protocol.
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However, the analysis in the rest of the thesis is general and does not assume this result
unless otherwise stated.
We use the reduced cheating SDPs to prove that we can assume Ai = Bi = {0, 1}, that
is, each message is a single qubit. More specifically, we show that for any BCCF-protocol,
there exists another BCCF-protocol with qubit messages where the bias is no larger. We
prove it for Alice’s messages as the proof for Bob’s messages is nearly identical.
Suppose we have a protocol defined by
A = A1 × · · ·An, B = B1 × · · · ×Bn, α0, α1 ∈ ProbA, β0, β1 ∈ ProbB.
Suppose Alice’s i’th message has large dimension, that is, |Ai| > 2. We define a new
protocol by replacing Ai with A
′
i×A′′i , where Ai ⊆ A′i×A′′i . Notice that α0 and α1 can be
viewed as probability distributions over A1 × · · ·Ai−1 × A′i × A′′i × Ai+1 × · · · × An in the
obvious way. We also add a “dummy” message from Bob by adding Bd in between Bi and
Bi+1. This dummy message needs to be independent of the protocol, so we can suppose
Bob sends |0〉. This effectively replaces βb with β′b := βb ⊗ [1, 0]>d , for each b ∈ {0, 1}. If
Alice and Bob cannot cheat more in this new protocol, then we can repeat these arguments
to show that all of Alice’s messages are qubit messages by inductively breaking up the CAi
spaces.
Bob’s cheating probabilities do not increase
We now show that Bob cannot use the extra message to cheat more in the new protocol.
We show this by constructing a dual feasible solution.
In the original protocol, cheating Bob can force outcome 0 with maximum probability




























In the new protocol, cheating Bob can force outcome 0 with maximum probability given



































For any (v0, v1) feasible in the first problem, we can define a solution feasible in the sec-
ond problem (ṽ0, ṽ1) :=
(
v0 ⊗ [1, 0]>d , v1 ⊗ [1, 0]>d
)
with the same objective function value.




1, i.e., if Bob wants
outcome 1. Since these are minimization problems, Bob can cheat no more in the new
protocol.
Alice’s cheating probabilities do not increase
We now show that Alice cannot use her extra message to cheat more in the new protocol.
To show this, we repeat the same argument as in the case for cheating Bob.
In the original protocol, cheating Alice can force outcome 0 with maximum probability

























In the new protocol, cheating Alice can force outcome 0 with maximum probability































For any zn+1 feasible in the first problem, we can define a solution feasible in the second
problem z̃n+1 := zn+1 ⊗ [1, 0]>d with the same objective function value. Notice the same




1, i.e., if Alice wants outcome 1. Since
these are minimization problems, Alice can cheat no more in the new protocol.
2.1.4 SOCP formulations of quantum strategies
We show that the reduced SDPs can be modelled using a simpler class of optimization
problems. We give details in this subsection and explain the significance to solving these
problems numerically.
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pi ti : t
2
i ≤ qi, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, q ∈ Rn+ ∩ S
}
,
where p ∈ Rn+ and S ⊆ Rn. We can replace t2i ≤ qi with the equivalent constraint
(1/2, qi, ti) ∈ RSOC3, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Therefore, we can maximize the fidelity using
n rotated second-order cone constraints.








F(pj, qj) : (q1, . . . , qm) ∈ Rmn+ ∩ S ′
}
,
where a ∈ Rm+ and S ′ ⊆ Rmn. However, this does not apply directly to the reduced problems
in Subsection 2.1.2 since we need to optimize over a linear combination of fidelities and





aj F(pj, qj) : (q1, . . . , qm) ∈ Rmn+ ∩ S ′
}
.
The root of this problem arises from the fact that the fidelity function, which is concave, is
a composition of a concave function with a convex function, thus we cannot break it into
these two steps. Even though the above analysis does not work to capture the reduced
cheating SDPs as SOCPs, it does have a desirable property that it only uses O(n) second-
order cone constraints and perhaps this formulation will be useful for future applications.
We now explain how to model the reduced problems as SOCPs directly.
Lemma 2.1.8. For p, q ∈ Rn+, we have







pipj ti,j : (qi, qj, ti,j) ∈ RSOC3, for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
}
.
Proof. For every i, j ∈ {1, , . . . , n}, we have (qi, qj, ti,j) ∈ RSOC3 if and only if qi, qj ≥ 0,
and 2qiqj ≥ t2i,j. Thus, ti,j =
√






2pipjqiqj = F(p, q),
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as desired.
This lemma provides an SOCP representation for the hypograph of the fidelity function.
Recall that the hypograph of a concave function is a convex set. Also, the dimension of
the hypograph of F(·, q) : Rn+ → R is equal to n (assuming q > 0). Since the hypograph
is O(n)-dimensional and convex, there exists a self-concordant barrier function for the
set with complexity parameter O(n), shown by Nesterov and Nemirovski [NN94]. This
allows the derivation of interior-point methods for the underlying convex optimization
problem which use O(
√
n log(1/ε)) iterations, where ε is an accuracy parameter. The
above lemma uses Ω(n2) second-order cone constraints and the usual treatment of these
“cone constraints” with optimal self-concordant barrier functions lead to interior-point
methods with an iteration complexity bound of O(n log(1/ε)). It is conceivable that there
exist better convex representations of the hypograph of the fidelity function than the one
we provided in Lemma 2.1.8.
Finding efficient SOCP formulations of the fidelity
We use the analysis of the fidelity function in Subsection 1.4.7 to develop an SOCP
formulation of the fidelity function using O(n) SOC constraints as opposed to the Ω(n2)
above. Note that this SOCP characterization is through a dual problem and does not
characterize the hypograph of the fidelity function.
Lemma 2.1.9. For p, q ∈ Rn+, we have
F(p, q) = inf{〈v, p〉 : 〈ξ, q〉 ≤ 1, (vi, ξi,
√
2) ∈ RSOC3, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}.
Proof. Using Lemma 1.4.10, we have
F(p, q) = max{〈ρ,√q√q>〉 : diag(ρ) = p, ρ  0}
= inf{〈v, p〉 : Diag(v)  √q√q>}















, the result follows.
Note, we can write the RSOC constraint above as
(v, ξ,
√






We can similarly formulate the fidelity of the quantum states ρ and σ using the following
SDP version of Alberti’s Theorem [Alb83]
F(ρ, σ) = inf
{








Note that the identity matrices on the off-diagonal blocks force X and R to be invertible.
We can now calculate the bias of a BCCF-protocol using second-order cone program-
ming as shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1.10. For the BCCF-protocol defined by the parameters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and
β0, β1 ∈ ProbB, we have























































































2.1.5 Point games for BCCF-protocols
In this subsection, we develop the point games corresponding to BCCF-protocols providing
us with a new perspective for studying them. In theory, one can use them to prove protocols
with a certain bias exist. In Section 2.2, we use them to lower bound the bias of “classical
BCCF-protocols.”
We start by examining Kitaev’s lower bound involving the quantities P ∗B,1 and P
∗
A,0.
Since we are concerned with strong coin-flipping, the choice of Bob desiring outcome 1 and
Alice desiring outcome 0 for this part is somewhat arbitrary. However, this way we can
compare them to point games for other classes of weak coin-flipping protocols (see [Moc07]).
We later show that we lose no generality in choosing these two values, as we consider all
four values simultaneously by viewing the point games in pairs (more on this later).
For any δ > 0, we can choose (W1, . . . ,Wn+1) feasible in the dual of Bob’s cheating
SDP and (Z1, . . . , Zn+1) feasible in the dual of Alice’s cheating SDP such that(
P ∗B,1 + δ
) (
P ∗A,0 + δ
)
> 〈W1 ⊗ Z1,TrA1|ξ1〉〈ξ1|〉
≥ 〈W1 ⊗ Z2,TrB1|ξ′1〉〈ξ′1|〉
≥ 〈W2 ⊗ Z2,TrA2|ξ2〉〈ξ2|〉
≥ 〈W2 ⊗ Z3,TrB2|ξ′2〉〈ξ′2|〉
...
≥ 〈Wn+1 ⊗ Zn+1,TrA′0×A′|ξn+1〉〈ξn+1|〉
≥ 〈Wn+1 ⊗ ΠB,0,TrB′0×B′ |ξ
′
n+1〉〈ξ′n+1|〉
≥ 〈ΠA,1 ⊗ ΠB,0, |ξn+2〉〈ξn+2|〉
= 0,
where |ξj〉 and |ξ′j〉 are equal to |ψ〉|φ〉 with the spaces permuted accordingly. Note that
these are dual variables from the original cheating SDPs, not the reduced version. The
dual variables for the reduced version are scaled eigenvalues of the corresponding dual
variables above. However, we do reconstruct Kitaev’s proof above using the reduced SDPs
in Section 2.3.
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Recall for a quantum state σ, we denote by Prob(X, Y, σ) the function







Y , σ〉 [λ, µ] ,
where [λ, µ] : R2 → R denotes the function that takes value 1 on input (λ, µ) and 0
otherwise. We create a point game as follows:
p0 := Prob(ΠA,1 ⊗ ΠB,0, |ξn+2〉〈ξn+2|),
p′1 := Prob(Wn+1 ⊗ ΠB,0,TrB′0×B′ |ξ
′
n+1〉〈ξ′n+1|),
p1 := Prob(Wn+1 ⊗ Zn+1,TrA′0×A′|ξ
′
n+1〉〈ξ′n+1|),
p′(n+2)−j := Prob(Wj ⊗ Zj+1,TrBj |ξ′j〉〈ξ′j|), for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
p(n+2)−j := Prob(Wj ⊗ Zj,TrAj |ξj〉〈ξj|), for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
noting that the i’th point corresponds to the i’th last message in the protocol. The reason
we define point games this way is so that they always have the same starting state and it
is shown later that the final point captures the two objective function values of the two
dual feasible solutions. The reverse time order ensures that we always start with the same
p0 and aim to get a desirable last point, instead of the other way around.
This gives rise to the point game moves (or transitions):
p0 → p′1 → p1 → · · · → p′j → pj → · · · → p′n+1 → pn+1,
which we give context to in the next subsection.
First, we calculate Prob(Wj, Zj,TrAj |ξj〉〈ξj|), for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 2.1.11. For a string z ∈ {0, 1}∗, we define p(z) as the probability of string z
being revealed during an honest run of a fixed BCCF-protocol.
Note we have p(x1, . . . , xj) = 〈ψx1,...,xj |ψx1,...,xj〉, for all (x1, . . . , xj) ∈ A1×· · ·×Aj, and
p(y1, . . . , yj) = 〈ψy1,...,yj |ψy1,...,yj〉, for all (y1, . . . , yj) ∈ B1 × · · · ×Bj, for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.




, where wj is the corresponding variable in the dual of Bob’s
reduced cheating SDP. Note that p(x1, . . . , xj) = 0 implies wj,x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj = 0, so we do
not need to worry about this case (nor the division by 0). The same argument holds in the
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:= |x1, y1, . . . , yj−1, xj〉〈x1, y1, . . . , yj−1, xj| ⊗ |ψ̃x1,...,xj〉〈ψ̃x1,...,xj |,
where |ψ̃x1,...,xj〉 is |ψx1,...,xj〉 normalized. The other eigenvalues do not contribute to the
points (this can be verified since these eigenvalues already contribute to probabilities adding
to 1). Similarly, an optimal choice of Zj has eigenvalues
zj,x1,y1,...,xj−1,yj−1
p(y1,...,yj−1)
, where zj is





:= |x1, y1, . . . , xj−1, yj−1〉〈x1, y1, . . . , xj−1, yj−1| ⊗ |φ̃y1,...,yj−1〉〈φ̃y1,...,yj−1|,
where, again, |φ̃y1,...,yj−1〉 is |φy1,...,yj−1〉 normalized.











⊗ Π[x1,y1,...,xj−1,yj−1]Zj ,TrAj |ξj〉〈ξj|〉
= δx1,x′1 · · · δxj−1,x′j−1δy1,y′1 · · · δyj−1,y′j−1 p(x1, y1, . . . , yj−1, xj).
Thus, we have the point











p(x1, y1, . . . , yj−1, xj)
[
wj,x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj
p(x1, . . . , xj)
,
zj,x1,y1,...,xj−1,yj−1
p(y1, . . . , yj−1)
]
.
We can similarly calculate











p(x1, y1, . . . , xj, yj)
[
wj,x1,y1,...,yj−1,xj
p(x1, . . . , xj)
,
zj+1,x1,y1,...,xj ,yj
p(y1, . . . , yj)
]
.
The first three points are different from above, they concern the last few messages in




































noting zn+1,x,y > 0 when p(y) > 0.
We call any point game for a BCCF-protocol a BCCF-point game. In the next subsec-
tion, we describe rules for moving from one point to the next in any BCCF-point game
yielding a protocol independent definition.
2.1.6 Describing BCCF-point games using basic moves
Below are some basic point moves (or transitions) as Mochon describes them in [Moc07].
Definition 2.1.12 (Basic moves).
• Point raising
q [w, z]→ q [w, z′] , (z ≤ z′),
• Point merging


















→ q1 [w, z1] + q2 [w, z2] , (z1, z2 6= 0).
An example of point splitting and point raising can be seen in Figure 2.5 and examples
of point mergings can be seen in Figures 2.6 and 2.7. Using a slight abuse of the definition
of point splitting, if we perform a point split then raise the points, we still refer to this as a
point split (for reasons that will be clear later). Also, we can merge or split on more than
two points by repeating the process two points at a time.
These are moves in the second coordinate (keeping the first coordinate fixed) called
vertical moves, and we similarly define horizontal moves acting on the first coordinate
(keeping the second coordinate fixed).
Mochon gives a rough interpretation of these moves in [Moc07]. We can think of point
raising as receiving a message, point merging as generating a message, and point splitting as
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checking a message via quantum measurement. These interpretations apply to the family of
weak coin-flipping protocols in [Moc05], and we show they also apply to BCCF-protocols.
Below are some special cases of these moves which are useful when describing BCCF-
point games.
• Probability splitting
(q1 + q2)[z, w]→ q1[z, w] + q2[z, w],
• Probability merging
q1[z, w] + q2[z, w]→ (q1 + q2)[z, w],
• Aligning
q1[z1, w] + q2[z2, w]→ q1[max {z1, z2} , w] + q2[max {z1, z2} , w].
Probability splitting is the special case of point splitting where the resulting points have
the same value and probability merging is the special case of point merging where all the
points have the same value. Aligning is just raising two points to the maximum of the two
(usually so a merge can be performed on the other coordinate).
We now show that each move in a BCCF-point game can be described using basic




















p(y, b) [vb,y, 1] ,










p(y, b) [vb,y, 1] ,










p(y, b̄) [vb,y, 0] ,







, for all a ∈ {0, 1}.
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when va > 0, which is the condition for a point split. Technically, a point split would have
this inequality satisfied with equality, but we can always raise the points such that we get
an inequality. As explained earlier, we just call this a point split.
We can interpret the point raise as Alice accepting Bob’s last message b, and the point
split as Alice checking Bob’s state at the end of the protocol using her measurement. Note
that these are the last two actions of a BCCF-protocol.





















































, for all b ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ supp(βb).
The points at this stage can be seen in Figure 2.5 for the special case of a four-round
BCCF-protocol with |A| = |B| = 2 (noting that p(y, b) = 1
2
βb,y).















p(y, b̄)αb,x [vb,y, 0] ,


















Figure 2.5: Left: Point splitting [1, 0] and point raising [0, 1]. Right: Four point splittings.
(Point labels omitted for clarity.)




























where the quantity on the right just relabelled b as a. The transitions here were point
splitting, point merging, and point raising (from the dual constraint on zx,y, we can think
of it as being a maximum over a, corresponding to a raise). These correspond to Bob
checking Alice, Bob generating b, and Bob receiving a, respectively.



























all we do is merge a, then align yn ∈ Bn in the first coordinate. To see why this is valid,










This corresponds to Alice generating a and receiving Bob’s message yn ∈ Bn. This is
depicted in Figure 2.6, below.
Figure 2.6: Left: Eight point merges (vertical). Right: Four point merges (horizontal).
(Point labels omitted for clarity.)


























p(y1, . . . , yn−1)
]
,
we merge on yn ∈ Bn then align xn ∈ An in the second coordinate. The dual constraint















where z1 is Alice’s dual objective function value. If we merge on x1, we get Bob’s dual





Therefore, if (w1, . . . , wn, v0, v1) is feasible for the dual of Bob’s reduced cheating SDP and
(z1, . . . , zn, zn+1) is feasible for the dual of Alice’s reduced cheating SDP, then the final
point of the point game is comprised of the two dual objective function values, as seen in
Figure 2.7, below.
Figure 2.7: Left: Two point merges (vertical). Right: Last point merge (horizontal).
(Point labels omitted for clarity.)
We summarize this entire process as a list of basic moves on the following page.
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→ 1 [ζB, ζA] merge x1.
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Therefore, an optimal assignment of variables in the duals of the reduced cheating
SDPs corresponds to a minimal choice of ζB and ζA. We now argue that these duals attain
an optimal solution. Since the optimal objective values are bounded above by 1, we can
upper bound the values on all of the variables in the duals accordingly (it can be shown
that va,y ≤ 2|A|, for all a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B and the rest of the variables in the four duals are
bounded above by 1). Also, they are bounded below by 0 from the positive semidefiniteness
constraints. Since we are optimizing a continuous function over a compact set, we have
that an optimal solution exists.
From the point game above, we see that the only freedom is in how we choose the point
splits, the rest of the points are determined from the merges and aligns. We have seen this
idea before, in the succinct form of the duals of the reduced SDPs in Subsection 2.1.2. In
each of the succinct forms of these duals, the only freedom is in how we choose to satisfy
the last constraints. Once these variables were fixed, there was an obvious way to choose
an optimal assignment of the rest of the variables. Coincidentally, the last constraints in
each dual correspond to the point splits in the point game.
This brings us to the following protocol independent definition of BCCF-point games.
Definition 2.1.14 (BCCF-point game (protocol independent definition)). A BCCF-point
game defined on the parameters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB, with final point [ζB, ζA],







[0, 1]→ p1 → p2 → · · · → pm := [ζB, ζA] ,
where the transitions are exactly the basic moves as described in Point Game 2.1.13.
As mentioned above, one only has the freedom to choose how the points are split at the
beginning, the rest of the points are determined. Thus, every choice of point splitting yields
a potentially different point game (keeping α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB fixed). A
BCCF-point game is defined on the parameters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB which
are the same parameters that uniquely define a BCCF-protocol. However, there could be
many point games corresponding to these same parameters. The analogous concept for
BCCF-protocols is that there could be many cheating strategies for the same protocol. Of
course, there is an optimal cheating strategy just as there is an optimal BCCF-point game.
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The above definition is protocol independent since we have defined starting points, an
ending point, and a description of how to move the points around. Indeed, the “rules”
for the point moves correspond exactly to dual feasible solutions with objective function
values being the two coordinates of the final point. This yields the following lemma which
is the application of weak and strong duality in the language of protocols and point games.
Lemma 2.1.15. Suppose [ζB, ζA] is the final point of a BCCF-point game defined on the
parameters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB. Then
P ∗B,1 ≤ ζB and P ∗A,0 ≤ ζA,
where P ∗B,1 and P
∗
A,0 are the optimal cheating probabilities for Bob forcing 1 and Alice forcing
0, respectively, in the corresponding BCCF-protocol. Moreover, there exists a BCCF-point







In this thesis, we are concerned with bounding the bias of strong coin-flipping protocols,
and therefore would like to bound all four cheating probabilities. Recall that Alice and
Bob’s two cheating probabilities are swapped when β0 and β1 are swapped. This motivates
the following definition.
Definition 2.1.16 (BCCF-point game pair). Suppose we have a BCCF-point game defined
on the parameters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB with final point [ζB,0, ζA,1]. Also,
suppose we have another BCCF-point game defined by the parameters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and
β′0 = β1, β
′
1 = β0 ∈ ProbB with final point [ζB,1, ζA,0]. We call the two point games a BCCF-
point game pair, defined by the parameters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB, with final
point [ζB,0, ζB,1, ζA,0, ζA,1].
It is worth commenting that BCCF-point game pairs are defined over certain parameters
even though one of the point games in the pair is defined over swapped parameters.
Using Lemma 2.1.15, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1.17. Suppose [ζB,0, ζB,1, ζA,0, ζA,1] is the final point of a BCCF-point game
pair defined on the parameters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB. Then
P ∗B,0 ≤ ζB,0, P ∗B,1 ≤ ζB,1, P ∗A,0 ≤ ζA,0, and P ∗A,1 ≤ ζA,1,
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A,1 are the optimal cheating probabilities for the corresponding








2.2 A related family of classical coin-flipping proto-
cols
In this section, we describe a family of classical protocols which is the classical counterpart
to quantum BCCF-protocols. That is, we choose messages according to the underlying
probability distributions (instead of in a superposition) and we have a modified cheat
detection step at the end of the protocol.
Consider the following Cartesian product of finite sets A = A1 × · · · × An which are
used for Alice’s first n messages to Bob. Suppose we are given two probability vectors
α0, α1 ∈ ProbA. Define A0 := {0, 1} for Alice’s committed bit and A′0 to be a copy.
Consider the following Cartesian product of finite sets B = B1×· · ·×Bn which are used
for Bob’s first n messages. Suppose we are given two probability vectors β0, β1 ∈ ProbB.
Define B0 := {0, 1} for Bob’s committed bit and B′0 to be a copy.
We now describe the communication of the protocol.
Protocol 2.2.1 (Classical BCCF-protocol).
• Alice chooses a ∈ A0 uniformly at random and samples x ∈ A with probability αa,x.
• Bob chooses b ∈ B0 uniformly at random and samples y ∈ B with probability βa,y.
• For i from 1 to n: Alice sends xi ∈ Ai to Bob who replies with yi ∈ Bi.
• Alice fully reveals her bit by sending a ∈ A0 to Bob. If x 6∈ supp(αa), Bob aborts.
• Bob fully reveals his bit by sending b ∈ B0 to Alice. If y 6∈ supp(βb), Alice aborts.
• The outcome of the protocol is a⊕ b, if no one aborts.
The rest of this section illustrates the connections between this classical protocol and
the quantum version.
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2.2.1 Classical cheating strategy formulations
We can similarly formulate optimal cheating strategies as optimization problems. In this
case, we use linear programming. Recall Bob’s cheating polytope, denoted PB, is the set
of vectors (p1, p2, . . . , pn) satisfying
TrB1(p1) = eA1 ,
TrB2(p2) = p1 ⊗ eA2 ,
...
TrBn(pn) = pn−1 ⊗ eAn ,
pj ∈ R
A1×B1×···×Aj×Bj
+ , for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
where eAj denotes the vector of all ones in the corresponding space CAj . Alice’s cheating
polytope, denoted PA, is the set of vectors (s1, s2, . . . , sn, s) satisfying
TrA1(s1) = 1,
TrA2(s2) = s1 ⊗ eB1 ,
...
TrAn(sn) = sn−1 ⊗ eBn−1 ,
TrA′0(s) = sn ⊗ eBn ,
s1 ∈ RA1+ ,
sj ∈ R
A1×B1×···×Bj−1×Aj





where eBj is the vector of all ones in the corresponding space CBj .
We use these to characterize classical cheating strategies in the lemma below.
Lemma 2.2.2. The four optimal cheating probabilities in the classical protocol are given
by the optimal objective values of the following linear programs:







αa,x pn,x,y : (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB
 ,







αa,x pn,x,y : (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB
 ,
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βa,ysa,x,y : (s1, . . . , sn, s) ∈ PA
 ,







βa,ysa,x,y : (s1, . . . , sn, s) ∈ PA
 .
Proof. We shall prove this for the case of cheating Bob as the case for cheating Alice is
almost identical. By examining Alice’s cheat detection, we see that if we switch the roles




B,1, so we only need to prove the P
∗
B,0 case.
After receiving the first message from Alice, Bob must choose a message to send. He
can do this probabilistically by choosing y1 ∈ B1 with probability p1,x1,y1 , yielding the first
constraint in Bob’s cheating polytope. Notice that his message can depend on Alice’s first
message. We can similarly argue that the probabilities with which he chooses the rest
of his messages are captured by the rest of the constraints in the cheating polytope with
the exception of the last message. For the last message, we assume that Bob replies with
b = a, where a ∈ A0 was Alice’s last message, if he desires outcome 0 and b = ā otherwise.
Therefore, this decision is deterministic and is not represented by the cheating polytope.
All that remains is to explain the objective function. Since Bob chooses his last message
deterministically, the quantity 1
2
αa,x pn,x,y is the probability that Alice reveals (x, a) and
Bob reveals (y, a). If he reveals y when βa,y = 0, he gets caught cheating, otherwise, his
choice of b is accepted. Therefore the objective function captures the total probability
Alice accepts an outcome of 0.
These are very similar to the quantum cheating probabilities except for the nonlinearity



















where esupp(αa) is the 0, 1 vector taking value 1 only on the support of αa. We have a
similar observation for Bob. What is surprising is that we can capture the communication
for both settings with the same respective cheating polytopes.
To better understand this connection, we can write the objective function of Alice’s





























|a〉〈a| ⊗ |a〉〈a| ⊗Diag(esupp(αa))⊗ IB′ .
A quick check shows that we can repeat the entire proof of the reduced cheating problems


















|ā〉〈ā| ⊗ |a〉〈a| ⊗Diag(esupp(βa))⊗ IA′ .
This proves two things. First, it proves that if we weaken the quantum cheat detec-
tion, we recover the optimal cheating probabilities for the corresponding classical protocol.
Second, it gives us a recipe for developing the point games. Notice that the eigenvalues of
the dual variables are the same as in the quantum case, it is just that we have the stronger
constraints:







































Since the feasible region is smaller in the classical case, we get that the optimal objective
value cannot be less than the quantum case. This makes sense since the classical protocol
has a weaker cheat detection step and we could have larger cheating probabilities. We
can think of the classical case having more general strategies since the cheat detection
step in the quantum version rules out certain strategies from being optimal. In this sense,
the classical primal feasible regions are larger and the classical dual feasible regions are
smaller. This is similar to the relationship between the duality of convex sets. We have
that C1 ⊆ C2 implies C∗1 ⊇ C∗2 and the converse holds if C1 and C2 are closed convex cones.
This relationship is depicted in Figure 2.8, below.
Figure 2.8: Relationship between primal and dual feasible regions. Roughly speaking,
duality reverses containment.
2.2.2 Point games for classical BCCF-protocols and security anal-
ysis
In this subsection, we develop the classical analog to the quantum BCCF-point games.
Using these “classical point games,” we prove that at least one party can cheat with
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probability 1 in any classical BCCF-protocol. A closer analysis shows that both cannot
cheat with probability 1, which holds true for quantum BCCF-protocols as well.
Since point games are defined in terms of dual SDPs, we use the above embedding of
the classical cheating LPs into SDPs to construct classical BCCF-point games. Due to the
similarities, very little about the quantum BCCF-point games needs to be changed to attain
classical BCCF-point games; we only need to change the definitions of Alice and Bob’s
projections. Of course, the dual solutions may be different due to the stronger constraints
for the classical version. The only differences are in the first few points (corresponding to
the last few steps in Kitaev’s proof that involve the projections). A quick calculation shows
that these points are the same as well. The reason for this is because, in Bob’s projections,
we replace |ψa〉〈ψa| with Diag(esupp(αa))⊗ IA′ , but they have the same inner product with
the honest state of the protocol
〈|ψa〉〈ψa|, |ψa〉〈ψa|〉 = 〈|ψa〉〈ψa|,Diag(esupp(αa))⊗ IA′〉 = 1.
A similar argument holds for Alice’s projections as well.
Thus, the only difference between the classical point games are the values of the points,
which are derived from slightly different dual constraints. Let us examine the point splits.


















, ∀a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B.
In the classical case, the corresponding constraints are





βa,yDiag(esupp(αa)), ∀a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B.





β0,y if x ∈ supp(α0) \ supp(α1),
1
2
β1,y if x ∈ supp(α1) \ supp(α0),
1
2
maxa∈{0,1}{βa,y} if x ∈ supp(α0) ∩ supp(α1),
0 otherwise,





















We see that these are probability splittings in this case (with possibly a point raise in the
case of x ∈ supp(α0) ∩ supp(α1)). These probability splittings are in contrast to the point
splittings in the quantum case. The rest of the constraints are the same as in the quantum
case and correspond to point merging, probability merging, and aligning. Therefore, the
only difference between quantum BCCF-point games and the classical version is that non-
trivial point splittings are allowed in the quantum version. Therefore, we get the following
definition.
Definition 2.2.3 (Classical BCCF-point game (protocol independent definition)). A clas-
sical BCCF-point game defined on the parameters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB,
with final point [ζB, ζA], is a quantum BCCF-point game defined by the same parameters
and having the same final point but the point splittings are trivial (i.e., they are probability
splittings).
Using this definition, we define classical BCCF-point game pairs analogously to the
quantum version.
To complete the picture, we now present the classical version of Theorem 2.1.17.
Theorem 2.2.4. Suppose [ζB,0, ζB,1, ζA,0, ζA,1] is the final point of a classical BCCF-point
game pair defined on the parameters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB. Then
P ∗B,0 ≤ ζB,0, P ∗B,1 ≤ ζB,1, P ∗A,0 ≤ ζA,0, and P ∗A,1 ≤ ζA,1,






A,1 are the optimal cheating probabilities for the corresponding









Figure 2.9 (on the next page) depicts the intricate connections between quantum and
classical BCCF-protocols and their point games.
Security analysis of classical BCCF-protocols
We start by giving an alternative proof that these classical protocols have bias ε = 1/2
using the language of point games.
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Figure 2.9: Quantum and classical BCCF-protocol crystal structure.







[1, 0]→ p1 → · · · → pm−1 → pm := [ζB, ζA] ,
where each move is either point raising, point merging, probability merging, or probability
splitting. Then ζB ≥ 1 or ζA ≥ 1.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that ζB, ζA < 1 and let i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} be the smallest
index such that pi has a point of the form [ζB,i, ζA,i] with ζB,i, ζA,i < 1. Now, since pi−1 has
no such points, [ζB,i, ζA,i] could not have been generated from a point raise, a probability
merge, nor a probability split. Thus, pi−1 → pi must be a point merge and suppose without
loss of generality it acted on the first coordinate. Then pi−1 has two points q1 [ζ1, ζA,i] and
q2 [ζ2, ζA,i] with
q1 ζ1 + q2 ζ2
q1 + q2
= ζB,i < 1 =⇒ ζ1 < 1 or ζ2 < 1,
a contradiction to the minimality of i.
Using the above lemma and Theorem 2.2.4, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2.2.6. Every classical BCCF-protocol has bias ε = 1/2.
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There are two special cases of classical protocols we consider in greater detail. Recall













The first case we consider is when α0, α1, β0, β1 > 0. Then we can set va,y = 1 for all
a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B and zn+1,x,y = 12 maxa∈{0,1} βa,y for all a ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ A, y ∈ B. After the





















using Lemma 1.4.14. We can see that this is a BCCF-point game with an optimal assign-





∆(β0, β1) as seen in Figure 2.10, below.
Figure 2.10: Classical BCCF-point game corresponding to a BCCF-protocol favouring
cheating Bob.
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∆(β0, β1). The corresponding optimal cheating strategies in the
classical BCCF-protocol are obvious by noticing the cheat detection step does nothing
when the vectors have full support. Bob can send anything during the first n messages
and then return b = a. Alice can send a corresponding to her best guess of b from her
information about y ∈ B, i.e., she can cheat with the probability she can infer b from
y ∈ B. An interesting observation is that since an optimal solution for the (classical) dual
LPs is feasible in the (quantum) dual SDPs, we have that P ∗A,0, P
∗




every quantum BCCF-protocol as well. This can be interpreted as follows. Suppose we
change the order of the messages in the BCCF-protocol in Alice’s favour, so that Bob’s
first n messages are sent first, followed by all of Alice’s messages, then finally Bob’s last




∆(β0, β1) and would be
an obvious upper bound on the amount she can cheat in the original protocol (since she
gets information about b sooner than intended). This argument works for the classical and
quantum versions.
It may seem that classical protocols favour a cheating Bob, but this is not always the
case. Consider the case when β0 ⊥ β1 and α0, α1 > 0. Then we have zn+1,x,yp(y) = 1 for
all y ∈ supp(β0) ∪ supp(β1), thus the second coordinate equals 1 for all points in (2.1),
and remains that way until the end of the point game. This proves Alice can cheat with
probability 1, which is obvious since Bob’s first message fully reveals b and she can always
pass the cheat detection step. The extent to which Bob can cheat depends on the choice


















using Lemma 1.4.14. This is a distance measure between the two marginal distributions
over Alice’s first message x1. This point game is depicted in Figure 2.11, on the next page.
Bob can cheat with this probability since he can choose b equal to his best guess for a
from his information about x1. Once his first message is sent, he must keep his choice of
b or he will be caught cheating with certainty. These cheating probabilities do not depend
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Figure 2.11: Classical BCCF-point game corresponding to a BCCF-protocol favouring
cheating Alice.




A,1 = 1 and









Therefore, a classical BCCF-protocol could favour either party. This raises the question:
Can we find a BCCF-protocol such that both parties can perfectly control the outcome?
We now argue that no such classical, and hence no such quantum, BCCF-protocol exists.
Assume for a contradiction that this is the case. Then we must have






∆(β0, β1) ≤ 1
which implies β0 ⊥ β1. The only way for Bob to cheat with probability 1 is to have complete
information about a after Alice’s first message, implying TrA2×···×An(α0) ⊥ TrA2×···×An(α1).
This can only be the case when α0 ⊥ α1 and in this case, we have argued before that Alice
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must stick to her choice of a after her first message. Since she has no information about b
before the start of the protocol, she can only cheat with probability 1/2, a contradiction.
We have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2.7. In any quantum BCCF-protocol, at most one party can cheat with prob-
ability 1. In any classical BCCF-protocol, exactly one party can cheat with probability
1.
2.2.3 Extreme points of the cheating polytopes
This subsection examines the extreme points of Alice and Bob’s cheating polytopes which
appear in both the quantum and classical cheating strategy formulations. We show that
deterministic strategies correspond to the extreme points of the cheating polytopes. One
can argue this directly from the properties of the protocol. However, we give a strictly
algebraic proof based on the properties of the cheating polytopes.
Definition 2.2.8. An extreme point of a convex set C is a point x ∈ C such that if
x = λy + (1− λ)z, for λ ∈ (0, 1), y 6= z, then y 6∈ C or z 6∈ C.
We start with a well-known fact.
Fact 2.2.9. Suppose x̃ ∈ {x ≥ 0 : Γx = b}. Then x̃ is an extreme point of {x ≥ 0 : Γx = b}
if and only if there does not exist nonzero u ∈ Null(Γ) with supp(u) ⊆ supp(x̃).
Lemma 2.2.10. Suppose (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB and (s1, . . . , sn, s) ∈ PA. Then the vectors are
extreme points of the respective polytopes if and only if they are Boolean, i.e., all of their
entries are 0 or 1.
Proof. We prove it for Bob’s cheating polytope as the proof for Alice’s is nearly identi-
cal. Suppose (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB is Boolean, we show it is an extreme point. Let Bob’s
polytope PB be represented by the linear system Γ(p1, . . . , pn) = b, (p1, . . . , pn) ≥ 0.
Let (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Null(Γ) satisfy supp(u1, . . . , un) ⊆ supp(p1, . . . , pn). We argue that
(u1, . . . , un) must be the zero vector. The constraint on p1 is
∑
y1
p1,x1,y1 = 1 for all
x1 ∈ A1. Therefore, since p1 is Boolean, there is exactly one value of y1 for every x1
such that p1,x1,y1 = 1. These are the only entries of u1 that can be nonzero, but since
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(u1, . . . , un) ∈ Null(Γ) we must have that entry equal to 0. We can repeat this argument
to get ui = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Therefore, (p1, . . . , pn) is an extreme point.
Conversely, suppose (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB is not Boolean. Let i be the smallest index where
pi is not Boolean. If i > 1, define uj := 0 for j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}. Let (x̂1, ŷ1, . . . , x̂i, ŷi) be an
index such that pi,x̂1,ŷ1,...,x̂i,ŷi ∈ (0, 1). From the constraints, we must have another ŷ′i such
that pi,x̂1,ŷ1,...,x̂i,ŷ′i ∈ (0, 1) as well (since they must add to 1). Now define ui,x̂1,ŷ1,...,x̂i,ŷi := t,
for some t 6= 0, and ui,x̂1,ŷ1,...,x̂i,ŷ′i := −t, and the rest of the entries of ui to be 0. We define
ui+1 to be equal to pi+1, but we scale each entry such that
TrBi+1(ui+1) = ui ⊗ eAi+1 .
We inductively define uj in this way for all j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n}. Therefore, since we
scaled (p1, . . . , pn) to get (u1, . . . , un), we have supp(u1, . . . , un) ⊆ supp(p1, . . . , pn) and
(u1, . . . , un) ∈ Null(Γ) implying (p1, . . . , pn) cannot be an extreme point.
We see that extreme points of the cheating polytopes correspond to the strategies where
Alice and Bob choose their next bit deterministically depending on the bits revealed.
Corollary 2.2.11. In a classical BCCF-protocol, Alice and Bob each have an optimal
cheating strategy which is deterministic.
Proof. In a linear program whose feasible region does not contain lines, if there exists
an optimal solution then there exists an optimal solution which is an extreme point of
the feasible region. The result follows since the feasible region is nonempty and compact
implying the existence of an optimal solution.
2.3 Using classical protocols to lower bound the quan-
tum bias
In this section, we prove that no quantum BCCF-protocol can have bias ε = 1/
√
2− 1/2.
More specifically, we prove that only protocols that share optimal cheating probabilities
with their classical counterpart can saturate Kitaev’s lower bound on the product of the
cheating probabilities. This shows yet another connection between quantum and classical
BCCF-protocols.
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We start with rederiving Kitaev’s lower bound using the reduced SDPs. The dual of
Bob’s reduced SDP can be written as
inf TrA1(w1)
subject to w1 ⊗ eB1 ≥ TrA2(w2),
w2 ⊗ eB2 ≥ TrA3(w3),
...
wn ⊗ eBn ≥ 12
∑







, for all a ∈ {0, 1},
for cheating towards 0, and the dual of Alice’s reduced SDP can be written as
inf z1
subject to z1 · eA1 ≥ TrB1(z2),
z2 ⊗ eA2 ≥ TrB2(z3),
...








>, for all a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B,




A,0 = TrA1(w1) z1
= 〈TrA1(w1), z1〉
= 〈w1, z1 ⊗ eA1〉
≥ 〈w1,TrB1(z2)〉
= 〈w1 ⊗ eB1 , z2〉
≥ 〈TrA2(w2), z2〉
...
≥ 〈wn ⊗ eBn , zn+1〉.
We look at the quantity 〈wn ⊗ eBn , zn+1〉 separately since the following analysis is slightly
different. We use the inequality









































































































Therefore, we get Kitaev’s lower bound P ∗A,0P
∗
B,0 ≥ 1/2 implying that P ∗A,0 ≥ 1/
√
2 or
P ∗B,0 ≥ 1/
√
2. Note this was later reproven by Gutoski and Watrous (for general coin-
flipping protocols) using a different representation of cheating strategies in [GW07].
We get the inequality P ∗A,1P
∗
B,1 ≥ 1/2 by switching β0 with β1 in the proof above (and
the dual variables accordingly). Using these two lower bounds, we show that it is impossible
to have a quantum BCCF-protocol with bias ε = 1/
√
2− 1/2 by proving Kitaev’s bounds
can only be saturated with protocols where one party can cheat perfectly. More specifically,
we show that if there exists four dual solutions that saturate both of Kitaev’s bounds
P ∗A,0P
∗
B,0 ≥ 1/2 and P ∗A,1P ∗B,1 ≥ 1/2,
then all four of the dual solutions must be in the restricted part of the feasible regions
defined by the classical dual LPs, depicted in Figure 2.12.
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Figure 2.12: The four “quantum” dual feasible regions and the four “classical” dual feasible
regions. If Kitaev’s lower bounds are saturated by a quantum BCCF-protocol, then the
four optimal dual solutions are in the smaller “classical” feasible regions.












Then the cheating probabilities are the same as in the corresponding classical protocol.
Proof. We look at Kitaev’s proof above, and note that if it were saturated, then every

































〉 = 1, (2.3)
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for both a ∈ {0, 1}. Consider va = esupp(βa), this satisfies the constraint (2.2) and satisfies
























≤ 1, va,y > 0
 .
Obviously va = esupp(βa) is an optimal solution since 1 is a lower bound on the optimal




















v′′ to get a better objective function value, a contradiction. Therefore, if
Kitaev’s bound is saturated, we must have va,y = 1 for all a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ supp(βa).
We argue the same about Alice’s dual variables z
(y)






























for all a, y such that va,y > 0, i.e., for all y ∈ supp(βa).





βa,y for a ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ supp(αa),
and y ∈ supp(βa).
To summarize, if we have Kitaev’s bounds saturated, then the optimal dual solutions
satisfy





βa,y Diag(esupp(αa)),∀a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ B,
which are exactly the constraints in the dual LPs for the classical version. Therefore, the
protocol must have the property that relaxing the cheat detection steps in ΠA,0 and ΠB,0
(obtaining the classical cheat detection) preserves the two cheating probabilities. We can
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repeat the same argument with Alice and Bob cheating towards 1 and get the two corre-
sponding classical cheating probabilities. Therefore, we have all four cheating probabilities
are equal to those of the corresponding classical protocol, as desired.
Since every classical protocol allows one party to cheat perfectly, we have the following
result.
Corollary 2.3.2. ε = 1/
√
2− 1/2 is impossible for any BCCF-protocol.
The proof of Theorem 2.3.1 gives necessary conditions on classical protocols that sat-






βa,y when βa,y, αa,x > 0.
In the case when α0, α1, β0, β1 > 0, then β0 must equal β1. This makes sense since Bob
can easily cheat with probability 1, but if β0 6= β1, then Alice could cheat with probability
greater than 1/2. In the case when α0 ⊥ α1, the condition above tells us nothing, but
it is easy to see that Alice fully reveals a in the first message, thus she can cheat with
probability 1/2 and Bob can cheat with probability 1.
2.3.1 A better lower bound on a special case
We prove that there are no BCCF-protocols with bias less than ε = 1/4 for the special case
when A = B = {0, 1}. This is the simplest non-trivial BCCF-protocol where Alice and
Bob each have two messages; the first message is a qubit, and the second message reveals
their committed bit.
We make use of the strengthened Fuchs-van de Graaf inequality
1− F(ρ0, ρ1) ≤ ∆(ρ0, ρ1),
when ρ0, ρ1 are qubit states (see [SR01]).
Let
β0 = [r, 1− r]> and β1 = [1− t, t]>,
where r ≥ 1 − t (we can switch β0 and β1 if this is not the case and the bias remains
unchanged).
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We present a fact here which is proved as part of two more general theorems (Theo-
rem 3.1.2 and Theorem 3.1.9) in Chapter 3. This fact presents lower bounds on the extent
Alice and Bob can cheat. Note that the result of this subsection is independent of Chaper 3.
Fact 2.3.3. For any four-round BCCF-protocol, we have




























(r − t)2 + 4rtF(α0, α1)
)
,
where r and t are as above.










=⇒ 2∆(β0, β1) ≥ 1 =⇒ r + t ≥
3
2














t(1− r) ≤ 1
2
which can be used to bound t as































































(since t ≥ f(r))
≥ 3/4 (minimized at r = 1 on the interval [1/2, 1]).
104
Therefore, one of Alice or Bob can cheat with probability at least 3/4 in this case.
Note that all three of the lower bounds in Fact 2.3.3 could be less than Kitaev’s bound
1/
√
2 ≈ 0.707 when |A| and |B| are larger than 2. Therefore, we cannot get an interesting
lower bound using Fact 2.3.3 even if we could strengthen the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequalities
for higher dimensional states.
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Chapter 3
A computational search for
BCCF-protocols with small bias
The content of this chapter is based on my work with Ashwin Nayak and Levent Tunçel.
In the previous chapter, we defined a family of coin-flipping protocols and proved a lower
bound on the bias. In this chapter, we are concerned with finding the best upper bound.
Upper bounds are achieved by exhibiting a protocol with a proof of its bias. With highly
interactive protocols, it is a difficult task to simply point out a protocol that performs well.
Instead, we have designed an algorithm to search for protocols with small bias over the
parameters α0, α1 ∈ ProbA and β0, β1 ∈ ProbB.
We start with a simple idea: We create a finite mesh over the parameters and, for each
point in the mesh, calculate the four cheating probabilities then the bias. However, it is
not hard to be convinced that this task grows very expensive as the mesh becomes finer.
We therefore introduce heuristics to decrease the number of protocols needed to be tested
and also to decrease the time it takes to test each protocol. This process is broken into
the following steps.
• Section 3.1: We examine feasible cheating strategies for Alice and Bob by studying
the reduced cheating SDPs. By restricting the feasible region in certain ways, we
reveal certain cheating strategies. The set of strategies we obtain creates a protocol
filter. The protocol filter is used to quickly eliminate protocols with high bias from
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the search.
• Section 3.2: We study the symmetry of the parameters defining BCCF-protocols
and show how certain permutations of the indices preserve the bias. This drastically
reduces the number of protocols needed to be checked.
• Section 3.3: We describe how the mesh is generated and exhibit a protocol with bias
ε = 1/4. We give two proofs of the bias of this protocol, one quantum and one using
the cheating SDPs. This gives a bias cut-off point. We then describe the algorithm
using these ideas and those developed in the previous two sections.
• Section 3.4: We present the numerical results of several searches. We present the
results in tables indicating how well each strategy in the filter performed and how
many protocols made it all the way through the filter. We also test the algorithm by
randomly offsetting the mesh. We conclude with the conjecture that ε = 1/4 is the
smallest attainable bias for BCCF-protocols.
3.1 The protocol filter
In this section, we describe ways to approximate the optimal cheating probabilities by
finding feasible solutions to Alice and Bob’s reduced cheating SDPs. Why do we care
about feasible solutions that may not be optimal? The algorithm tests many protocols
so the idea is to have simple checks to see whether a protocol is a good candidate for
being optimal. For example, suppose we have the success probability of a certain cheating
strategy for, say, Bob. Then for a given set of parameters, if this strategy succeeds with
high probability, then we can rule out these parameters as being a good candidate and
save the time it would have taken to solve the SDPs (or SOCPs).
We illustrate this idea using Kitaev’s lower bound below.













Suppose that we compute and find P ∗A,0 ≈ 1/2, that is, the protocol is very secure
concerning Alice cheating towards 0. Then, from Kitaev’s bound, we know that P ∗B,0 ≈ 1
and the protocol is very insecure concerning cheating Bob. Therefore, we do not need to
solve for P ∗B,0 since we know this protocol has large bias.
The remainder of this section is divided into cheating Alice and cheating Bob. We
discuss cheating strategies for each and for the special cases of four-round and six-round
protocols.
3.1.1 Cheating Alice
We now present a theorem which captures some of Alice’s cheating strategies.



































































We call (3.1) Alice’s improved eigenstrategy, (3.2) her eigenstrategy, and (3.3) her three-
round strategy.

















































We call (3.4) Alice’s six-round eigenstrategy and (3.5) her measuring strategy. We get
bounds for P ∗A,1 when we switch the roles of β0 and β1 above.
Note that only the improved eigenstrategy is affected by switching β0 and β1 (as long
as we are willing to accept a slight modification to how we break ties in the definitions of
η, η′, τ, and τ ′).
We now briefly describe the strategies that yield the corresponding cheating probabili-
ties in Theorem 3.1.2.
Figure 3.1: Alice cheating in a four-round BCCF-protocol.
Her three-round strategy is to send σ1 as if it were a standard three-round protocol,
measure Bob’s message to try to learn b, and reply with a deterministically, depending on
her desired outcome. Her eigenstrategy is the same as her three-round strategy, except the
first message is optimized. The improved eigenstrategy has the same first message as her
eigenstrategy, but the last message is optimized. These strategies work for the general case
as well, were Alice treats her first n messages like the first one in a four-round protocol.
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Figure 3.2: Alice cheating in a six-round BCCF-protocol.
The six-round version is depicted above. Her six-round eigenstrategy is the same as
the four-round version, except she tries to learn b from the first message, and only her
first message is optimized. Her measuring strategy is the same as her three-round strategy
in the four-round version, she sends the first message as in a three-round protocol then
measures Bob’s first message to try to learn b.
Developing Alice’s strategies
Recall Alice’s reduced SDP






(a,y), αa) : (s1, . . . , sn, s) ∈ PA
 ,
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where PA is the set of vectors (s1, s2, . . . , sn, s) satisfying
TrA1(s1) = 1,
TrA2(s2) = s1 ⊗ eB1 ,
...
TrAn(sn) = sn−1 ⊗ eBn−1 ,
TrA′0(s) = sn ⊗ eBn ,
s1 ∈ RA1+ ,
sj ∈ R
A1×B1×···×Bj−1×Aj





To get a feasible solution, suppose Alice guesses b before she reveals a in the following
way. If Bob reveals y ∈ B, then Alice guesses b = 0 if β0,y ≥ β1,y and b = 1 if β0,y < β1,y.
Let Alice’s guess be denoted by f(y), so
f(y) = arg max
a
{βa,y} ∈ {0, 1},
and we set f(y) = 0 in the case of a tie. We have chosen a way to satisfy the last
constraint in Alice’s cheating polytope, but we can choose how Alice sends her first n
messages s1, . . . , sn. We make one more restriction, we set sn = d⊗ eB and optimize over
d ∈ RA+. We can easily satisfy the rest of the constraints given any d by choosing each
variable as the corresponding marginal probability distribution.




















We can simplify this using the following lemma.


















where λmax denotes the largest eigenvalue. Furthermore, an optimal solution is the entry-










































p : p ∈ Probn
}
.
If the nonnegativity constraint were not present, the optimal value would be attained by set-
ting
√















has nonnegative entries, we know there exists a nonnegative principal eigenvector by the
Perron-Frobenius Theorem. Since this does not violate the nonnegativity constraint in






























which we call Alice’s eigenstrategy.
Since 1
2






























η + τ +
√





η + τ +
√






























using Lemma 1.4.14 and Lemma 1.4.13.
This lower bound has a natural interpretation. This is the strategy where Alice ignores





∆(β0, β1). She then tries to get past Bob’s cheat detection and can





F(α0, α1). We call this Alice’s three-round strategy since
it combines optimal strategies for three-round protocols [Amb01, NS03, KN04]. It makes
sense that this is a lower bound on the success probability of Alice’s eigenstrategy since
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her eigenstrategy is optimized after the same restriction present in three-round strategy
(choosing b from the most likely choice from knowledge of y).
We can also examine how Alice can choose her last message optimally supposing she has
already sent her first n messages. I.e., suppose we fix some s1, . . . , sn satisfying the first n
constraints of her cheating polytope and we want to optimize over s satisfying TrA′0(s) = c,
where c := sn⊗ eBn is now constant. In this case, the only constraint is TrA′0(s) = c which
can be written as
∑
a∈{0,1} s
(a,y) = c, for each y ∈ B, where again, s(a,y) is the restriction











(a,y) = c, for all y ∈ B,
s(a,y) ∈ RA+.











(a,y) = c, for all y ∈ B,
s(a,y) ∈ RA+,
we see that this is a separable problem over y ∈ B. That is, for each fixed ỹ ∈ B, we need







s(a,ỹ) = c, s(a,ỹ) ∈ RA+, ∀a ∈ {0, 1}
 .
This optimization problem has a special structure.
Definition 3.1.4. The infimal convolution of the convex functions f1, f2, . . . , fn, where
f1, . . . , fn : Rn → R ∪ {∞}, is











We do not need to worry about the nonnegativity constraints on the variables since we
can define the convex function −F(p, q) = +∞ if p or q is not nonnegative. Note for every
p ∈ Rn+, that −F(p, ·) is a proper, convex function, i.e., it is convex and −F(p, q) < +∞ for
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some q ∈ Rn+. Using these properties and the fact that −F(p, ·) is positively homogeneous,
we show a way to express Gỹ.
Recall that for proper, convex functions f1, . . . , fn : Rn → R∪{∞} we define the convex
hull of {f1, . . . , fn} as the greatest convex function f such that f(x) ≤ f1(x), . . . , fn(x) for
every x ∈ Rn. To write down explicitly what the convex hull is, we use the following
definition.
Definition 3.1.5. We define the right scalar multiplication of a function f as
(fλ)(x) =

λf(λ−1x) for λ > 0,
0 for λ = 0, x = 0,
+∞ for λ = 0, x 6= 0.
Thus, (fλ) = f for all λ > 0 if and only if f is positively homogeneous.
Theorem 3.1.6 (Rockafellar, [Roc70, page 38] ). Let f1, . . . , fn : Rn → R∪{∞} be proper,
convex functions. Then we have
conv {f1, . . . , fn} (d) = inf
λ∈Probn
{((f1λ1)  (f2λ2)  · · ·  (fnλn))(d)} .
We now present a theorem which helps capture Alice’s cheating probability.
Theorem 3.1.7. Suppose f1, . . . , fn : Rn → R ∪ {∞} are positively homogenous, proper,
convex functions and fi(0) = 0, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then
conv {f1, . . . , fn} = f1  f2  · · ·  fn.
Proof. From the results above, it suffices to prove that we can assume λ > 0 in Theo-
rem 3.1.6. Now suppose λi = 0 for i in index set I, positive otherwise. Since we are
minimizing over x, we need xi = 0 for i ∈ I, otherwise (fi0)(xi) = +∞. Then we have


































= (f1  f2  · · ·  fn)(d),
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Thus, we can write Alice’s optimization problem as














where c ranges over all feasible choices of the first n messages. Note the special case of
n = 1, then this is simply c ∈ ProbA1 = ProbA. Alice’s improved eigenstrategy is when
Alice chooses c according to her eigenstrategy, yet reveals a optimally as above.
This may seem like an optimal solution since we are optimizing over the first n messages,
then optimizing over the last message, but we are not optimizing over them simultaneously.
However, this is a very good approximation of the optimal solution as seen in the numerical
tests in Subsection 3.4.
Alice cheating in the six-round version












over (s1, s2, s) satisfying:
TrA1(s1) = 1,
TrA2(s2) = s1 ⊗ eB1 ,
TrA′0(s) = s2 ⊗ eB2 ,
s1 ∈ RA1+ ,





We suppose that Alice chooses her commitment a based on the most likely choice of b
after seeing y1 ∈ B1 from Bob’s first message. Let f ′(y1) = arg maxa∈A′0 {[TrB2(βa)]y1} and






all y1 ∈ B1, where s(y1)2 is the projection of s2 with the index y1 fixed. Alice’s choice of
commitment is equivalent to setting s(a,y1,y2) = s
(y1)
2 , if a = f










2, if 1 = f









2 are the second messages which only depend on her first message and the inferred
value of b from y1.



























Since the only constraints remaining are TrA2(s
0
2) = s1 = TrA2(s
1
2), we now optimize over
each choice of s02 and s
1
2 separately using the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1.8. For α ∈ RA1×A2+ and c ∈ RA1+ , we have
max
{
F(p, α) : TrA2(p) = c, p ∈ RA1×A2+
}
≥ F(c,TrA2(α)).
The inequality can be shown to hold with equality by Uhlmann’s theorem. However,
we prove the inequality by exhibiting a feasible solution which is also useful for the analysis
of cheating Bob.
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if [TrA2(α)]x1 = 0.













































































which is the success probability of the strategy where Alice measures the first message to






























We now present a theorem capturing some of Bob’s cheating strategies.


















We call (3.1) Bob’s ignoring strategy and (3.2) his measuring strategy.
















































We call (3.3) Bob’s eigenstrategy and (3.4) his eigenstrategy lower bound.
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if [TrB2(βg(x))]y1 = 0,














We call (3.5) Bob’s six-round eigenstrategy, (3.6) his six-round eigenstrategy lower bound,







which we call Bob’s returning strategy. We can lower bound P ∗B,1 as well if we switch the
roles of β0 and β1 above.
Note that the only strategies that are affected by switching β0 and β1 are the eigen-
strategies and the returning strategy.
We now briefly describe the strategies that yield the corresponding cheating probabili-
ties in Theorem 3.1.9.
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Figure 3.3: Bob cheating in a four-round BCCF-protocol.
His ignoring strategy is to ignore all of Alice’s messages until a is revealed, then try to
change his value of b. His measuring strategy is to measure Alice’s first message and choose
b according to his best guess for a. His returning strategy is to send Alice’s messages right
back to her. For the four-round eigenstrategy, Bob’s first message is a principal eigenvector
depending on Alice’s first message.
For the six-round version (figure on the next page), his three-round strategy is to send
his first message as in a three-round protocol, measure Alice’s second message to obtain a
guess for a, then try to change the value of b. His six-round eigenstrategy is the same as
his three-round strategy, except the first message is optimized in a way described later in
this section.
Developing Bob’s strategies
Bob’s returning strategy is to send Alice’s messages right back to her (if the dimensions
agree). If α0 = β0 and α1 = β1, then this strategy allows Bob to win perfectly if he wants
outcome 0 since if a = 0 and Alice sends |ψ0〉, then Bob replies with b = a and the state
to be checked is |ψ0〉 = |φ0〉. To evaluate the success probability of this strategy for any
choice of parameters, it is easier to use the original cheating SDP as opposed to the reduced
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Figure 3.4: Bob cheating in a six-round BCCF-protocol.
cheating SDP. This cheating strategy corresponds to the feasible solution
ρ̄1 = ρ̄2 = · · · = ρ̄n = ρ̄F = |ψ〉〈ψ|
which has success probability






This is clearly optimal when α0 = β0 and α1 = β1.
Recall Bob’s reduced problem below





(αa ⊗ IB)>pn, βa
)
: (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ PB
 ,
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where PB is the set of vectors (p1, p2, . . . , pn) satisfying
TrB1(p1) = eA1 ,
TrB2(p2) = p1 ⊗ eA2 ,
...
TrBn(pn) = pn−1 ⊗ eAn ,
pj ∈ R
A1×B1×···×Aj×Bj
+ , for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
There is a strategy for Bob that works for any n and is very important in the search
algorithm. This is the strategy where Bob ignores all of Alice’s messages and tries to
choose b after learning a from Alice. By ignoring Alice’s messages, he is effectively setting










































using Lemma 3.1.3 and Lemma 1.4.13. The reason this strategy is important is that it is
relatively cheap to compute, only depends on half of the parameters, and performs quite
well under these circumstances. We call this Bob’s ignoring strategy.
Another strategy for Bob is to measure Alice’s first message, choose b accordingly,







∆(TrA2×···×An (α0) ,TrA2×···×An (α1)),
when n ≥ 2. We discuss the case of n = 1, i.e. four-round protocols, separately.
Bob cheating in the four-round version
In four-round protocols, some cheating strategies exist that do not work for protocols
with more rounds. One reason is because Bob has all of Alice’s CA space before he must
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send any messages. We show that Bob can use this to his advantage. One example is Bob’s







Similar to cheating Alice, we can develop an eigenstrategy for Bob. For the special case
of four-round protocols, notice that Bob’s cheating polytope contains only the constraints
TrB(p1) = eA and p1 ∈ RA×B+ . This can be rewritten as p
(x)
1 ∈ ProbB for all x ∈ A. Also,
F
(
(αa ⊗ IB)>p1, βa
)






. Thus, we can rewrite Bob’s
reduced problem as












1 ∈ ProbB, for all x ∈ A
 .










1 , βa). There-








1 , βa) : p
(x)
1 ∈ ProbB, for all x ∈ A





































Since we are using the concavity of the objective function to bound it, we are getting
a loose bound. Notice that solving the smaller separated problems yields a solution which
is feasible for the original problem. Therefore, we can substitute this into the original
objective function to get a better lower bound on Bob’s optimal cheating probability. We
call this Bob’s eigenstrategy.













































where the last equality follows from Lemma 1.4.14.

















































using Lemma 1.4.13. Therefore, Bob’s eigenstrategy lower bound performs better than
both his measuring strategy and ignoring strategy.
Bob cheating in the six-round version





F((αa⊗IB1×B2)>p2, βa) over (p1, p2)
124
satisfying:
TrB1(p1) = eA1 ,
TrB2(p2) = p1 ⊗ eA2 ,
p1 ∈ RA1×B1+ ,
p2 ∈ RA1×B1×A2×B2+ .





















We make the restriction p
(x1)
1 = c, for all x1 ∈ A1, for a fixed value of c which we optimize






2 , αa,xβa) : TrB2(p
(x)




using the following lemma.




F(p, βa) : TrB2(p) = c, p ∈ RB1×B2+
 ≥ F(c,TrB2(βã)),
for any ã ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. Just fix a value for a then choose p ∈ arg max
{
F(p, βa) : TrB2(p) = c, p ∈ RB1×B2+
}
.
The result follows since F(p, βā) ≥ 0 and by Lemma 3.1.8.




2 , αa,xβa) ≥ αg(x),x F(c,TrB2(βg(x))),
where g(x) := arg maxa∈A′0 {αa,x}, and 0 in the case of a tie.
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Substituting this into the subproblem, we have



















































by the same arguments used for cheating Alice. We call (3.6) Bob’s six-round eigenstrategy
lower bound. The quantity (3.7) corresponds to the strategy where Bob measures Alice’s
second message to try to learn a early, then tries to change the value of b. He can learn




∆(α0, α1). He can change the value























We call this Bob’s three-round strategy.
Although we used many bounds in developing the quantity (3.6), such as the lower
bound in Lemma 3.1.10, we can recover some of the losses by generating the correspond-
ing feasible solution and computing its objective function value for the original objective
function. For example, we can calculate c as the entry-wise square of the normalized,
















2 for each value of x from the construction of the feasible solution in the
proof of Lemma 3.1.8. We call this Bob’s six-round eigenstrategy.
3.2 Protocol symmetry
In this section, we discuss symmetry in BCCF-protocols. Symmetry is very important in
computational optimization since it can greatly reduce the time for computations. For
BCCF-protocols, we show that there is much symmetry in the parameters.
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3.2.1 Symmetry in local permutations
We show that if we permute the elements of Ai, or Bi, for some fixed i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then
this does not change the bias of the protocol. We first show that cheating Bob is unaffected.






(αa ⊗ IB)>pn, βa
)
,






(αa ⊗ IB)>pn, βā
)
, for forcing outcome 1, over the
polytope PB defined as the set of all vectors (p1, p2, . . . , pn) satisfying
TrB1(p1) = eA1 ,
TrB2(p2) = p1 ⊗ eA2 ,
...
TrBn(pn) = pn−1 ⊗ eAn ,
pj ∈ R
A1×B1×···×Aj×Bj
+ , for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Suppose we are given a new protocol where the elements of Ai have been permuted,
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (and likewise the entries of αa for a ∈ {0, 1}). We can write the
entries of (αa ⊗ IB)>pn as




for each y ∈ B. If we permute the entries in pn corresponding to Ai (and likewise for every
variable in the polytope) we get the same objective function value. Thus, dishonest Bob
cannot cheat more or less than the original protocol.
Now suppose we are given a new protocol where the elements of Bi have been permuted
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We can write
F
(









If we permute the entries in pn corresponding to Bi (and likewise for every variable in the
polytope) we get the same objective function value. A similar argument holds for P ∗B,1. In
both cases, Bob’s two cheating probabilities are unaffected.
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Cheating Alice: To show the bias remains unchanged, we still need to check that cheat-
ing Alice is unaffected by these permutations. Alice’s reduced problems are to maximize













(a,y), αa) for outcome 1, over the set of all vectors (s1, s2, . . . , sn, s)
satisfying
TrA1(s1) = 1,
TrA2(s2) = s1 ⊗ eB1 ,
...
TrAn(sn) = sn−1 ⊗ eBn−1 ,
TrA′0(s) = sn ⊗ eBn ,
sj ∈ R
A1×B1×···×Bj−1×Aj





By examining the above problem, we see that the same arguments that apply to cheating
Bob also apply to cheating Alice. We can simply permute any feasible solution to account
for any permutation in Ai or Bi.
Note that these arguments only hold for “local” permutations, i.e., if we permute the
elements between Cartesian products in A1 × · · · × An the bias may change.
3.2.2 Symmetry between probability vectors









(αa ⊗ IB)>pn, βa
)





























for Alice. We argue that the four quantities above are not effected if we switch β0 and β1
and simultaneously switch α0 and α1. This is obvious for cheating Bob, but it requires
explanation for cheating Alice. The only constraints involving s(a,y) can be written as∑
a∈A′0
s(a,y) = s(y1,...,yn−1)n ,
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for all y = (y1, . . . , yn−1, yn) ∈ B. Since this constraint is symmetric about a, the result
follows.





switches P ∗B,0 and P
∗
B,1. With these symmetries, we can effectively switch the roles of α0
and α1 and the roles of β0 and β1 independently and the bias is unaffected.
How we apply the symmetry in the four and six-round versions
Since we are able to switch the roles of α0 and α1, we can assume α0 has the largest
entry out of α0 and α1 and similarly that β0 has the largest entry out of β0 and β1.
In the four-round version, since we can permute the elements of A = A1, we can also
assume α0 has entries that are non-decreasing. This allows us to upper bound all the
entries of α0 and α1 by the last entry in α0. We can do this simultaneously for β0 and β1.
In the six-round version, we need to be careful when applying the symmetry arguments,
we cannot permute all of the entries in α0. The symmetry only applies to local permuta-
tions so we can only partially order them. We can order A2 such that the entries α0,x̃1x2
do not decrease for one particular index x̃1 ∈ A1. It is convenient to choose the index
corresponding to the largest entry. Then we can order the last block of entries in α0 such
that they do not decrease. Note that the last entry in α0 is now the largest among all the
entries in α0 and α1. We can do this simultaneously for β0 and β1.
3.3 The search algorithm
In this section, we describe an algorithm for finding BCCF-protocols with small bias. We
start with the following search algorithm prototype.
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Pseudo-algorithm for finding BCCF-protocols with small bias
For each choice of α0, α1, β0, and β1 (modulo the symmetry):
• Use the protocol filter to test if the protocol has large bias.
• Solve the necessary SDPs (or SOCPs) characterizing the bias.
• If the protocol has small bias: stop and output the protocol parameters.
We now discuss a few key steps to speed up the search and how to iterate over the param-
eters.
3.3.1 A protocol with bias 1/4
We now present a protocol and give two proofs of its bias. This acts as a cut-off point
for a “small bias.” We can extend the three-round protocol in [KN04] to a four-round
BCCF-protocol by defining
A = {0, 1, 2} , B = {0, 1} , α0 =
1
2
[1, 0, 1]> , α1 =
1
2
[0, 1, 1]> , β0 = [1, 0]
> , β1 = [0, 1]
> .
Notice that β0 ⊥ β1, so b is completely revealed in Bob’s first message. We now show that
the bias of this protocol is ε = 1/4.
A quantum proof
We examine the most general cheating strategies of Alice and Bob.
Cheating Alice: We see that Bob’s first message completely reveals his committed bit.
Therefore, Alice must choose her first message, call it σ ∈ ΣA+, such that when she learns b
after Bob’s message, she can fool him into thinking that she chose a = b at the beginning
of the protocol (if she wants outcome 0). If σ ∈ ΣA+ was sent in the first message, and b is
revealed, then the success probability is
F(σ,TrB|ψb〉〈ψb|) = F(σ,Diag(αb)),
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where |ψb〉 := 1√2 |bb〉+
1√
2
|22〉 ∈ C3 ⊗ C3, as discussed in Subsection 1.4.3. Therefore, the








where σ ∈ ΣA+ is a density matrix. Define the following quantum channel
Ξ(X) := Diag(diag(X)).


















































using Lemmas 3.1.3 and 1.4.13. This upper bound can be achieved by choosing σ to be
diagonal. This is independent of whether she wants outcome 0 or 1, thus P ∗A,0 = P
∗
A,1 = 3/4.
Cheating Bob: If Bob wants to cheat, he must infer the value of a from Alice’s first
message since β0 ⊥ β1 which binds him to a value of b from his first message. Thus, he






∆(α0, α1) = 3/4,
as discussed in Subsection 1.4.3. Therefore, P ∗B,0 = P
∗




Numerically solving for the cheating probabilities for this protocol shows that







However, when it comes to proving the bias of a protocol, one should take numerical
findings such as these as supporting evidence only. Thus, we prove these are the optimal
values of the four cheating SDPs by presenting feasible primal and dual solutions with
matching objective function values. Note, sometimes it suffices to just prove an upper
bound. In these cases, one could just find feasible solutions for the dual SDPs.
Cheating Alice: We can adapt the quantum proof (or the output from numerical tests)
to find a feasible primal solution to Alice’s reduced cheating SDP for forcing outcome 0.
Define
(s1, s


















F(c, α1) = 3/4.
Therefore, P ∗A,0 ≥ 3/4. Alice’s dual SDP for forcing outcome 0 is
inf TrA(w)























which has the feasible solution














with corresponding objective function value 3/4. Thus, P ∗A,0 ≤ 3/4 proving P ∗A,0 = 3/4.
By switching
v0 ←→ v1, s(0,0) ←→ s(0,1), and s(1,0) ←→ s(1,1),
we get primal and dual feasible solutions for Alice forcing outcome 1, both having objective
function value 3/4. Therefore, we have P ∗A,1 = 3/4, as well.
Cheating Bob: We now repeat the process for cheating Bob. Define p ∈ RA×B+ as
p := [1, 0, 0, 1, 1/2, 1/2]> ∈ PB,












[(α0 ⊗ IA)>p]0 + [(α1 ⊗ IA)>p]1 = 3/4
for forcing outcome 0. By defining













[(α0 ⊗ IA)>p]1 + [(α1 ⊗ IA)>p]0 = 3/4
for forcing outcome 1. This proves P ∗B,0, P
∗
B,1 ≥ 3/4. The dual for forcing outcome 0 is
inf z1








































2 , we get a feasible dual solution
for Bob forcing outcome 1, with objective function value 3/4. Thus, P ∗B,0, P
∗
B,1 ≤ 3/4,
proving P ∗B,0, P
∗
B,1 = 3/4 as desired.
Note that the SDP proof is longer in this case (in part because we reproduced the
SDPs and their duals). However, it has the advantage of working for protocols with many
rounds. Proving upper bounds on cheating is a very difficult task and this is where the
duality of semidefinite programming becomes a very useful tool.
3.3.2 Making a finite mesh
We can only search a finite number of protocols so we create a finite approximation of an
uncountably infinite set using a mesh. We fix a dimension d and a precision p ∈ (0, 1)
and range over entries in α0, α1, β0, and β1 in increments of p keeping them as probability
vectors. For example, in the four-round version, the values of α0,0 range over
{0, p, 2p, . . . , 1− p, 1} .
Note we only consider p = 1/p′ for some positive integer p′ so that we use the endpoints
of the intervals. For values of α0,1, we range over
{0, p, 2p, . . . , 1− α0,0},
and so forth. Note that by creating the mesh in this way, it is very easy to exploit the
symmetry discussed in Section 3.2. We show numerically that this symmetry helps by






protocols to test (before symmetry).
3.3.3 The refined algorithm
Using these ideas, we can further refine the algorithm.
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Search algorithm for finding BCCF-protocols with small bias
For each protocol in the finite mesh (modulo the symmetry):
• Use the protocol filter to test if the protocol has bias ε ≥ 1/4.
If so, move on to the next protocol.
• Solve the necessary SDPs (or SOCPs).
If any have optimal value 3/4 or larger (or 2/3 or less) move on
to the next protocol.
Else, output the protocol parameters and bias ε < 1/4.
Suppose for example that P ∗A,0 ≤ 2/3. Then P ∗B,0 ≥ 3/4 from Kitaev’s bound so we move
on to the next protocol.
We test the search algorithm for the cases of four and six-round protocols and for
certain dimensions and mesh precisions in the following section.
3.4 Numerical results
Computational Platform. Programs were ran on Matlab, Version 7.12.0.635, on an
SGI XE C1103 with 2x 3.2 GHz 4-core Intel X5672 x86 CPUs processor, and 10 GB
memory, running Linux.
Semidefinite programs were solved using SeDuMi 1.3, a program for solving semidefinite
programs in Matlab [Stu99, Stu02].
3.4.1 Four-round search
We list the filter cheating strategies in the tables below and give an estimate of how long
the success probability for each strategy takes to compute (averaging over 1000 randomly
generated α0, α1, β0, β1). We then give tables detailing how well the filter performs for
four-round protocols for dimension d ∈ {2, . . . , 9} and for various values of precision p.
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Note that for the cheating probability cut-off, we use 0.7499 instead of 0.75. This is
because many cheating strategies in the filter succeed with probability exactly 0.75 and
the filter would let these boundary cases through which slows down the search.
Notice the two strategies F1 and F2 are special because they only involve two of the
four probability distributions. Preliminary tests show that first generating β0 and β1 and
checking with F1 is much faster than first generating α0 and α1 and checking with F2, even
though F2 is much faster to compute. If we were to calculate F2 first, we would have to
calculate F1 for every choice of (α0, α0, β0, β1) that F2 did not filter out, roughly squaring
the number of F1 computations. For this reason, it is better to have the cheaper strategy
second.




B,1. The strategies F8 and
F9 performed very well in preliminary tests and the cheating probabilities are very close
to P ∗B,0 and P
∗
B,1. Thus, if a protocol gets through the F8 and F9 filter strategies, then it
is likely that P ∗B,0 and P
∗
B,1 will also be less than 0.7499. This is why we place P
∗
A,0 first.






A,1 using the SDP formulation of the reduced
problems. Preliminary tests show that SeDuMi ran into numerical issues while solving the






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The first observation is that we were able to search larger spaces than if we used the
SDP formulations alone. For example, suppose we took the 2.74 × 1016 protocols from
the d = 9, p = 1/8 search and checked to see if any of these had bias less than 0.7499 by
solving only the reduced SDPs. Since each SDP takes at least 0.08 seconds to solve, this
search would take at least 69 million years to finish. By applying the techniques in this
chapter, we are able to run this search in a matter of days.
We see that symmetry helped to dramatically reduce the number of protocols needed
to be tested. In the largest search, we were able to cut down the 2.74 × 1016 protocols
down to 3.98× 1010.
F1 and F2 perform very well, together cutting down the number of protocols by a factor
of about 10. F3, being the first strategy to rely on all four probability vectors, performs
very well by reducing the number of protocols by another factor of 10. F4, F5, and F6
do not perform well with F5, being the same as F4 but with β0 swapped with β1, cutting
down the number of protocols by a very small amount. F7 and F8 perform so well that no
SDPs were needed to be solved. This suggests that
min
α0,α1,β0,β1∈Prob9
max {F1, . . . ,F8} = 3/4.
From Theorem 3.1.9, we see that Bob’s eigenstrategy, F8, has the highest cheating prob-
ability among Bob’s four-round strategies with the exception of possibly the returning
strategies F4 and F5. Alice’s eigenstrategy, F6, performs better than her three-round
strategy F3. Therefore, it seems that the F8 and F6 strategies suffice to prove that the
bias of any four-round BCCF-protocol is at least 1/4.
3.4.2 Six-round search
We list the filter cheating strategies in the table below and give an estimate of how long
the success probability for each strategy takes to compute (averaging over 1000 randomly
generated α0, α1, β0, β1). We then give tables of how well the filter performs for six-round

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Again, we have to choose which strategy to put first, G1 or G2. Preliminary tests
show that placing G1 first is much faster, similar to the four-round case. Even though G5
takes longer to compute than G6, tests show that is better to have G5 first. We calculate
SDPB0 before SDPA0 since G9 and G10 are close approximations of SDPA0 and SDPA1,
respectively.
We note here a few omissions that are present in the four-round tests. First, we have
removed the two returning strategies, F4 and F5. These did not perform well in the four-
round tests and preliminary tests show that they did not perform well in the six-round
tests either. Also, we do not have all the lower bounds for the eigenstrategies. Preliminary
tests show that the lower bounds omitted take just as long or longer to compute than
the corresponding upper bound, thus we just use the upper bounds in the filter. Also,
the marginal probabilities take approximately 5.49 × 10−6 seconds to compute which is
negligible compared to the other times. Thus, we need not be concerned whether the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We find again that the symmetry arguments cut down the number of protocols signifi-
cantly, this time by a factor of roughly 100. Note that in the four-round case it was a factor
of 10, 000 (for the d = 9 case). This can be explained by the weaker index symmetry in the
six-round version. G1 and G2 cut down the number of protocols by a factor of 10 similar
to the four-round case. G5 also performed well, but after this G6 was not much help. G7
and G8 cut down the number of protocols by a factor of 10 each in the d = 2 case, but
not as much in the d = 3 case. The next notable strategy was G10, being the swapped
version of G9, which performed very poorly. It seems that the swapped strategies do not
help much in the filters, that is, there is not much discrepancy between cheating towards
0 or 1. SDPB0 almost filtered out the rest of the protocols, relying on SDPA0 to stop the
rest. The implicit strategy from Kitaev’s bound, G11, did not perform well after SDPB0,
unfortunately we need SDPB0 to be computed first. Again, we notice that no protocols
with bias less than 0.7499 were found.
Another observation is the performance of G9 and G10, the eigenstrategies for Alice.
For low-precision tests, we notice that they hardly filter out any protocols, if any at all. In











for every value of y. In the eigenstrategy, we are approximating the concave hull with
whichever of the two has the larger constant. When we choose these constants according
to a rough mesh, e.g., p = 1/3 or p = 1/4, the one with the larger constant is a very good
approximation of the concave hull. Thus, we need finer precisions to bring out the power
of this strategy in the filter.
Since in the four and six-round tests, we did not find any protocols with bias less than
0.7499, we have the following conjecture.
Conjecture 3.4.1. The minimum bias of BCCF-protocols is ε = 1/4.
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3.4.3 Random offset
Since the six-round searches take a long time, we need another way to test more protocols.
We could increase the mesh precision, but this increases the search time dramatically. To
test more protocols, we offset all of the values in the search by some random factor δ > 0.
For example, the entries of α0, α1, β0, and β1 have been selected from the set
{0, p, 2p, . . . , 1− p, 1} .
With an offset parameter δ ∈ (0, p/2), we use the range
{δ, δ + p, δ + 2p, . . . , δ + 1− p} .
Note that this destroys the index symmetry. The simplest way to see this is to consider












1− δ − 2p
]
, . . . ,
[




We see that the set of first entries is not the same as the set of second entries when δ > 0.
We arbitrarily choose the last entry in each vector to be such that the entries add to 1.
Also, since we are generating all four of the probability distributions in the same manner,
we can still apply the symmetry arguments to suppose α0 has the largest entry out of both
α0 and α1 and simultaneously β0 has the largest entry out of both β0 and β1.
The tables below show how well each strategy in the filter performs in the worst case
and average case over 100 random choices of offset parameter δ ∈ [0, 1/100].
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Table 3.16: The percentage of protocols that get stopped by each strategy in the worst
case over 100 random instances of offset parameter δ
d = 2 p = 1/3 p = 1/4 p = 1/5 p = 1/6
G1 71.87 % 82.35 % 84.06 % 86.63 %
G2 17.18 % 29.80 % 15.80 % 24.15 %
G3 8.17 % 10.73 % 13.46 % 12.12 %
G4 51.45 % 49.68 % 53.99 % 48.44 %
G5 70.00 % 83.29 % 78.02 % 82.96 %
G6 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
G7 79.16 % 92.43 % 87.46 % 94.39 %
G8 100.00 % 100.00 % 43.83 % 100.00 %
G9 − − 0 % −
G10 − − 0 % −
SDPB0 − − 100.00 % −
Table 3.17: The percentage of protocols that get stopped by each strategy in the average
case over 100 random instances of offset parameter δ
d = 2 p = 1/3 p = 1/4 p = 1/5 p = 1/6
G1 85.51 % 86.65 % 88.82 % 90.69 %
G2 17.18 % 29.80 % 15.80 % 24.15 %
G3 10.95 % 13.50 % 14.56 % 12.36 %
G4 62.14 % 51.73 % 55.39 % 53.25 %
G5 70.00 % 86.83 % 92.23 % 94.12 %
G6 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
G7 99.04 % 98.91 % 95.75 % 99.13 %
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Random offset observations
We see that G6 performs very poorly on these tests. We need a finer mesh to see
the effects of G6 in the filter. Also, G1 performs generally better as the filter precision
increases and, as the previous tables suggest, it should stay at roughly 90%. We see that
G5 and G7 perform very well. G8 performs well most of the time, except in the worst case
the percentage was quite low in the p = 1/5 column. No protocols with bias ε < 0.7499
were found, with only SDPB0 needed to be solved of the four SDPs. This supports the
conjecture that ε = 1/4 is the smallest attainable bias for BCCF-protocols.
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Chapter 4
A protocol and lower bounds for
quantum oblivious transfer
The content of this chapter is based on my work with André Chailloux and Iordanis Kereni-
dis in [CKS10].
In the last two chapters, we have been examining coin-flipping protocols based on bit-
commitment. As we have seen, bit-commitment and coin-flipping are very closely related
primitives. It turns out that some of the knowledge about bit-commitment can be applied
to oblivious transfer as discussed in this chapter. This chapter is organized as follows.
• Section 4.1: We show a two-message protocol for oblivious transfer which has bias
εOT = 1/4. This protocol is similar to the bit-commitment protocol in [KN04] (which
was used for strong coin-flipping). We notice that this maintains the same bias as
the bit-commitment protocol, however this is a coincidence since there is no known
way to reduce bit-commitment to oblivious transfer in a way that preserves the bias.
• Section 4.2: We study a reduction from oblivious transfer to bit-commitment and
show how the cheating probabilities are related to each other. We then present
a Learning-In-Sequence Lemma which roughly states: If there are is a projective
measurement to learn the value of x0 with probability p from an encoding ρx0,x1 and
another projective measurement to learn the value of x1 with probability q, then
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there is a measurement to learn both x0 and x1 with probability a(2a − 1)2, where
a := p+q
2
. Using this lemma and lower bounds for bit-commitment [CK11], we obtain
the lower bound on the bias εOT ≥ 0.0852 for any oblivious transfer protocol.
• Section 4.3: We prove the Learning-In-Sequence Lemma.
• Section 4.4: We conclude with studying forcing oblivious transfer which is a variant
of oblivious transfer and a generalization of coin-flipping. Using SDP formulations of
cheating strategies, we prove optimal lower bounds on the bias. This analysis illus-
trates the variety of security notions in quantum cryptography and relates oblivious
transfer with the analysis in earlier parts of the thesis.
4.1 An oblivious transfer protocol with bias 1/4
The protocol starts with the same starting states as the bit-commitment protocol in [KN04].
This helps Bob conceal the value of b from Alice. In addition, both these states have the
property that under the action of changing a local phase, the image and preimage become
orthogonal. We use this property to encode Alice’s message into a local phase. The protocol
is given below.
Protocol 4.1.1 (An OT protocol with bias 1/4).








where A = B = {0, 1, 2}.
(ii) Alice randomly chooses x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1} and applies the following unitary Ux0,x1 to CA:
|0〉 → (−1)x0|0〉, |1〉 → (−1)x1|1〉, |2〉 → |2〉.







(iv) Bob performs the measurement {Π0 := |φb〉〈φb|, Π1 := I− Π0} on the state.
(v) If the outcome is “ 0” then xb = 0. If the outcome is “ 1” then xb = 1.




|11〉 in the first message, then he can
learn x0 ⊕ x1 perfectly (although he does not learn either x0 or x1). Thus, this protocol is
not secure if we want to stop Bob from learning x0 ⊕ x1.
We now show that it is impossible for Bob to perfectly learn both x0 and x1 and also
that his bit is not completely revealed to a cheating Alice.
Theorem 4.1.2. In the protocol described above, we have P ∗A,OT = P
∗
B,OT = 3/4.
Proof. We analyze the cheating probabilities of Alice and Bob.
Cheating Alice: Let σb := TrB|φb〉〈φb| denote the reduced states Alice may receive
in the first message. An optimal strategy for Alice to learn b is to perform the optimal










Alice’s optimal measurement is, in fact, a measurement in the computational basis. If she
gets outcome “0” or “1” then she knows b with certainty. If she gets outcome “2” then she
randomly guesses. Note that Bob never aborts.
Cheating Bob: Bob wants to learn both bits (x0, x1). We now describe a general strat-
egy for Bob:
• Bob creates |ψ〉 :=
∑
i∈A αi|i〉A|ξi〉B′ ∈ CA×B
′
, where CB′ is a space used by Bob to
cheat. He sends the CA part to Alice. The |ξi〉 states need not be orthogonal but∑
i∈A |αi|2 = 1.





where x2 := 0.
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At the end of the protocol, Bob applies a four-outcome measurement on |ψx0,x1〉 to obtain
his guess for (x0, x1).
From this strategy, we create another strategy with the same cheating probability where
Bob sends a pure state. We define this strategy as follows:
• Bob creates |ψ′〉 :=
∑
i∈A αi|i〉A ∈ CA and sends the whole state to Alice.




αi(−1)xi |i〉 ∈ CA.
• Bob applies the unitary U : |i〉|0〉 → |i〉|ξi〉 to |ψ′x0,x1〉|0〉 and obtains |ψx0,x1〉.
To determine (x0, x1), Bob applies the same measurement as in the original strategy.
Clearly both strategies have the same success probability. When Bob uses the second
strategy, Alice and Bob are unentangled after the first message and Alice sends back a
qutrit to Bob. Since Bob has an encoding of two randomly chosen bits in a qutrit state,
we have
Pr[Bob correctly guesses (x0, x1)] ≤ 3/4
from information bounds (see [Nay99]).
Note that there is a strategy for Bob to learn both bits (x0, x1) with probability 3/4.
















Then, Bob performs a projective measurement in the four-dimensional basis


























Note that Alice never aborts.
4.2 A lower bound on any oblivious transfer protocol
In this section, we prove that the bias of any OT protocol is bounded below by a con-
stant. We start from an OT protocol and show how to construct a bit-commitment
protocol. Then, we prove a relationship between the cheating probabilities of the bit-
commitment protocol and those for OT. Lastly, we use the lower bound for quantum
bit-commitment [CK11] (reproduced as Proposition 4.2.4) to derive a lower bound on the
bias of any OT protocol.
We create a bit-commitment protocol from an OT protocol as follows.
Protocol 4.2.1 (Bit-commitment protocol via OT).
(i) Commit phase: We invert the roles of Alice and Bob so that Bob is the one who
commits. He wants to commit to a bit a. Alice and Bob perform the OT protocol
such that Alice has (x0, x1) and Bob has (b, xb). Bob sends c := a⊕ b to Alice.
(ii) Reveal phase: Bob reveals (b, xb) to Alice. If (b, xb) from Bob is consistent with Alice’s
bits, then Alice accepts c⊕ b = a. Otherwise, Alice aborts.
Note that the OT outputs could be generated from within the OT protocol for this
construction and the following arguments to work.
We now analyze how much Alice and Bob can cheat in the bit-commitment protocol
and compare these quantities to those of OT. Our goal is to show the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2.2. For the protocol above, we have




B,OT ≥ f(P ∗B,BC) where f(x) = x(2x− 1)2.
Proof. Let ¬⊥BCA (resp. ¬⊥BCB ) denote the event “Alice (resp. Bob) does not abort during
the entire bit-commitment protocol.” Let ¬⊥OTA (resp. ¬⊥OTB ) denote the event “Alice
(resp. Bob) does not abort during the OT subroutine.”
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Cheating Alice: Since Alice knows c := a ⊕ b, the probability of Alice guessing a in
the bit-commitment protocol is the same as the probability of her guessing b in the OT
protocol. Therefore P ∗A,OT = P
∗
A,BC.
Cheating Bob: By definition, we have
P ∗B,OT = sup{Pr[(Bob guesses (x0, x1)) ∧ ¬⊥OTA ]}
= sup{Pr[¬⊥OTA ] · Pr[(Bob guesses (x0, x1))|¬⊥OTA ]},
where the suprema are taken over all strategies for Bob. If Bob wants to reveal 0 in the
bit-commitment protocol (a similar argument works if he wants to reveal 1), then first,
Alice must not abort in the OT protocol and second, Bob must send b = c as well as the
correct xc such that Alice does not abort in the last round of the bit-commitment protocol.
This is equivalent to saying that Bob succeeds if he guesses xc and Alice does not abort in
the OT protocol. Since Bob randomly chooses which bit he wants to reveal, we can write





Pr[(Bob guesses x0) ∧ ¬⊥OTA ] +
1
2







Pr[(Bob guesses x0)|¬⊥OTA ] +
1
2
Pr[(Bob guesses x1)|¬⊥OTA ]
)}
.
Notice that we use “max” instead of “sup” above. This is because an optimal strategy
exists for every bit-commitment protocol. To see this, we can construct a coin-flipping
protocol from any bit-commitment protocol and an optimal strategy always exists for a
coin-flipping protocol. This is a consequence of strong duality in the semidefinite pro-
gramming formulation of coin-flipping cheating strategies, see the SDPs and their duals in
Subsection 1.4.6.
Let us now fix Bob’s optimal cheating strategy in the bit-commitment protocol. For
this strategy, let




We use the following lemma to relate P ∗B,BC and P
∗
B,OT which we prove in Subsec-
tion 4.3.1.
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Lemma 4.2.3 (Learning-In-Sequence Lemma). Let p, q ∈ [1/2, 1] and suppose Alice and
Bob share a joint pure state. Suppose Alice performs on her space a projective measurement
M = {Mx0,x1}x0,x1∈{0,1} to determine the value of (x0, x1). Suppose there is a projective
measurement P = {P0, P1} on Bob’s space that allows him to guess bit x0 with probability
p and a projective measurement Q = {Q0, Q1} on his space that allows him to guess bit
x1 with probability q. Then, there exists a measurement on Bob’s space that allows him to
guess (x0, x1) with probability at least a(2a− 1)2 where a = p+q2 .
Note that we can assume Alice determines x0 and x1 at the end of the OT protocol even
if she has inputs. She can instead input |+〉 states, run the protocol with the appropriate
controlled operations, then measure them at the end in the computational basis to obtain
random values for x0 and x1. However, the result applies to the case where the outputs
are generated from within the protocol as well.
We now construct a cheating strategy for Bob for the OT protocol: Run the optimal
bit-commitment strategy and look at Bob’s state after the commit phase conditioned on
Alice not aborting. Note that this event happens with nonzero probability in the optimal
bit-commitment strategy since otherwise the success probability would be 0. The optimal
bit-commitment strategy gives measurements that allow Bob to guess x0 with probability p
and x1 with probability q. Bob uses these measurements and the procedure of Lemma 4.2.3
to guess (x0, x1). Let m be the probability he guesses (x0, x1) using this strategy. From
Lemma 4.2.3, we have that m ≥ a(2a− 1)2. By definition of P ∗B,OT and P ∗B,BC, we have:



















=⇒ P ∗B,OT ≥ P ∗B,BC
(
2P ∗B,BC − 1
)2
,
where the implication holds since P ∗B,BC ≥ 1/2.
We make use of the following lower bound for quantum bit-commitment.
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Proposition 4.2.4 ([CK11]). For any quantum bit-commitment protocol, there is a pa-

















Using Proposition 4.2.2 and the lower bound for quantum bit-commitment above, we
can show the following lower bound on oblivious transfer.
Theorem 4.2.5. In any quantum oblivious transfer protocol, at least one party can cheat
with probability 0.5852.




B,OT ≥ f(P ∗B,BC) (where
f(x) = x(2x − 1)2). From the bit-commitment lower bound, we know there exists a





















noting that we have reversed the roles of Alice and Bob in the bit-commitment protocol.
From Proposition 4.2.4, we know there exists a parameter t ∈ [0, 1] such that
















since f is nondecreasing on the interval [1/2, 1]. We get a lower bound on the maximum
of P ∗A,OT and P
∗
B,OT by equating the lower bounds above and solving for t ≈ 0.1705 (t is
a solution of a degree six polynomial). At this value of t, we have P ∗A,OT, P
∗
B,OT ≈ 0.5852,
yielding the desired bound.
4.3 Proof of the Learning-In-Sequence Lemma
In this section, we prove the Learning-In-Sequence Lemma which is reproduced below.
Lemma 4.3.1 (Learning-In-Sequence Lemma). Let p, q ∈ [1/2, 1] and suppose Alice
and Bob share a joint pure state. Suppose Alice performs on her space a projective mea-
surement M = {Mx0,x1}x0,x1∈{0,1}to determine the values of (x0, x1). Suppose there is a
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projective measurement P = {P0, P1} on Bob’s space that allows him to guess bit x0 with
probability p and a projective measurement Q = {Q0, Q1} on his space that allows him
to guess bit x1 with probability q. Then, there exists a measurement on Bob’s space that
allows him to guess (x0, x1) with probability at least a(2a− 1)2 where a = p+q2 .
Before giving a proof, we start with a few technical lemmas.
Lemma 4.3.2. Let |X〉 be a pure state, Q a projection, and |Y 〉 a pure state such that
Q|Y 〉 = |Y 〉. Then we have
‖Q|X〉‖22 ≥ |〈X|Y 〉|2.
Proof. Using Cauchy-Schwarz, we have






Lemma 4.3.3. Suppose θ, θ′ ∈ [0, π/4]. If |〈ψ|φ〉| ≥ cos(θ) and |〈φ|ξ〉| ≥ cos(θ′), then
|〈ψ|ξ〉| ≥ cos(θ + θ′).
Proof. Define the angle between two pure states |ψ〉 and |φ〉 as A(ψ, φ) := arccos |〈ψ|φ〉|.
This is a metric (see [NC00] page 413). Thus, we have
arccos |〈ψ|ξ〉| = A(ψ, ξ) ≤ A(ψ, φ) + A(φ, ξ) = arccos |〈ψ|φ〉|+ arccos |〈φ|ξ〉| ≤ θ + θ′.
Taking the cosine of both sides yields the result.
Lemma 4.3.4. Let θ, θ′ ∈ [0, π/4]. Then
cos(θ + θ′) ≥ cos2(θ) + cos2(θ′)− 1.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that θ ≥ θ′. Consider the function
f(θ) = cos(θ + θ′)− cos2(θ) + sin2(θ′)
for fixed θ′. Taking its derivative, we get
f ′(θ) = − sin(θ + θ′) + sin(2θ)
which is nonnegative for θ ∈ [θ′, π/4]. Since f(θ′) = 0, we conclude that f(θ) ≥ 0 for
θ ∈ [θ′, π/4], which gives the desired result.
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We combine these lemmas to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.5. Let |ψ〉 be a pure state and let {C, I−C} and {D, I−D} be two projective
measurements such that
cos(θ) := ‖C|ψ〉‖2 ≥
1√
2






2(θ) cos2(θ + θ′).
Proof. Define the following states
|X〉 := C|ψ〉
‖C|ψ〉‖2
, |X ′〉 := (I − C)|ψ〉
‖(I − C)|ψ〉‖2
, |Y 〉 := D|ψ〉
‖D|ψ〉‖2
, |Y ′〉 := (I −D)|ψ〉
‖(I −D)|ψ〉‖2
,
which are well-defined (otherwise, if any of the denominators are 0, then the result holds
trivially). We can write




≥ cos2(θ)|〈Y |X〉|2 using Lemma 4.3.2
≥ cos2(θ) cos2(θ + θ′) using Lemma 4.3.3,
as desired.
We now prove Lemma 4.3.1.
Proof. Let |Ω〉 ∈ CA×B be the joint pure state shared by Alice and Bob, where CA is the
space controlled by Alice and CB is the space controlled by Bob.
Let M = {Mx0,x1}x0,x1∈{0,1} be Alice’s projective measurement on CA to determine her
bits x0, x1. Let P = {P0, P1} be Bob’s projective measurement that allows him to guess
x0 with probability p = cos
2(θ) and Q = {Q0, Q1} be Bob’s projective measurement that
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allows him to guess x1 with probability q = cos
2(θ′). These measurements are on CB only.













C (resp. D) is the projection on the subspace where Bob guesses correctly the first bit
(resp. the second bit) after applying P (resp. Q).
A strategy for Bob to learn both bits is simple: Apply the two measurements P and Q
one after the other, where the first one is chosen uniformly at random. The measurement




Mx0,x1 ⊗Qx1Px0 = DC.
Similarly, the measurement operator on the subspace where Bob guesses (x0, x1) when




Mx0,x1 ⊗ Px0Qx1 = CD.



























Note that we can use Lemma 4.3.5 since Bob’s optimal measurements to guess x0 and x1
each succeed with probability at least 1/2.
4.4 Forcing oblivious transfer
Here we discuss a variant of oblivious transfer which is a generalization of coin-flipping. Like
coin-flipping, it can be analyzed using Kitaev’s semidefinite programming formulation of
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cheating strategies. Although this primitive is not as interesting as the standard definition
of OT from a cryptographic standpoint, it helps illustrate the different security notions in
quantum cryptography. In addition, it shows how OT can be analyzed using the techniques
from earlier chapters.
We reproduce the definition of forcing oblivious transfer below.
Definition 4.4.1 (Forcing oblivious transfer (Forcing-OT)). A k-out-of-n forcing obliv-
ious transfer protocol, denoted as Forcing-OT(n,k), with forcing bias εFOT, is a protocol
satisfying:
• Alice and Bob start uncorrelated,
• Alice and Bob have no inputs,
• Alice outputs n random bits x := (x1, . . . , xn),
• Bob outputs a random k-index set b and bit string xb consisting of xi for i ∈ b,











• εFOT = max{εA, εB},
where the suprema are taken over all cheating strategies of the party indicated.
Note that we are interested in how much each party can force a desired output, as
in coin-flipping. In the language of Forcing-OT, strong coin-flipping is a Forcing-OT(1,1)
protocol. This is in contrast to the standard definition of oblivious transfer studied in the
first part of this chapter, where the goal was to learn inputs.
4.4.1 Extending Kitaev’s lower bound for strong coin-flipping
We now extend Kitaev’s formalism from the setting of coin-flipping to the more general
setting of Forcing-OT(n,k). Very little modifications are needed to the coin-flipping setting
described in Subsection 1.4.6, we can still use the setting for the spaces and unitaries.
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However, we need different projections since the outputs of the protocol are different in
the case of Forcing-OT. We can suppose Alice has projections
{ΠA,abort} ∪ {ΠA,x : x ∈ Zn2} ⊂ ΣA+
and Bob has the projections
{ΠB,abort} ∪
{





If we let |ψ〉 ∈ CA×M×B be the state at the end of the protocol when Alice and Bob are
honest, the requirements of a Forcing-OT(n,k) protocol are satisfied when






for all consistent (x, b, xb).
Similar to coin-flipping, we can capture cheating strategies as semidefinite programs.
Bob can force honest Alice to output a specific x ∈ Zn2 with maximum probability equal
to the optimal value of the following semidefinite program
P ∗B,x = max 〈ΠA,x, ρA,n〉
subject to ρA,0 = |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|,
ρA,i = ρA,i−1, for all i even,







, for all i odd,
ρA,i ∈ ΣA+, for all i,
ρ̃A,i ∈ ΣA×M+ , for all i even.
Similarly, Alice can force honest Bob to output a specific (b, xb) with maximum probability
equal to the optimal value of the following semidefinite program
P ∗A,(b,xb) = max 〈ΠB,(b,xb), ρB,n〉
subject to ρB,0 = |ψB,0〉〈ψB,0|,
ρB,i = ρB,i−1, for all i odd,







, for all i even,
ρB,i ∈ ΣB+, for all i,
ρ̃B,i ∈ ΣM×B+ , for all i odd.
Using Kitaev’s proof for coin-flipping, we get the following theorem.
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In particular, the forcing bias satisfies εFOT ≥ 2k/2.
The only difference in the proof is that the honest outcome probabilities are different.
From the last line of Kitaev’s proof, we get








4.4.2 A protocol with optimal forcing bias
First, consider the following protocol which achieves the bound in Theorem 4.4.2 but is
asymmetric. Alice sends n random bits to Bob who then outputs b, a random k-index subset
of n indices, and xb. In this protocol, Bob can force a desired outcome with probability
1
2n
and Alice can force a desired outcome with probability 1
(nk)
. Thus, the product of the
cheating probabilities is optimal, that is it achieves the lower bound in Theorem 4.4.2,
however the protocol is asymmetric. This can be easily remedied using coin-flipping. We
present an optimal protocol below.
Protocol 4.4.3 (An optimal Forcing-OT(n,k) protocol with forcing bias 2
k/2).
(i) Bob randomly chooses a k-index set b and sends b to Alice.
(ii) Alice and Bob generate each bit in xb using a strong coin-flipping protocol where
neither party can force the outcome with probability greater than 1√
2
+ δ, for some
small constant δ > 0.
(iii) Alice randomly chooses her bits not in b.













The bias satisfies εFOT ≤ 2k/2(1 + γ).








. This sets an upper bound on the probability of forcing a k bit string
using k coin-flipping protocols each with a maximum cheating probability of 1√
2
+ δ. We
now analyze each party cheating. Alice has no control over the index set but she can try








































For the special case of Forcing-OT(1,2), we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.4.5 (Optimal Forcing-OT(1,2)). For any γ > 0, there exists a protocol for
Forcing-OT(1,2) where each party has honest outcome probabilities of 1/4 and neither party
can cheat with probability greater than 1√
8
+ γ ≈ 0.3535 + γ.
We remark that this protocol is completely classical with the exception of the quantum
coin-flipping subroutines. This is similar to the optimal strong coin-flipping protocol in




In this thesis, we analyzed two primitives using convex optimization techniques. In Chap-
ters 2 and 3, we studied a family of coin-flipping protocols which are based on quantum
bit-commitment and Chapter 4 involved the analysis of oblivious transfer using ideas from
bit-commitment and coin-flipping. Below, we summarize the ideas and concepts used in
this thesis and some open questions that arise.
Coin-flipping
We studied the security of quantum (and classical) coin-flipping protocols based on
bit-commitment utilizing SDP formulations of cheating strategies. These SDPs allowed us
to use concepts from convex optimization to further our understanding of the security of
such protocols. In particular, using a reduction of the SDPs and duality theory, we were
able to develop a family of point games corresponding to the protocols.
We constructed the classical counterpart to the quantum protocols and showed how the
analysis is very similar to the quantum version due to the similarities between the cheating
strategy formulations. Figure 5.1 (on the next page) summarizes the connections between
the classical and quantum protocols. Using these connections, we were able to show that
a bias of ε = 1/
√
2 − 1/2 is impossible for BCCF-protocols using a modified version of
Kitaev’s lower bound.
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Figure 5.1: Classical/quantum BCCF-protocol relationship.
Finding optimal cheating strategies for protocols with multiple rounds of communica-
tion turns out to be a very difficult problem. To further our understanding of the structure
of optimal protocols, we designed a search algorithm that seeks protocols with small bias.
Using cheating strategies that arise from studying the cheating SDPs, we designed a proto-
col filter to eliminate protocols with high bias from the search. Using the protocol filter and
other heuristics, we checked 1016 protocols for optimality, a task that would take millions
of years without using the optimization techniques developed in this thesis. We conclude
with the conjecture that the smallest attainable bias for BCCF-protocols is ε = 1/4.
Coin-flipping open questions
An open problem is to find the optimal cheating strategies for a general n-round BCCF-
protocol. This can be accomplished by finding closed-form optimal solutions to the cheating
SDPs or the reduced cheating SDPs. Very few highly interactive protocols, such as BCCF-
protocols, have descriptions of optimal cheating strategies and therefore having such for
this family of protocols would be very interesting.
A related open problem is to find an explicit construction of optimal protocols for weak
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coin-flipping, strong coin-flipping, or bit-commitment. We can accomplish all three of these
tasks by finding a construction of optimal weak coin-flipping protocols, so this would be
very rewarding. Technically, such a construction is implicit in [Moc07], however it involves
many reductions and is quite complicated. As for strong coin-flipping, it seems that we
may need to look further than BCCF-protocols to find a way to construct an optimal
protocol.
Oblivious transfer
We described a new protocol for oblivious transfer such that Alice can learn Bob’s index
with maximum probability 3/4 and Bob can learn Alice’s input with maximum probability
3/4. As for lower bounds, we use a construction of bit-commitment from oblivious transfer
and related the corresponding cheating strategies. We then exhibited a cheating strategy
for Bob using a Learning-In-Sequence Lemma which is a way for Bob to sequentially learn
Alice’s two input bits. Using this strategy and known bounds for bit-commitment, we
derived a lower bound on the bias of any oblivious transfer protocol.
To relate oblivious transfer to the analysis of Chapters 2 and 3, we studied a “forc-
ing” variant of oblivious transfer. This primitive allows for SDP formulations of cheating
strategies in the same way as coin-flipping. As in the case of coin-flipping, these SDPs led
to optimal lower bounds for the bias.
Oblivious transfer open questions
An open problem is to formulate cheating strategies for oblivious transfer as semidefinite
programs in a way that gives a nontrivial lower bound on the bias. The difficulty is that
in oblivious transfer, the cheating goal is to learn the other party’s input (as opposed to
the goal in coin-flipping which is to force an outcome). This subtle difference makes the
task much more challenging. If it were possible, it would be interesting to see if a point
game analog can be made for oblivious transfer.
Solving for the optimal bias of oblivious transfer protocols is still an open problem.
The lower bound we obtained for the bias originally relied on Kitaev’s bound for strong
coin-flipping, but then we used the stronger bound for bit-commitment to get a better
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result. Perhaps it is possible to find a different reduction between oblivious transfer and
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